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ABSTRACT
SOMEONE ELSE’S WAR: KOREA AND THE POST-1945 U.S. RACIAL ORDER
A. Yumi Lee
David L. Eng
Josephine Park

The Korean War (1950-1953) marked a major turning point in matters of race in the
United States. One the one hand, the desegregation of the U.S. armed forces during the
war inaugurated state-mandated institutional racial integration as a putative path to full
and equal citizenship for racial minorities, particularly for African American soldiers and
their families. On the other, the lifting of racially exclusive immigration laws signaled
changing conceptions of who could become an American citizen at all, paving the way
for the mass migration of Asian immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century.
The dissertation reads the Korean War as the event that set these twin processes of
integration and immigration in motion—processes that transformed the racial order in the
post-45 period in the United States. It examines recent and contemporary works of
literature by American writers of color, including novels by Ha Jin, Rolando Hinojosa,
Chang-Rae Lee, and Toni Morrison, in order to work through the profound but often
unthought effects of the Korean War for minority subjects in U.S. culture. Through these
readings, the dissertation argues that the Korean War heralded a new mode of liberal
inclusion for racial minorities in the United States.
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Introduction

Early in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered, Hector, the former American GI,
thinks back on his participation in the Korean War three decades earlier. Growing up in a
working-class white neighborhood, he had been eager, but too young, to enlist in the
army after the Pearl Harbor attacks; when war broke out in Korea five years later, he
jumped at the chance to leave home and go fight on the other side of the world. But once
he was in Korea and forced to both witness and commit atrocities against not just enemy
soldiers but civilians and refugees, his enthusiasm waned. Before these incidents,
he had been a willing enough soldier in their war. Or maybe not their war exactly,
but Mao’s war, or Truman’s, or someone else’s; it was a war that from the
beginning had been nobody’s cross, inciting only mild attacks of patriotism and
protest, jingoism and pacifism, a war both too cold and too hot and that managed
to erase fifty thousand of his kind and over a million of theirs. (99)
For Hector, the stakes of this war, unlike World War II, are unclear, even though he
risked his life to fight it. Was it a war being fought on behalf of the Koreans – “their
war,” “their kind” – whose land and way of life hung in the balance? If so, the very
division between North and South that had caused the war would seem to negate the
distinction he was drawing between “his kind” and “theirs”: after all, “their kind” was
irrevocably split across new national and ideological borders, and “his kind” in turn was
far from homogenous itself. Or was the Korean conflict being used as a pretext for the
1

Cold War superpowers – Mao, Stalin, Truman – to prove the superiority of their lands
and their ways of life to the rest of the world? If so, then the consequences of the war
would determine more than just the fate of Korean peninsula; indeed, the war’s results
might threaten the continued existence of the planet altogether. And if none of these
options was quite right, then whose war was it? How could it be everyone’s war and
nobody’s war at the same time?
For a white American soldier like Hector, the Korean War also became “someone
else’s war” in another sense: one of the effects of the war was to newly integrate
populations and communities of color into the mainstream of American society. Because
the Korean War was the first war to be fought by formally desegregated U.S. troops,
Korea became the site of an unprecedented experiment in racial integration an ocean
away from, and several years before, the Supreme Court ruling that would declare
segregation unconstitutional stateside in 1954. During the Korean War, in other words,
among the fifty thousand of “our kind” who were killed in the war were soldiers of color
who had been invited to participate in the war on a purportedly equal basis for the first
time. At the same time, the Korean War was a war that sorted “their kind” into enemies
and friends and facilitated the eventual transformation of the latter into potential
American citizens. Before the war, Koreans, along with other Asians, were largely denied
legal entry into the United States; afterwards, first through special dispensations for
refugees, war brides, and adoptees and later through wider reforms, immigration policies
were liberalized, allowing for mass migrations. Thus, to use the language of Lee’s novel,
over time, as a direct consequence of the war, “their kind” was increasingly becoming
Hector’s kind as well.
2

Someone Else’s War: Korea and the Postwar U.S. Racial Order argues that the
Korean War heralded a new mode of liberal inclusion for racial minorities in the United
States. In this dissertation, I examine how, on the one hand, the desegregation of the U.S.
armed forces during the war inaugurated state-mandated institutional racial integration as
a putative path to full and equal citizenship for racial minorities, particularly for African
American soldiers and their families. At the same time, I trace how the lifting of racially
exclusive immigration laws signaled changing conceptions of who could become an
American citizen at all. My dissertation thus reads the Korean War as the event that set
these twin processes of integration and immigration in motion—processes that
transformed the racial order in the post-45 period in the United States.
The 1950s are widely viewed in American studies as a period of global and
domestic racial struggle and progress, exemplified in contentious processes of
decolonization overseas and desegregation at home. The post-World War II years were a
period not only of U.S. ascendancy in the Cold War contest to establish a new world
order, but also of newly articulating racial formations both within and beyond U.S.
borders. Historians of the global Cold War have shown how U.S. efforts to integrate
newly decolonized nations into the U.S.-led sphere of liberal capitalist democracy in the
Cold War took the form of developmental programs, diplomatic missions, and cultural
initiatives as well as covert action and outright war across the emerging Third World. 1 At
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For an overview of the Cold War as a conflict between competing modernities, see Odd Arne Westad’s
The Global Cold War. For discussions of the U.S. deployment of cultural propaganda during the Cold War,
see Penny Von Eschen’s Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War and Serge
Guilbaut’s How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art. For analyses of developmental discourse in the
global Cold War, see David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction
of an American World Order and Maria Josefina Saldaña-Portillo’s The Revolutionary Imagination in the
Americas and the Age of Development.
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the same time, scholars of race in the U.S. in this period have highlighted the domestic
turn toward formal equality for people of color, arguing that the state’s new investment in
racial liberalism was also tied to the U.S. bid for ascendancy in the Cold War.2 The
Korean War, at once a local civil war for national unification, a regional war over the
political fate of East Asia, and the first hot war of the global Cold War, brought together
a number of apparently remote racialized struggles in this turbulent period of geopolitical
reordering. However, the place of the Korean War within the U.S. Cold War racial order
has been largely subsumed under a bipolar framework of superpower competition and
overlooked in the existing scholarship on race, U.S. ascendancy, and the Cold War.
In her groundbreaking work Cold War Civil Rights, for example, historian Mary
Dudziak argues that from the years immediately after World War II until the mid-1960s,
the story of race in America “was thought to have a critical impact of U.S. prestige
abroad” (250). To claim the position of leader of the free world in the context of the Cold
War conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States would need to address and manage
the domestic racial conflicts that contradicted its desired image as a democratic nation. In
this way, she shows that as the U.S. government “tried to project a story of progress”
abroad, Cold War concerns created an urgent “imperative for change” and facilitated key
civil rights reforms, including desegregation, at home (250). More recently, Jodi
Melamed has situated the “liberal antiracisms” adopted by the U.S. state after World War
II as part of a larger geopolitical reordering (9). She argues that the period after World
War II saw the “inauguration of a formally antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity under
2

See especially Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy,
Thomas Borstelmann’s The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena,
and Nikhil Pal Singh’s Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy.
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the management of U.S. global ascendancy” that ousted the dominant formation of
“white supremacist modernity” that had governed race prior to that moment (8). With
regard to Asia in particular, Christina Klein argues that U.S. expansion after World War
II demanded “an ideology of global interdependence rather than one of racial difference,”
leading to a formation she names “Cold War Orientalism” (16). Klein ties this logic of
affiliation rather than just difference or domination to Asia’s newfound importance to the
United States’ ambitions for global ascendancy.
Each of these scholars describes a transformation in the domestic management of
race linked to the ascendancy of the United States as a global superpower in the years
after the Second World War. Yet the Korean War, America’s first “hot war” of the Cold
War, factors into these analyses minimally, if at all. We might attribute this silence to the
Korean War’s status as the so-called “forgotten war,” or to a tendency to define the Cold
War primarily in terms of ideological and diplomatic superpower conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union rather than through its “proxy” wars across the Third
World.3 This dissertation provides a critical counterpart, and corrective, to this important
existing scholarship by bringing a necessary focus on the Korean War to the scholarly
conversation on race and the Cold War. If Cold War Civil Rights works by way of
“setting an American story within an international context” – Dudziak points out that “An
international framework helps us discover what happened at home” (253) – then my
project asks: what happens when we set the international story of the Korean War within

3

For an analysis of the Korean War as the “forgotten war,” see the work of Bruce Cumings, especially
Origins of the Korean War, Volume II, in which he notes, “The Korean War is called ‘the forgotten war’ in
America, because it is forgotten…By calling the Korean conflict a ‘forgotten war,’ we both name it, and we
remember it—a paradox: what is it that we are remembering to forget?” (767).
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an American context? How do the transnational militarized zones of Korea come to shape
racial formations in the U.S. domestic context? Seeking to redress understandings of the
Korean War as a peripheral skirmish with little bearing outside of its immediate context, I
show how the Cold War American project of remapping the Korean peninsula both
typifies and complicates a Cold War American project of resignifying race domestically
and globally.
To address these questions, I turn to a site where the legacy of the Korean War for
people of color in the United States is being actively confronted, contested, and rewritten:
contemporary fiction. My approach to the literary archive of this project is inspired by
recent scholarship in Asian Studies that has called for a collective critical reengagement
with the lingering effects of the Cold War. In 2010’s The Other Cold War, Heonik Kwon
names this process the “decomposition of the cold war.” For Kwon, an anthropologist,
the conventional view of the cold war presents an “image of the global that encompasses
local social process,” rather than one that is “revealed and made through the local” (10).
This privileging of the global has taken a certain picture of the Cold War to be central
(the idea of the Cold War as a “long peace” in the “West,” for example) and
peripheralized others (the Cold War as endless violence and war in the “East” and global
South) in ways that map onto longer histories of colonialism, imperialism, and
Eurocentrism. Kwon argues that a rethinking of the conceptual relationship between what
is taken to be central and peripheral, between the “global dynamic” and “local
processes,” will help us put into practice this decomposition of the cold war, which for
him involves two shifts of perspective regarding cold war history: first, a shift from
geopolitical to social history, and second, a shift “from the exemplary central positioning
6

of the cold war as imaginary or metaphoric war to a comparative positioning that
privileges neither this peculiar history of war without warfare nor the peripheral
unbridled reality of state terror and civil war” (9). This latter shift does not entail a simple
“de-centering” of Europe or the “West,” but rather requires a “comparative positioning”
of multiple local sites across different spaces, especially spaces actively contending with
the consequences of the Cold War (9). It is for this reason that he sees the
“decomposition of the cold war” as a “participatory, ethnographic question”: he proposes
that the question of the end of the Cold War is “fundamentally an anthropological
problem,” and as such, his book takes up an anthropological investigation of local
practices and rituals linked to the traumas of the Cold War in Asia and their lived effects
in the present (8).
For Kuan-Hsing Chen, the ongoing effects of the Cold War in Asia have “become
embedded in local history” and “been inscribed into our national, family, and personal
histories” (118). As he puts it in 2010’s Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, “the
cold war is still alive within us,” as “the subjectivities formed during the cold war remain
within us” (119). As such, he argues that we must “undertake the critical work of
confronting the ongoing problematic of the cold war,” a task he somewhat inelegantly
names “de-cold war.” To “de-cold war,” he states, “does not mean simply to rid ourselves
of a cold-war consciousness or to try to forget that period in history”; rather, it means “to
mark out a space in which unspoken stories and histories may be told, and to recognize
and map the historically constituted cultural and political effects of the cold war” (120).
“De-cold war”-ing, for Chen, goes hand in hand with the also-essential twin processes of
decolonization and what he calls deimperialization, respectively the “attempt of the
7

previously colonized to reflectively work out a historical relation with the former
colonizer, culturally, politically, and economically” and the former colonizer’s need to
“examine the conduct, motives, desires, and consequences of the imperialist history that
has formed its own subjectivity” (3-4). He argues that because the processes of
decolonization and deimperialization were interrupted in Asia by the formation of the
Cold War geopolitical structure, decolonization can only truly take place once we choose
to actively grapple with the effects of the Cold War. This claim recalls Chungmoo Choi’s
argument that after the defeat of Japan ended its colonial rule in Korea, South Korea
experienced a “deferred postcoloniality,” as liberation from Japan gave immediate way to
the U.S. neocolonial occupation and domination of South Korea. Both Choi and Chen
look to cultural studies to take on the work of decolonizing, de-imperializing, and “decold war”-ing, offering analyses of social movements and popular memory that speak to
the embeddedness of the Cold War formations in daily lives and relationships.
This dissertation looks to recent and contemporary works of literature by
American writers of color in order to work through the profound but often unthought
effects of the Cold War for minority subjects in U.S. culture. Whereas Kwon looks to
anthropological inquiry to enact the decomposition of the cold war and Chen to cultural
studies, I look to literature as a sphere in which the unspoken stories and histories of the
Korean War have been brought to light with increasing urgency in recent years.4 And
whereas both Kwon and Chen focus their analysis on sites in Asia, where the often
4

The novels I read in this dissertation represent selections from a wave of recent American literary works
that have marked a renewed popular interest in the place of the Korean War in our cultural and historical
memory. See in addition to the works discussed in this dissertation Heinz Insu Fenkl’s Memories of my
Ghost Brother (1996), Susan Choi’s The Foreign Student (2004), Philip Roth’s Indignation (2008), Jayne
Anne Philips’ Lark and Termite (2009), Robert Olmstead’s The Coldest Night (2010), and Paul Yoon’s
Once the Shore (2009) and Snow Hunters (2013) among many others.
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painfully felt effects of the Cold War in everyday life are clear in mainstream culture, the
texts I turn to in this dissertation represent a renewed attempt by American writers to
excavate a story that has been largely discarded and willfully forgotten by the dominant
culture. Of particular importance for our reading of American narratives of the Korean
War, and of the Cold War in Asia generally, is an engagement with the difficult task of
deimperialization: if the Korean War marks the inauguration of the ongoing neocolonial
U.S. occupation of South Korea and the arrival of the U.S. as a global military
superpower, then reading narratives of the Korean War offers us the opportunity to
critically engage that history of occupation and empire-building, a task sorely needed in a
nation whose imperial projects and ambitions have continued unabated into the present.
At the same time, the voices of the Cold War subjects of color represented in these texts
articulate a vexed relationship to U.S. power: if the Korean War also marks the
inauguration of a new mode of liberal inclusion for racial minorities in the United States,
as I argue in this dissertation, then these texts offer an invaluable account of the complex
dynamic of belonging and distance under formation during the Korean War, from the
perspective of the present racial formation.
Each of the literary works that I read in this dissertation takes the Korean War as a
setting and a starting point for its main characters and traces the trajectories of these
characters over the following decades as they pass through institutions and structures of
racialization and citizenship. Indeed, each work concerns the question of the attainment
of full and equal citizenship by subjects of color who have been previously excluded
from that endeavor, whether as nonwhite Americans facing segregation and systematic
discrimination or as Asians legally barred from entering the United States. And in each
9

work, the story of the attainment of full and equal citizenship is predicated on a
character’s enlistment in the military and participation in the war as a soldier. Because
military service often operates as an index of national belonging, soldiering is a
particularly useful frame for thinking about race and citizenship. In his study of soldiers
and the management of racialized populations in the total war regimes of the U.S. and
Japan, for example, Takashi Fujitani observes that during World War II, soldiering was a
site in which “not only the soldiers themselves but also the racialized communities that
they represented passed most paradigmatically and dramatically from the outside to the
inside of the national community” (82). My readings of the literary works in this
dissertation are grounded in an analysis of the figure of the soldier. In attending to
questions of gender related to this figure, my project has also been informed by feminist
and queer critiques of U.S. militarism that not only oppose war, imperialism, and state
power, but question the political aims of assimilating marginalized communities into the
institution of the military.5 If the development of policies and practices of liberal
inclusion over the past sixty years has largely resulted in the absorption of minority
subjects into institutions of state power, then my analyses of the integration of the soldier
and his family during and after the Korean War are invested in envisioning the potential
radical alternatives to this outcome for the present and the future.
The first chapter of the dissertation, “Becoming Asian American: Repatriation
and the Communist Soldier in Ha Jin’s War Trash,” traces the workings of Cold War
5

For feminist critiques of U.S. militarism in Asia, see Cynthia Enloe’s The Morning After: Sexual Politics
at the End of the Cold War and Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International
Politics, Grace M. Cho’s Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War, and
Katharine Moon’s Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korean Relations. For queer critiques of
militarism and assimilationist attitudes toward the military, see statements by queer and queer of color
grassroots organizations including the Audre Lorde Project and FIERCE.
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ideological belief in Ha Jin’s War Trash (2004), a fictionalized account of an uprising in
a UN prison camp on South Korea’s Koje Island during the Korean War. If the Cold War
project in East Asia can be crudely thought of as dividing Asian territory – and Asian
subjects – into “good” (anticommunist) and “bad” (communist) categories, then this
chapter reads War Trash as a novel about the making of “good” Asian Americans in the
Korean War. Ha Jin’s narrator is unavoidably caught up in Cold War politics in the Koje
Island prison camp, but he himself never subscribes to any particular ideology. Rather,
the narrator sees himself above all as a pragmatic individual, and it is Ha Jin’s voicing of
the “universal human” through the narrator that critics have most lauded in the novel. But
my chapter argues that over the course of the novel, what is coded as “universal” or
“human” is firmly anchored to the liberal politics of the USA, the land of the free. I read
Ha Jin’s historical fiction against firsthand accounts of the Koje Island prison uprisings
and the legal documents that managed the uprisings. Following the narrator on his
journey from Chinese Communist soldier to prisoner of the UN Command in Korea to
repatriated victim of the Communist state to, finally, Asian American patriarch of a
multicultural family, this chapter explores the transformation of Asian subjects in the
Cold War from enemy aliens to potential U.S. citizens.
Where Ha Jin’s War Trash concerns the transformation of the foreign enemy into
the domestic ally, the subject of the next chapter concerns the assimilation of the
colonized subject into mainstream institutions of U.S. power. Chapter Two, “From the
Río Grande to the 38th Parallel: Genealogies of Empire in Rolando Hinojosa’s Klail City
Death Trip Series,” turns to the work of Chicano author and Korean War veteran
Rolando Hinojosa. In several fictional works written in a period from 1973 through 2006,
11

Hinojosa chronicles the Korean War from the perspective of the Mexican American GI in
Korea, an unlikely agent of U.S. national-imperial domination. This chapter reads the
stories of these characters in relation to the liberal narrative of civil rights as a story of
increased access, integration, and upward mobility for racial minorities, particularly
taking into account the role of military service and the GI Bill in this narrative. In
Hinojosa’s work, we find that this story of racial liberalism is also a story of continuing
colonial domination. Hinojosa’s work shows us how in the Korean War, the state enlisted
its former colonial subjects living in one historical border space – Mexican Americans in
Texas – to help impose a new colonial regime in a border war across the globe, offering
the promise of upward mobility to soldiers of color in return for their willingness to risk
their lives in allegiance to its goals. Engaging with scholarship in Chicano studies and
transnational American studies as well as theories of racial formation in the postwar
period, this chapter contends that to understand this complicated colonial and racial logic,
we must read the Korean War in a long genealogy of U.S. imperial border wars.
The dissertation’s second chapter argues that Hinojosa’s tales of the “Texas
Mexican” soldier present the potential benefits of joining the military and the upward
mobility it can afford to the soldier of color. In contrast, Chapter Three looks at a text that
depicts the trauma of desegregation, suggesting the extent to which the military’s move
toward inclusiveness itself enacts a different kind of violence upon its intended
beneficiaries. This chapter, “Going Color-Blind: The Black Soldier in Toni Morrison’s
Home,” assesses the place of the Korean War in constructing a Cold War paradigm of
color-blindness. The desegregation of the U.S. armed forces during the Korean War, the
first U.S. war fought by integrated units, marked the arrival of an era of legislating formal
12

equality for racial minorities under the legal doctrine of color-blindness. In this chapter,
examining color-blindness as a symptom of racial trauma in Home, I argue that the Cold
War paradigm of racial color-blindness cannot redress past violence, but rather functions
as a new system of racial harm. In this way, I show, opening up the process of resolving
wartime traumas for the characters in Home brings about the restoration of color to their
worlds.
The first three chapters of the dissertation assess the figure of the soldier of color
and the role he plays in the construction of a Cold War racial order from several
perspectives: the Communist enemy and his potential rehabilitation in Chapter One, the
colonized subject and his integration into dominant national formations in Chapter Two,
and the Black soldier and the traumas of color-blindness in Chapter Three. The final
chapter of the dissertation considers the fates of two figures linked to the presence of the
American GI in Korea: the war orphan and the war bride. Chapter Four, “‘June, from the
war’: Refugee Rescues in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered,” argues that wartime
institutions linked to the heteronormative family underpin patterns of Asian migration to
the U.S. in the second half of the twentieth century. In this chapter, I read Chang-Rae
Lee’s novel The Surrendered, which centers on the war orphan and the war bride, figures
who are granted entry to the United States through their adoption or marriage into the
newly multiracial American family before the 1965 immigration reform that would allow
for wider immigration from Asia. This chapter explores the dissonances between these
early gendered refugee figures and the Asian American immigrant community that
followed suit, examining how the violence of the Korean War became the condition of
possibility for historical and contemporary modes of Asian American citizenship.
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Chapter One

Becoming Asian American:
Repatriation and the Communist Soldier in Ha Jin’s War Trash

I. Introduction

Early in Ha Jin’s War Trash, the narrator, Yu Yuan, shares the story of an
incident that will scar him for the rest of his life. It is 1951, less than a year into the
Korean War, and Yu is one of twenty thousand Chinese and North Korean prisoners of
war incarcerated in a UN prison camp on Koje Island, South Korea. The camp has
organized itself into two fiercely divided factions: the pro-Nationalists have declared
their intent to reject repatriation to China and are agitating instead to be sent to “Free
China,” or Taiwan, while the Communists demand that they, and every Chinese prisoner,
be returned home to China as dictated by international law. Given the increasingly violent
tactics the leadership on each side uses to intimidate and coerce the prisoners, Yu faces a
difficulty: for reasons entirely unrelated to this political split, he desires to return to
mainland China, where his aging mother and beloved fiancée await his return. In the
upcoming individual “screenings” in which each prisoner will declare his intent to either
14

assent to or refuse repatriation before a panel of international observers, he plans to
choose to go back home. But after a night of drinking with the pro-Nationalists, who are
trying to recruit him to their side, Yu is clubbed in the back of the head and blacks out.
He wakes up in the Nationalists’ tent, and to his horror, he sees “two English words
tattooed on my belly, right below my navel: FUCK COMMUNISM” (97).
Naturally, Yu is terrified by the new slogan on his body, certain that he will never
be able to return to China. But over the course of the novel, the tattoo comes to represent
not just the brutality of the situation he faces, but an unlikely way for him to manipulate
those who control his fate. When necessary, he is able to deploy the tattoo as evidence of
his allegiance to the pro-Nationalists (he was willing to get tattooed with an
anticommunist slogan!) as well as his resistance to their demands (they tattooed him in
retribution for his noncompliance!). By the end of his time in the prison camp, he has
switched sides no less than five times, all the while privately maintaining his resolve to
return home to China when the war ends. Once he makes it back to China, he finds a
clinic where he can finally have his “embarrassing mark” removed (341). The doctor at
the clinic removes the tattoos of some of his fellow returned POWs completely, while in
other cases he “just removed a word or two to make a dark phrase unintelligible or give it
a new meaning”: he “would play with the alphabet” (341). In Yu’s case, he decides, the
procedure will be simple. The doctor leaves the word FUCK and suggests that they “just
[erase] all the letters in the word COMMUNISM except the U and the S” (341). As a
result of the operation, the original tattoo is transformed into one with a message more
fitting for Yu’s new situation: it now reads, “FUCK …U…S…” (341).
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The story of Yu’s tattoo does not end with this transformation. In fact, the
continuing problem of the tattoo takes center stage in the prologue and final chapter that
frame the novel and explain its origins. The prologue, which introduces Yu as a doting
grandfather visiting his family in the suburbs of Atlanta in the present day, begins with
the following words:
Below my navel stretches a long tattoo that says ‘FUCK …U…S…’ The skin
above those dots has shriveled as though scarred by burns. Like a talisman, the
tattoo has protected me in China for almost five decades. Before coming to the
States, I wondered whether I should have it removed. I decided not to, not
because I cherished it or was nervous about the surgery, but because if I had done
that, word might have spread and the authorities, suspecting I wouldn’t return,
might have revoked my passport. (3)
What has protected him in China has become a liability on his extended visit to the
United States. Even now, after all these decades, his tattoo remains a source of “constant
concern” (3); walking down the street, he fantasizes that an “invisible hand might grip the
front of my shirt and pull it out of my belt to reveal my secret to passersby” (3). He
unsuccessfully attempts to hide the tattoo from his young grandchildren; in the novel’s
final pages, he schedules an appointment with a surgeon in the U.S. to try to have it fully
removed once and for all. But before this, he explains that his true motivation for writing
the memoir we hold in our hands is to tell the story behind the tattoo to his grandchildren,
who he hopes will one day “read these pages so that they can feel the full weight of the
tattoo on my belly” (5). The letters etched on his body, then, have prompted the words on
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the page before us, and we are left in the position of Yu’s American grandchildren,
attempting to unpack the meaning of the words on his skin and on the page.
The image of an elderly Chinese man sporting a crude “FUCK U.S.” tattoo, trying
in vain to hide his brutal Cold War past while taking his American grandchildren
shopping in a suburban strip mall, exemplifies a contradiction that the novel will go on to
pose again and again: how can we reconcile the militancy of Yu Yuan’s tattoo with the
reasoned moderation of the narrative voice that bears it? Yu Yuan emerges in the novel
as the picture of an individual free thinker who is uniquely equipped to move between the
poles of the Cold War, humanizing the absurdity of war with the complexity and depth of
his thoughts, feelings, and motivations. Indeed, reviews of the novel have lauded above
all the universal humanity of the narrator’s voice. According to the reviewer at The New
York Times, Yu Yuan’s narrative voice, while “not especially familiar…to an American
ear,” is “recognizably, authentically, universally human” in every sentence, revealing a
“moral perspective” that gives the novel an “inescapable relevance” to us all (Banks).
The reviewer at The Kansas City Star similarly declares that the novel “is not a story of
Korea, or POWs, or even Yu Yuan, but of what it means to be human” (Volin). For these
reviewers, it is the novel’s very foreignness – of its stilted language, of its unfamiliar
settings – that provides the ground against which to bring out the narrator’s essential
humanity. But such a view elides what I assert in this chapter is a much simpler marker of
Yu’s recognizable humanity: his final conversion into an American subject. I will argue
in this chapter that it is Yu Yuan’s concluding turn as kindly Asian American patriarch,
preserving his history in English for his American grandchildren – and, conveniently, for
Ha Jin’s American readers – that makes our narrator such a legible and laudable bearer of
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humanity. In traversing the ground from Communist Chinese soldier to prisoner of war to
Chinese citizen to Asian American grandfather, I want to suggest, Yu Yuan becomes
recognizably human. But how did this Chinese Communist enemy soldier and prisoner
become transformed over the decades into an Asian American family man?
Asian American racialization since World War II has been bound up with the
fates of U.S. wars and the demands of U.S. foreign policy. The lifting of Chinese
exclusion in 1943, for example, is generally viewed by historians as a wartime measure
designed to counter Japanese charges of American anti-Asian racism and to court China
as an ally during World War II.6 By the same token, the wartime enmity of the U.S. and
Japan led to the mass internment of Japanese Americans, suspected wholesale of holding
loyalty to Japan rather than the United States. Japanese Americans’ conversion into
enemy and menace was clearly tied to the United States’ military ambitions during World
War II.7 The provisions for immigration from Asia made in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, or the McCarran-Walter Act, similarly reflected the United
6

As historian Mae Ngai notes, “The exigencies of war also led Congress to repeal Chinese exclusion in
1943, in order to stanch Japanese war propaganda in Asia that criticized U.S. policy as racist” (233) –
although, as she observes, “Congress’s continued antipathy towards Chinese migration was evident in the
annual Chinese quota of 105” (203). Yen Le Espiritu similarly argues that during World War II, the
treatment of Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Indian Americans improved “because their ancestral nations
were allies of the United States” (49). Takashi Fujitani disagrees with the latter point, arguing that the
United States’ investment in disavowing racism in this period meant that “The fate of all U.S. minorities,”
including both the above Asian American ethnicities and Japanese Americans, “was tied to a larger
propaganda campaign that tried to represent the United States as a nation that did not discriminate against
any racial or ethnic minority” (12). In Fujitani’s analysis, the larger goal of lifting exclusionary
immigration laws was “to mobilize an ever-greater diversity and number of people for national projects”
(13).
7
Takashi Fujitani has shown the blatantly racist incarceration of Japanese Americans was at odds with the
U.S. state’s investment in disavowing racism in this period. As such, he argues, internment was justified as
having been “motivated only by military concerns, not by racism” (13). Similarly, the use of the nuclear
bomb in Japan “had to be legitimated by the logic of military necessity, rather than viewed simply as a
means to exterminate an enemy cast as nonhuman” (13). He argues that serving as soldiers for the United
States military became a way for Japanese Americans to move from the “outside” to the “inside” of the
nation and prove their loyalty during the war. See also Colleen Lye’s America’s Asia, in which Lye ties
Japanese American internment to American New Deal liberalism.
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States’ military agenda at the beginning of the Cold War: the act lifted racial restrictions
to immigration, but maintained numerical quotas for many nations and imposed
particularly restrictive quotas on the so-called “Asia Pacific Triangle.”8 At the same time,
steeped in Cold War rhetoric, the McCarran-Walter Act allowed the government to
deport immigrants suspected of subversive activities and to bar suspected Communists
from entering the country. It was in this historical context that the United States
formulated a plan according to which Chinese and North Korean soldiers imprisoned by
the United Nations on Koje Island during the Korean War – the literal enemies of the
United States – were offered the unprecedented opportunity to refuse repatriation to their
homeland of Communist China and instead declare their allegiance to the anticommunist
free world. This policy of “no forced repatriation” was derived from the conviction that,
in President Truman’s words, U.S. troops “must not use bayonets to force these prisoners
to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands of the Communists”
(“Truman”); its apparent purpose was to provide propaganda value for the United States
as Communist prisoners defected en masse to the “free world” in a highly publicized
fashion.
On Koje Island, unlike in the internment camps, the U.S. state was willing to
disaggregate Asian subjects from their countries of origin. Instead, it was now apparently
willing to wager that ancestry or ethnicity did not necessarily determine loyalty or
ideology. If the Cold War years saw the transformation of Asian subjects from foreign
enemy and Communist menace to potential productive American citizen, then, I will
8

Under the McCarran-Walter Act’s provisions for the “Asia Pacific Triangle,” “Persons of Asian descent
born or residing anywhere in the world could immigrate only under the Asia-Pacific quotas of one hundred
per country,” with an overall Asia-Pacific quota of 2000 (Ngai 237).
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show in this chapter, in War Trash, Ha Jin naturalizes that transformation by humanizing
the Chinese Communist soldier. In his fictionalized account of the events on Koje Island,
Ha Jin takes great pains to depict its protagonist and narrator as not just Chinese, but
human, and, ultimately, American. War Trash does not lionize the UN’s implementation
of the policy of “no forced repatriation” on Koje Island. Rather, the novel suggests that
the process of electing or refusing repatriation at Koje was facile, artificial, and too
coercive to be a legitimate litmus test for people’s convictions and desires. It shows the
disastrous consequences of the failure of the UN Command at Koje for the unfortunate,
and unwitting, individuals caught up in the crisis. And it insists that that entire incident is
an unmitigated failure on both sides of the war. But over the course of his time in the
prison camp, the narrator Yu Yuan comes to exemplify the qualities of a true American:
open-mindedness, compassion, intelligence, loyalty, a well-calibrated moral compass,
and most important, individuality. In War Trash, to humanize the Chinese Communist
soldier is to infuse him with American values. Through his encounter with the U.S.
military in Asia, Yu Yuan comes to embody the exemplary American.
This chapter begins by considering how scholars have theorized the place of the
American rhetoric of freedom in the ideological framing of the Cold War conflict
between the American-led “free world” and the Soviet-led Communist world. I next
examine prisoner of war repatriation in the Korean War as an issue that animated this
ideological conflict between “freedom” and “slavery” in the American popular
imagination, taking the public outcry over the twenty-three American POWs who elected
not to repatriate to the United States as an exemplary case that serves as a necessary
frame for our understanding of American representations of the struggle over Chinese
20

and North Korean POW repatriation on Koje Island. Then, turning to the historical
“screening” of Communist prisoners of war on Koje Island during and after the Korean
War, I explore how a mechanistic concept of ideological belief circumscribes American
understandings of the North Korean and Chinese POWs, focusing in particular on the
process of “screening,” in which prisoners’ ideological affiliations are determined by
their individual responses to a set of questions asked by UN soldiers. Finally, the chapter
returns to Ha Jin’s War Trash to work through the narrator’s agonizing decision to
repatriate to China and the unexpected trajectory that ensues, eventually transporting him
from his chosen life under Communism to the land of the free itself, the United States.

II. Discourses of Freedom and Slavery in the Early Cold War

The struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union that
defined the Cold War era is often characterized as, first and foremost, an ideological
battle between two superpowers committed to diametrically opposed, inevitably warring
worldviews: capitalism versus communism, freedom versus totalitarianism. As President
Truman put it in the speech announcing his now-eponymous doctrine in 1947, the United
States’ primary objective in the Cold War era was to guarantee for itself and its allies “a
way of life free from coercion,” entailing a commitment to “help free peoples to maintain
their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek
to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”9 Other Cold War documents, including NSC-
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The full text of the “Truman Doctrine” speech can be found at:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.
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68, the policy paper that famously laid out U.S. foreign policy and military objectives for
the Cold War, referred more plainly to a grand, apocalyptic battle between American
freedom and communist “slavery.” But as Cold War scholar Anders Stephanson has
noted, this framing of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as a
battle between “freedom” and “slavery” is itself an American construction with a long
genealogy. In his essay “Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U.S. Ideology,” Stephanson
argues that this pairing of terms dates back to the very inception of the United States as a
nation. He links Cold War phraseology – “Better dead than red!” – to such iconic
American utterances as Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death” and Abraham
Lincoln’s admonition that our nation, a “house divided,” could not permanently endure as
a land “half slave and half free.” He explains that in the conceptual field formed by the
pair “freedom” and “slavery,” freedom is understood to be “always already under threat,
internally as well as externally” and hence in need of constant vigilance and defense (85).
In its American Cold War iteration, then, “slavery” – variously named fascism,
communism, and totalitarianism in the 1940s and 1950s – is defined as that which
“cannot tolerate the very existence of freedom as an idea and must systematically attempt
its liquidation” (85).10 For this reason, Stephanson argues, not only the United States, the
10

Stephanson notes that this construction of the enemy also has a longer lineage. He links the notion of an
arbitrary, lawless, tyrannical power – namely, Stalin’s Soviet Union – to Montesquieu’s concept of the
“Oriental despot,” the secretive, all-powerful ruler who crushes his anonymous subjects with his despotic
will. This imagined contrast between east and west, Stephanson argues, becomes an integral part of the
emerging liberal understanding of a legitimate social order defined by the consent of its members.
Stephanson posits that the United States saw the coalition of World War II as “an embryonic form of
‘international community’ in that contractual sense” and hence came to see the Soviet Union as “lawlessly
break[ing] the given agreements” (89). In this way, he concludes, the “contractual theory of liberal
‘society’ served…to exacerbate the negative view of the Soviet adversary” (89). See also William Pietz’s
essay “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” in which he argues that the theory of
totalitarianism “made police terror into Oriental despotism” (70), thus “displacing the human essence of
fascism into the non-Western world” (58) as a means of preserving the integrity of Western civilization.
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“vanguard defender” of freedom, but the “basic principles of humankind” are represented
as being at risk of annihilation by the Soviet system, and in this way, the ideological
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is elevated to a question of
“antagonistic ‘ways of life’” (87). For Stephanson, this ideologically constructed
antagonism makes the Cold War fundamentally an American project.
How did the United States deploy the concept of freedom in the Cold War, and to
what ends? The United States’ self-styled ideological position as the defender of the
world’s freedom against the constant threat of encroaching communism became essential
to its bid for global hegemony in the 1950s. In the military arena, the defense of freedom
became a key justification for the implementation of an ambitious vision of national
security that, according to Melvyn Leffler, demanded the strategic establishment of a
global network of U.S. military bases in the interest of maintaining a sphere of influence
throughout the Western hemisphere and preserving a favorable balance of power across
Europe and Asia.11 The rhetoric of defending freedom, in this view, facilitated the United
States’ larger and longstanding goal of seizing global power through military and
economic domination.12 At the same time, as Penny von Eschen has shown, the U.S.
actively drew upon the cultural capital of the concept of freedom in its attempt to “win
hearts and minds” globally. In particular, eager to counter charges of racism that could
potentially damage its reputation as leader of the “free” world, the U.S. State Department
sponsored tours of popular jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong and Dizzy Gillespie
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See Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 194548,” 348-349.
12
Other revisionist historians including William Appleman Williams and Thomas McCormick have placed
the United States’ Cold War agenda in a longer history of U.S. economic and territorial expansion.
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throughout the decolonizing Third World in the 1950s and 1960s in an effort to promote
American culture.13 Such concerted efforts to disseminate American cultural forms, a
second way that the U.S. state worked to “spread freedom,” often preceded or coincided
with its military efforts in the same regions.
Development projects in the newly minted Third World were another important
way that the United States waged its ideological battle for freedom in these years.
According to historian David Ekbladh, because systems “with broad prescriptions for the
organization of political, social, cultural, and economic life” such as liberalism and
communism banked on the promise of a better way of life for their adherents,
development discourse became “crucial to understanding how the United States
confronted other ideological systems when they emerged as threats” (2). In fact, historian
Odd Arne Westad characterizes the Cold War as a contest between the United States and
the Soviet Union to take up the mantle of modernity in the wake of World War II and the
crumbling of the Eurocentric world order. Countering mainstream views of the Cold War
as an era of rigid bipolarism, Westad argues that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in
many ways more similar than they were different: both claimed to offer the Third World
“a road to high modernity through education, science, and technological progress” (92).
He sees the Cold War as less a monolithic ideological face-off than a conflict between
13

In a similar vein, others have investigated the state’s deployment of other artistic forms such as Abstract
Expressionism during the Cold War. See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art:
Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) and
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York:
New Press, 2001). For other studies on the U.S. state’s efforts to manage international perceptions of
domestic race relations during the Cold War, see Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the
Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002), Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country:
Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005) and Thomas
Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003).
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competing modes of modernity, each of which aimed to prove its superiority by winning
over – and developing – the decolonizing nation-states of the Third World. The “proxy”
battlefields of the Third World thus take central importance in Westad’s view of the Cold
War, which he sees as largely “a continuation of European colonial interventions” of
old—with the important distinction that the objectives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union
were no longer “exploitation or subjection” but rather “control and improvement” (5).
Like Westad, Maria Josefina Saldaña-Portillo argues that American development
discourse in this era replaced the erstwhile colonial “civilizing mission” with a rhetoric of
freedom, marked by “imperatives of self-determination, independence, free trade,
industrialization, and economic growth” for its beneficiaries (20).
Finally, in contrast to the above critiques of the United States’ attempts to spread
freedom as neocolonial in nature, some have examined U.S. power in the decolonizing
Third World as an “anticolonial” force in this era. Melani McAlister describes the
postwar United States as anticolonial in that it “took over from the European colonial
nations the role of a preeminent world power” after World War II (46). If anticolonial
movements, supported by the Soviet Union, opposed the continuation of European
colonial rule, then the “genius of U.S. foreign policy” in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
McAlister argues, was its ability to “develop a better appreciation of the potential of third
world nationalism and anticolonialism than the old colonial powers did” (47). In other
words, strategically supporting certain national independence movements in the Third
World could offer the United States the opportunity to challenge both European and
Soviet power. U.S. policymakers could draw on the anti-British, revolutionary rhetoric
that “formed the heart of American national origin stories” to suggest that “an American25

dominated international order would best guarantee the expansion of democracy and
secure the liberty of all nations” (47).14 In this way, even the United States’ neoimperial
expansion – military, economic, and cultural – in the Third World in the 1940s and 1950s
could be corralled under the rubric of spreading freedom.
The overarching story of the Korean War tells us that the United States entered
the war in order to protect the freedom and sovereignty of the South Koreans, who were
soon to be victims of an unwanted communist takeover. As such, it was the first U.S. war
to be fought under the emerging ideological conditions laid out above. In 1951, reports
that 22,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war held in UN camps in South Korea
wanted to defect to the “free world” would have served to confirm the American
narrative about the horrors of the communist “slave world.” However, the domestic
propaganda value of this mass defection was overshadowed by the apparently more
shocking news that twenty-three American POWs in Korea had rejected repatriation in
favor of settling down in China to live under the communist system, an unexpected turn
of events that activated American anxieties about the vulnerability of freedom in the
postwar world.
Although the twenty-three nonrepatriates represented only a negligible fraction of
the total number of American POWs in Korea, their much-publicized choice to repudiate
the American way occasioned a panicked national conversation about American
weakness in the postwar world, the same world it was supposed to be leading. The failure
14

As scholars of U.S. empire have demonstrated, such a contradiction between the American rhetoric of
freedom and the United States’ imperial expansion and subjugation of other peoples has been present from
westward territorial expansion to the annexation of Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawaii to colonial
interventions in the Philippines to the present-day military occupation of the Middle East and other regions
around the globe. See for example Amy Kaplan’s discussion of westward expansion in The Anarchy of
Empire.
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of American soldiers to properly stand up to their Communist captors in Korea was seen
as symptomatic of the same “give-up-itis” that had led to the American failure to win a
decisive victory in the war overall, an affliction that tainted even those POWs who did
manage to return from Korea.15 Upon their return home, as historian Susan Carruthers
notes, American POWs became one of “the most intensively cross-questioned groups in
history—by American social scientists…as much as by Communist captors in North
Korea” (“Redeeming” 275). Indeed, she argues, the prisoners’ captivity “came to
function as something akin to a Rorshchach test for social commentators,” who believed
they could diagnose “every ailment believed to afflict the body politic as a whole” by
“dissecting the infirm bodies and fragile psyches of America’s POWs” through a host of
psychological, criminological, and “characterological” studies (179). The flaws
discovered in the bodies and minds of the POWs, she explains, “suggested that America
itself was an unfit competitor in the Cold War” (“Redeeming” 276). In other words, it
was not Communist brainwashing tactics but American susceptibility to those tactics that
bore the brunt of the blame for the American defections.
For Eugene Kinkead, who reported on the Korean War in The New Yorker
throughout the 1950s, the twenty-three American defectors to China were merely
evidence of a larger scale of collaboration between U.S. prisoners of war and their
communist captors, something “new in history” that revealed a unique weakness at the
heart of contemporary American society. Countering these claims in a 1970 article, H.H.
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A number of sensationalistic studies and profiles of the twenty-three nonrepatriates were published in the
years after the war. See for example Virginia Pasley, 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose
Communist China: Who They Were and Why They Stayed, Albert Biderman, March to Calumny: The Story
of American POWs in the Korean War, and Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One.
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Wubben argues that the only “new” thing about the case of the American POWs in Korea
was the assumption that such “selfish undisciplined behavior as existed among the POWs
was…a direct consequence of a characterological deterioration in the nation itself” (19).
In earlier instances of American soldiers’ being taken prisoner in war, he notes, there was
“no tendency to denigrate American civilization” as such as a result of their failings (9).
But in the case of the Korean War, potential American deficiencies – harmful models of
progressive education, homegrown communist subversion, excessive materialism – were
investigated for their contributions to this new “societal sickness” on display in Korea
(7). This perceived weakness was linked to new gender and racial formations of the
1950s as well. Betty Friedan famously takes the American POW in Korea to task in The
Feminine Mystique for his compromised masculinity. She describes the prisoner as “an
apathetic, dependent, infantile, purposeless being … reminiscent of the familiar
‘feminine’ personality” (286). In her withering diagnosis, American men in the Korean
War proved themselves “psychologically incapable of facing the shock of war, of facing
life away from their ‘moms’” (277). At the same time, as Adam Zweiback notes, an
imagined susceptibility to promises of Communist egalitarianism among African
Americans was believed to have strongly influenced the three black soldiers who chose to
remain in China. Widespread discussion of the three black nonrepatriates in the press at
the time, he observes, highlighted public perceptions of a special link between
Communism and civil rights in the mid-1950s (347).
As Carruthers observes, the civilizational anxiety about the weakness of
American power activated by the return (and non-return) of American POWs from Korea
reflected a larger paradox. “Across Asia, western Europe, the Middle East, and South
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America,” she writes, “U.S. influence was expanding rapidly in the years after World
War II,” but many Americans “had no sense that they were witnessing their state’s ‘rise
to globalism.’ Quite the reverse” (173). To some onlookers, the POWs’ captivity was a
sign of danger that the American way could be eclipsed by other ideological systems.
And if captivity functioned as a “testament to U.S. vulnerability” (173), then the
kidnapping of U.S. Brigadier-General Dodd, commander of the UN camp on Koje Island,
on May 7, 1952 by the prisoners under his watch was an even more alarming sign of
American powerlessness. That Dodd’s successor, General Colson, conceded in writing to
the prisoners’ major demands in order to secure Dodd’s freedom after a 78-hour ordeal
made the kidnapping even more embarrassing for the U.S. military. The United States
had hoped that the policy of non-forcible repatriation would be a major propaganda
victory, as highly publicized mass defections by Chinese and North Korean prisoners
would demonstrate to its enemies and the world the superiority of democracy. But
instead, the policy gave rise to the opposite scenario, as Colson’s letter was widely
publicized in the communist press as evidence for North Korea’s claims of UN and U.S.
brutality in the prison camp. In the months leading up to this event, the ideological
affiliations and divisions among prisoners were especially scrutinized as the opposition
between freedom and slavery became a concrete matter of individual choice.

III. Screening the Prisoner of War on Koje Island

The UN prisoner-of-war camp on Koje Island, which housed more than 170,000
North Korean and Chinese prisoners over the course of the Korean War, was viewed by
29

commentators at the time as a virtual laboratory for Cold War ideological division. In
Mutiny on Koje Island, a sensationalistic, semi-journalistic account of the events on Koje
Island published in Tokyo in 1965, the American psychology professor and apparent East
Asia expert Hal Vetter describes the camp as “a huge tank,” a “vast electrolytic bath in
which a process of polarization was at work. Anode—Communism; cathode—antiCommunism” (64). In this metaphor, the early riots in the prison are “merely bubbles
breaking” on the surface; “the real agitation” remains “down below,” but will eventually
erupt in the coordinated uprisings across the prison camp and the shocking kidnapping of
General Dodd (64). Stanley Weintraub, an American soldier who served as a UN prison
guard in Korea at this time, similarly begins his memoir, War in the Wards: Korea’s
Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of War Hospital Camp, with a metaphor of depth to
describe the ideological commitments of the prisoners under his watch. “Deeper than skin
markings,” he writes, “on the part of prisoners of every ideological complexion, was a
fanaticism and hatred intensified by the corrosive effects of captivity” (6).
In these depictions, the prisoners at Koje are at heart essentially ideological
creatures, true products and soldiers of the Cold War. But the polarization in the camp
that so struck these observers had larger resonances given the recent history of the region:
after all, the Chinese civil war had resulted in the split of China into the Communist
People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the Nationalist Republic of China on
Taiwan, each of which continued to claim legitimate sovereignty over the entirety of
“China,” in 1949, a year before the start of the Korean War. As such, the ideological
frame that these American observers placed on the polarization in the camp mapped the
foreign policy concerns of the U.S. national security state onto preexisting regional
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conflicts that were not fully understood or taken into account by the American
commanders of the camp. The United States’ resulting clumsiness in handling the
repatriation crisis on Koje Island speaks to what Jodi Kim describes as the triangulation
of the Cold War in Asia: rather than taking sides in a global, top-down opposition
between the United States and the Soviet Union, prisoners in the camp were taking sides
in the closer and more urgent battle between the pro-Nationalists and the proCommunists. In this battle, as we will see below, the United States saw an opportunity to
make a statement that served its own Cold War ends.
In Mutiny on Koje Island, Vetter reprints the set of questions used by the UN
Command to individually screen prisoners in April 1952. He reports that prisoners’
responses to these questions, which had been “carefully selected to elicit true and
unbiased answers” (37), were to be noted on their identification papers, and they were to
be segregated and held separately thereafter according to their chosen final destinations:
1. Will you voluntarily be repatriated to Communist China?
2. Will you forcibly resist repatriation?
3. Have you carefully considered the impact of such actions on your
family?
4. Do you realize that you may remain here on Koje-do long after those
electing repatriation have returned home?
5. Do you realize that the United Nations cannot promise that you will be
sent to any certain place?
6. Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation?
7. What would you do if you are repatriated in spite of this decision? (37)
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Commenting on this sequence of questions, Vetter finds it “difficult to imagine how a
fairer test of the prisoner’s intentions could be devised”; indeed, he argues, the questions
are “weighted heavily in favor of repatriation” (38), demonstrating all the more the
strength of the convictions of those prisoners who elected not to repatriate. His view that
these questions were intended to encourage rather than deter prisoner repatriation aligns
with that of contemporary U.S. commentators such as Jaro Mayda, whose article on “The
Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law” in the journal of the American
Society of International Law cites the “circumstances under which the prisoners were
polled” as “persuasive proof” of the UN Command’s desire to return as many prisoners
as possible to North Korea and China (421).16 In Mayda’s analysis, the UN Command
ultimately took up the “voluntary repatriation” policy only reluctantly; he refers the
reader to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s claim that “a prisoner of war who does
16

International legal scholars publishing in the United States at the time generally agreed that the U.S. and
UN were in the right to refuse to “forcibly” repatriate prisoners of war despite the clause in the Geneva
Convention that seemed to specifically disallow such a refusal. Jan Charmatz and Harold Wit, writing in
the Yale Law Journal in February 1953, find that “even the sacrosanct principle of territorial sovereignty
can be overridden to protect human rights”; in the case of a state that “treats its nationals in such a way as
to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity may be legally permissible”
(408). Josef Kunz similarly argues at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in
April 1953 that the UN’s liberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention is “fully justified from a
humanitarian and ethical point of view” (110). That same month, in the International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, J.A.C. Gutteridge argues further that the principles of “no detention by force and no
repatriation by force” are “implicit” in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as they are “consistent
with the maintenance of the general rule…[that] all prisoners of war shall be free to return to their
homelands” when hostilities end (216). In July 1952, Pitman B. Potter calls the repatriation crisis a
“sociological situation” in which, since the “old law [is] defective from ethical and humanitarian view
points, the captor must frankly refuse to be bound by it” despite the legal and practical risks associated with
such an action. Writing a year later in the same journal, the American Journal of International Law, Potter
concludes that the very use of the term “prisoner of war” is “somewhat anomalous” in the Korean case and
asks whether a “state of war” truly exists in Korea: “if so, between whom and whom?” (661). As such, he
suggests that the “old rules” concerning the treatment of prisoners of war need to be revised to “cover
captives taken in an international police action” (662). Lastly, in the autumn 1953 issue of the International
Journal, Norman Alstedter claims that the “Western World’s unity was tested possibly more severely by
the Korean truce negotiations than by Communist aggression in Korea” in the first place (256) and argues
that the “western powers” must become “organized for making a unified policy” for “affairs in the Far
East” (265). Charmatz and Wit agree, adding that the “burden” of providing for any nonrepatriates “should
not be placed on detaining powers alone, but rather on some international organization” (414).
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not want to go back is a problem … something one does not want to happen” (421).
Demaree Bess in the Saturday Evening Post similarly argues that the seven questions
above “were frankly designed to encourage the return of the maximum number” of
prisoners (53).17 According to Bess, “powerful political pressures had been building up in
Washington to get a Korean truce at almost any price” (52) – including the cost of the
consigning thousands of prisoners of war to life under communism.
Susan Carruthers agrees that the UN’s screening process on Koje Island aimed to
pressure prisoners to return home rather than refuse repatriation. In the postwar era, she
argues, the United States maintained an “ideological investment in escape—in captive
peoples’ right to flight” that belonged to a postwar historical moment that saw “freedom
of movement” as a universal and fundamental right for all peoples (88).18 The primary
concern of the United States government at this particular moment in the Korean War and
the larger Cold War, she argues, “lay neither in offering prisoners real freedom of choice
nor in securing the largest possible number of ‘converts,’” but rather in “[tapping] the
symbolic potential of defection while averting the calamitous blow to U.S. prestige that
would ensue if UN Command forces ended up repatriating anticommunist prisoners at
gunpoint” (184). In her view, in its “indoctrination efforts” in 1951 and beyond, the U.S.
primarily aimed not to foment a mass defection, but rather to “win ideological converts”
17

On the Saturday Evening Post and its significance to the “middlebrow” culture of Cold War America, see
Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism.
18
She further notes that in practice, however, the United States “was less welcoming to mobile humanity
than advocates of [freedom of movement] implied” (88), both refusing to let certain Americans leave its
borders (Paul Robeson, Josephine Baker) and denying entry to the vast majority of “escapees” from
Communist states. Although Truman recommended that a “right of asylum” be included in U.S.
immigration law in the form of a “Special Migration Assistance Act,” Congress instead passed the
McCarran-Walter Act, which Carruthers argues “did its best simply to sidestep the question of refugee
resettlement” (80). See chapter four of this dissertation for a discussion of U.S. refugee policies in relation
to the adoption of Korean War orphans.
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who might carry the lessons of freedom with them back home (184). According to
Carruthers’ reading of the situation, the UN never intended for repatriation to become
such a contentious issue as to hold up negotiations, but rather wanted to come to an
agreement with China and North Korea as quickly as possible. For this reason, when
China refused the U.S. proposal for voluntary repatriation in early 1952, the UN
responded by “trying to reduce the number of nonrepatriates” by “[posing] leading
questions that emphasized the desirability of returning home” and “stressing that the UN
Command would accept no responsibility for those who refused repatriation” in the
questionnaire documented above (184). At the same time, she notes, the nonrepatriate
category was narrowed “to exclude those who merely preferred not to return” (184) –
marking a shift from the language of “voluntary” repatriation to that of “no forced” or
“non-forcible” repatriation – in order to further lessen the number of nonrepatriates,
placating China while protecting anticommunist prisoners and maintaining a symbolic
victory in the eyes of the rest of the world.
From the 1950s Saturday Evening Post to Carruthers’ recent scholarly work, the
U.S. narrative that emerges about the screenings on Koje tells us that it was the staunch
anticommunism of the majority of the prisoners that precipitated the crisis over
repatriation. Naturally, the story from China and North Korea looks considerably
different. For example, Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington’s Koje Unscreened,
published in 1953 in Beijing by the “Britain-China Friendship Association,” begins from
the premise that the Koje Island prison camp was a “mosaic of unrelieved terror,
bloodshed and deceit” on the part of the United States (or as they sarcastically put it, the
United “Nations”). In their view, the repatriation controversy was nothing less than a
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“deliberately conceived and carried out…policy” whose ultimate goal was “the wrecking
of the truce talks, the continuation and expansion of the Korean War” (105). Burchett
and Winnington, British journalists who base their assessments on their firsthand
observations of the camp as well as interviews with current and former guards and
prisoners, contrast North Korea’s insistence upon the “internationally agreed principle of
the return of all prisoners of war” with what they perceive as the “Made-in-USA issue” of
voluntary repatriation, “the only issue preventing the armistice in Korea” for the last
eighteen months of the war (67). In this light, the screenings become a site of
intimidation, violence, torture, and even murder beneath a ruse of humanitarianism. One
among many accounts of the individual screening process in the book depicts a prisoner
“brought individually to the table and asked ‘Do you wish to return to the mainland or go
to Formosa?’”
When the prisoner replied that he wanted to return to China, he was asked ‘Why?’
while the [pro-Kuomintang] guards gathered in, expectantly twirling their clubs.
‘Why do you want to go to the mainland? Are you still loyal to the Communists?’
If he still insisted, a beating followed that left the prisoner covered in bloody dust
and the question was put again … It was made very clear that the way out of his
misery lay toward Formosa and the Kuomintang army. (27)19
According to Burchett and Winnington, conditions were no less coercive outside the
interrogation chamber, where prisoners who wanted to return to China were forcibly
tattooed with anticommunist slogans by Kuomintang agents and forced to sign bogus
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Burchett and Winnington note that this example, from November 1951, was “the first case we were able
to trace of the type of ‘screening’ that later became universal” (27).
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petitions refusing to return to China with their names in their own blood.20 Any prisoner
who desired to be repatriated “was at once branded as a ‘diehard Communist,’ with all
the brutal treatment that entailed” (136). Far from a neutral or equitable exchange, the
individual screening, like the prison camp at large, becomes a nightmarish site of
intimidation in which the full force of the U.S. war machine is brought to bear on its
captives, one by one. In this counternarrative to the UN’s version of what took place at
Koje and why, the individual screening becomes the very site of ideologically-driven fear
and intimidation, rather than the site of its alleviation, and “voluntary repatriation”
becomes an excuse to artificially prolong the Korean War rather than an unfortunate but
necessary measure to protect prisoners of war from totalitarian persecution. As Burchett
and Winnington put it, “‘Forcible repatriation’ or ‘voluntary repatriation’ was in fact only
a camouflaged term for ‘forcible detention’ of prisoners,” a “certain stumbling block to
peace in Korea” that was “eagerly accepted by [the] American government” (3).21
Given these divergent understandings of the motive for and the meaning of the
UN’s individual screening process at Koje, I would like to return here to the sequence of
20

It is clear that these acts of tattooing and blood petitions did take place on Koje Island; what is contested
is who carried out these acts and under what conditions. For the UN, tattooed prisoners and names signed
in blood provided incontrovertible evidence of the desperation of the prisoners not to return to China and
North Korea; for those on the other side, these same things served as proof of the abuse and torture that
prisoners faced under UN Command.
21
The UN’s response to these charges at the time was to deny any such wrongdoing in the camps,
condemning the lies generated by the other side as an attempt to manufacture its own propaganda victory in
the Cold War. Burchett and Winnington quote one U.S. officer who claims that the North Korean and
Chinese POWs were only “being taught the fundamental concepts of democracy…the basic principles of
democratic life, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from disease and
freedom from fear … There is nothing that remotely resembles coercion or intimidation” (Burchett and
Winnington 35). But some of the UN’s own agents also held doubts about the integrity and efficiency of
the screening process, not to mention conditions in the camp in general. General K.S. Thimayya, the Indian
officer who led the “Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission” charged with overseeing the repatriation
screening process at the war’s close, stated that in his view, the “terror tactics” employed by Rhee’s South
Korean regime and the Kuomintang “negate[d] all assumptions or assertions about Freedom of Choice”; in
fact, he believed that “any prisoner who desired repatriation had to do so clandestinely and in fear of his
life” (Carruthers 215).
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questions asked to the Chinese prisoners of war during the UN Command’s individual
screenings in the camp in April 1952. The administration of a loyalty questionnaire as a
method of determining national allegiance and fitness for citizenship is, of course, a
familiar process in the annals of Asian American history. During the World War II-era
internment of Japanese Americans, the questionnaire given to all internees notoriously
featured two questions regarding the extent of their national loyalties: question 27, which
asked if the subject would be willing to serve in the U.S. armed forces “wherever
ordered,” and question 28, which asked, “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the
United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the
Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?” Those who
answered with two yeses were declared loyal, while those who answered “no” to both
questions, the so-called “no-no boys,” were considered to be disloyal to the United States,
housed in special camps, and threatened with deportation. As many have noted, the
second of these questions is a particularly difficult one: to answer “yes” is to admit a
preexisting loyalty to the Japanese Emperor even in the act of affirming “unqualified”
loyalty to the United States, a contradiction in terms that has the effect of categorically
casting suspicion on all Japanese Americans.22 Like the questionnaires administered to
Japanese American internees, the individual screenings on Koje Island were intended not
just to assess prisoners’ loyalties, but to potentially reassign their nationalities. The
22

See also Caroline Chung Simpson’s An Absent Presence for an analysis of Japanese American
internment and the Cold War; Mae Ngai’s Impossible Subjects for a discussion of internment and U.S.
immigration policy; Colleen Lye’s America’s Asia for a discussion of internment and the Asian American
racial form; and Takashi Fujitani’s Race for Empire for a treatment of internment and the Japanese
American soldier.
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screenings similarly featured a rhetorically complicated series of questions administered
to subjects under duress: captives interrogated by their captors, with their futures hanging
in the balance.
The first in the set of screening questions, “Will you voluntarily be repatriated to
Communist China,” allows for the prisoner to elect or refuse voluntary repatriation. This
question demands a straightforward yes or no answer, but the following six questions do
not exist unless the prisoner has answered “no” to this first question. From that point on,
each question depends on an affirmative response by the prisoner in order to maintain the
rhetorical stability of the questionnaire as a whole, presupposing a subject resistant to
repatriation. “Will you forcibly resist repatriation? Have you carefully considered the
impact of such actions on your family? Do you realize that you may remain here on Kojedo long after those electing repatriation have returned home? Do you realize that the
United Nations cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place?” (Vetter 37).
These questions evoke without directly stating the vast range of negative consequences
for the prisoners who refuse repatriation and their families: the potential torture,
imprisonment, or killing of family members, indefinite detention on Koje Island, a
lifetime of statelessness and exile. The fact that the vast majority of the prisoners clearly
choose to “forcibly resist” repatriation with full knowledge of the negative consequences
for them and their families back home – “Are you still determined that you would
violently resist repatriation?” (my emphasis) – appears then as a testament both to the
sheer strength of the prisoners’ desire not to return to life under Communism and to the
irrefutable duty of the UN to abide by that desire. Those who made it to the end of the
questionnaire, having answered no, yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes to the questions above,
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would be faced with these final question, the response to which would serve as proof of
the force of their convictions: “What would you do if you are repatriated in spite of this
decision?” Only this last question of the seven allows for an answer beyond yes or no,
and presumably the prisoner’s response to it would provide a gauge for the interrogators
to distinguish between those who “merely preferred not to return,” in Carruthers’ words
(184), and those truly determined to forcibly resist being repatriated.
The questions asked in the screening as well as the conditions under which the
screenings took place highlight the extent to which ideological conflict overdetermines
the very concepts of “free choice” and “coercion” in the prison camp on Koje Island. I
have suggested here that they presuppose a certain sequence of responses that
demonstrate an already existing militant anticommunist subjectivity, a Cold War
politicization so deep that it trumps all other human concerns. It is this opposition of
ideological versus “human” motivations that seems to most trouble American observers.
Near the end of his memoir, for example, Stanley Weintraub, wondering at various
prisoners’ decisions to “screen North” rather than South, briefly considers the possibility
of factors that exceed the purely ideological. Discussing one prisoner, referred to by the
GIs as “No-face” due to his disfigurement from napalm attacks by UN forces, Weintraub
recounts that his captain
queried No-face about why he decided to screen North, since he probably could
get better medical care here. ‘But I won’t be here all my life, because you won’t
be. What good will I be to the Koreans, or even to the Nationalists [in Taiwan],’
he said, ‘without eyes and without a nose? But back home in China I’ll be a hero,
even if I’m not good to look at. And my brother has a basket factory. I won’t be
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good for very much, but probably I can help make baskets and feel useful. It has
nothing to do with politics.’ (160)
In relaying this anecdote, Weintraub acknowledges the less ideologically driven, more
mundane – might we say, more human – reasons for wanting to return to Communist
China: to be with one’s family, to make a secure living, to feel useful and wanted despite
a war-inflicted disability. But even in this most sympathetic of cases that professes to
have “nothing to do with politics,” we see the way that the U.S. anticommunist military
intervention in Korea has shaped prisoners’ decisions about their life chances in a
politically uncertain future. From Weintraub’s point of view, this prisoner’s chances of
survival look better in the South, where he can receive better medical care from U.S.
military doctors, but the prisoner is not willing to stake his life on the U.S. military’s
continuing benevolence and stewardship. “I won’t be here all my life, because you won’t
be”: this comment betrays the political calculation behind a decision supposedly not
driven by political concerns. (Of course, he was wrong, although he couldn’t have known
it at the time; U.S. military forces have occupied Korea continuously since the war.) That
is to say, this prisoner’s choice is “not political” in that it is not his Communist or
anticommunist allegiance that primarily determines his decision, but it is profoundly
political in that the Cold War conflict has radically curtailed the available choices for his
life—not to mention his life itself. In this context, what does it mean to make a decision
motivated by “human” concerns?
The American rationale for insisting on a policy of non-forcible repatriation was
that the United States had a duty to protect the human rights of anticommunist prisoners
whose lives would be in danger back at home due to Communist reprisals. For
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Weintraub, the plucky GI in over his head at the prison camp in Korea, surrounded by
militant, violent communists, the U.S. military’s protection of the human rights of
prisoners is one of the only things that seems to be going right. Just after the UN
announces it will be screening prisoners for voluntary repatriation, he writes home to
explain to his family what is taking place in the camp:
It may sound corny, but the 16th and 17th of April were momentous days for men
all over the world as a result of the screening begun and accomplished. It
signifies a step forward in human history. We dare not turn back. We have
committed ourselves irrevocably to a policy unheard of before, the principle that
men have the right to ask for our protection from unwanted Communist
domination, and that we must guarantee their right to decide for themselves
whether they prefer to live under Communism or to reject it. The middle ground
of passive looking-on has about disappeared. (47)
Here, Weintraub elevates what might appear to us now as mere Cold War hyperbole to a
groundbreaking principle of human rights.23 The act of screening is figured as nothing
less than a “step forward for human history,” momentous not just within the walls of the
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While the UN stakes a claim to protecting the “human rights” of its prisoners, the messaging that
emerges from inside the prison camp claims that it is the UN, not Communist China or North Korea, that is
transgressing prisoners’ human rights and violating international law. For example, after kidnapping the
commander of the camp, General Dodd, the prisoners in the communist compounds of the camp on Koje
Island issued four written demands. These demands call for the guarantee of basic human rights in the
camp, an end to the “illegal” practice of voluntary repatriation, an end to forcible screenings, and
recognition by the UN Command of a “PW Representative Group” as a negotiating entity. Their first
demand, for example, reads, “Immediate ceasing the barbarous behavior, insults, torture, forcible protest
with blood writing, threatening, confine, mass murdering, gun and machine-gun shooting, using poison gas,
germ weapons, experiment object of A-bomb, by your command. You should guarantee PW human rights
and individual life with the base on the International Law” (Vetter 127). Where we might expect to find
pure Communist propaganda, we find here instead that the prisoners invoke the language of human rights.
In this sense, the concept of “human rights” functions as a contested property that each side would like to
claim as wholly its own.
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hospital that provides the setting for what Weintraub later calls “our private little cold
war” (74), not just for the North Korean and Chinese prisoners who will live its
consequences, but for “men all over the world.” The “unheard of” policy that Weintraub
describes offers a Cold War vision of human progress, one that irrevocably splits men
into a “we” and a “they,” celebrating the obliteration of any potential “middle ground.”
This refusal of “passive looking-on” calls upon every individual prisoner – not just the
fortunate prisoners at Koje, but eventually all the prisoners of Communist domination in
the world – to make a choice, to irrevocably state a “preference” for Communist systems
or a rejection of them, even if such a rejection does not necessarily entail the privilege of
entry or citizenship in any other preferred location. Given that the possibility of neutrality
has disappeared in this particular vision of human history after the Korean War, U.S.
troops emerge as the most fitting guarantors of this act of self-determination (“we must
guarantee their right to decide for themselves”). The exercise of individual freedom of
choice becomes the marker of a fully human existence, and the Communist world, which
offers no such freedom, emerges as a shadowy outside to that existence. In fact, the U.S.
state’s magnanimous act of proffering a choice to those living under Communism is seen
as an act itself in need of humanitarian protection and enforcement. And if individual
choice is understood to be the hallmark of humanity, then the Communists, who fear and
abhor choice as such, have already lost legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world.
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IV. Feeling at Home in America: War Trash

The narrator of War Trash, Yu Yuan, manages to sidestep the political debate
ostensibly at the heart of the repatriation crisis. Despite having joined the “Chinese
People’s Volunteer” Army, he explains, he was not a true Communist even before the
war began. He had matriculated at the Huangpu military academy before the Communists
came to power in China in 1949, but was pleased to see the Communist government put
an end to the corruption that had taken place under the Nationalists. When the Korean
War started, he felt, as “most Chinese” did, that “it was obvious that MacArthur’s army
intended to cross the Yalu River and seize Manchuria… As a serviceman I was obligated
to go to the front and defend our country” (8). Once in the prison camp, he defends the
Communists when pressed – for example, he states at one point that he “believed in
socialism,” since the Communists “had brought order and hope to the land” (122) – but
makes clear to the reader that his participation in any “pro-Communist” activities is
purely strategic, since he does mean to return to China and will need to answer for
himself there after the war. He reasons, “Whether I join them or not, they’ll never leave
me alone, so I mustn’t stand aloof. Either you become their friend or their enemy. The
Communists don’t believe anyone can remain neutral” (123). His true motivation for
wanting to return to China, he insists again and again, is to be reunited with his mother
and fiancée: a personal reason, as he continually reminds the leaders of both sides in the
camp, not a political one (65). Thus, when it is his turn to undergo the final screening that
will determine his destination, his desired political or national affiliation does not enter
his thought process. Rather, as he sits before the various arbitrators and “persuaders” in
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the UN tent, his mother and fiancée are at the forefront of his mind. Even if he could
bring himself to move elsewhere and begin a new life without them, he fears that they
would be harassed or punished by the Chinese government for his desertion; as he writes,
“it grew clear to me that there was no way I could go elsewhere without implicating my
mother and my fiancée,” and thus he tells the arbitrator that he wants to repatriate.
Once Yu Yuan makes it back to China, however, in an ironic and not entirely
unpredictable turn of events, he is crushed to find that his reason for returning to China
no longer exists. His mother has passed away during the three years he’s been gone, and
his fiancée has since moved on, asking Yu to stop bothering her, since “she couldn’t
possibly marry a ‘disgraced captive’” (344). Her reaction mirrors that of the Chinese
government, which regards the repatriated POWs as traitors and failures. Rather than
being rewarded for their service and loyalty, the returned soldiers, all dishonorably
discharged, have been relegated to the “dregs of society” (345). But over time, Yu is able
to salvage his dream of starting a family: he is assigned to teach in a middle school in a
new city, where he marries one of his fellow teachers, never again returning to his
hometown. He and his wife raise a son and daughter who both go on to graduate from
college. Their son “manage[s] to come to the States” and obtain a master’s degree in civil
engineering, and Yu proudly informs us, “I even have two American grandchildren, and I
love them dearly” (347). This brings us to the present day, when Yu is visiting his son’s
family in the Atlanta area, writing down his story for his grandchildren to read one day.
Yu recovers remarkably quickly from the jettisoning of the future he had
imagined with his fiancée, the figure whose idealization had sustained him for two years
in the camp and driven his most important life decisions. But writing from the U.S., Yu
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looks back on the decades after his repatriation to China with a kind of wistful
satisfaction: he considers himself “very fortunate compared with the other repatriates” in
every respect (347), but remembers that when he first returned to China, “I felt as though
time had played a cruel joke on me. If only I had known about my mother’s death when I
was Korea; if only I had foreseen that home was no longer the same place” (344). Had he
known, he tells us, he might have chosen to go to Taiwan and restart his life there, but it’s
more likely that “at any cost I would have gone to a third country, where I could have
lived as a countryless man, and probably as a lonely drudge for the rest of my life” (344).
This specter of a “third country” is on his mind throughout his time in the camp. When he
first tells the pro-Nationalist leadership that he does not want to go to Taiwan, the first
thing they ask him is, “Then to the U.S.A.?” (95), to which he responds, “That country
doesn’t take in Chinese prisoners like us, you know that” (95). But as the final
repatriation screening looms ever closer, he wonders whether a viable third choice exists:
“Where in the world can I ever be among my true comrades? Why am I always alone?
When can I feel at home somewhere?” (305). Later, he thinks to himself in anguish that if
only a “third choice” existed, “I could disentangle myself from the fracas between the
Communists and the Nationalists” (313). Finally, just before the screening, he hears from
an Indian UN officer that “if you were reluctant to go to either mainland China or
Taiwan, you could apply for a third country” like India, Brazil, or Argentina (325). He
rejects Brazil and Argentina because of the language barrier and India because of that
country’s rigid caste system (in which he imagines he would quickly fall to the bottom
rung). The question that remains, then, is: “Was there another neutral English-speaking
country where I might go?” (325).
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As we know, Yu Yuan does not request to be sent to a neutral “third” country,
instead suffering through his return to an unwelcoming China until he finds his footing.24
But by the novel’s end, the United States becomes that third country for him: certainly
not a neutral space in the context of the Cold War, but a place where he can feel at home
and fulfill his dreams of having a good life with his family. One could argue that it is
clear throughout the novel that he was always going to land in the U.S.: from the
beginning, it was his English literacy that saved him, from his ability to communicate
with the American doctors who operated on his infected wounds after his capture to his
ability to communicate directly with prison guards and officials to the privileged position
he occupied as a translator for the leadership of both the pro-Nationalist and proCommunist factions within the camp. It was his knowledge of English that allowed him
to secure a steady job teaching English in a middle school after his return to China, and it
was his and his wife’s higher education that allowed his children to succeed. Perhaps
most pointedly, it is his fluency in English that has allowed him to write the memoir that
constitutes War Trash itself. That this novel about Cold War violence in Asia begins and
ends with the narrator in the present-day United States, though, is a curious development:
why has this novel about choosing China been written in the United States?
Ha Jin comes closest to offering an answer to this question, I think, in the novel’s
final pages: it is Yu’s reflection on the occasion of the writing of his memoirs that most
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One might read in Ha Jin’s invocation of a “third” or “neutral” country a reference to the Cold War’s
Non-Aligned Movement, the association of primarily postcolonial nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America that attempted to maintain neutrality and independence from the superpowers during the Cold
War. India, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned
Movement, and Argentina was a member from 1973-1991. Brazil was aligned with the United States
throughout the Cold War. See Vijay Prashad’s The Darker Nations for an analysis of the Non-Aligned
movement in the context of the formation of the “Third World” during the Cold War.
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clearly underscores the underlying Americanness of his story. Before leaving China, Yu
hears from a former comrade from the prison camp, who tells him that Commissar Pei,
the leader of the pro-Communist faction, has passed away, his dying words an entreaty to
his fellow repatriates to “Please write our story!” (349). As though in response to Pei, Yu
ends the novel with the following words:
Now I must conclude this memoir, which is my first attempt at writing and also
my last. Almost seventy-four years old, I suffer from gout and glaucoma; I don’t
have the strength to write anymore. But do not take this to be an “our story.” In
the depths of my being I have never been one of them. I have just written what I
experienced. (350)
Yu’s own last words are in direct opposition to the Communist commissar’s final
directive to his underlings to tell “our story.” He resists being folded into the collectivity
of the rest of the repatriates, insisting on the singularity of the text he has penned with at
once a kind of false modesty (what we have read “just” represents a first attempt at
writing down his thoughts) and a grating self-importance (his story is too unique to be
merely grouped in with all the others). His claim that he has “never been one of them”
extends beyond his dissatisfaction with the Communist party in China. Rather, it speaks
to a more fundamental aspect of his character: Yu Yuan is his own person, a selfpossessed individual acting in accordance with his own personal moral compass in a
world of followers. And what could be more American than exercising your freedom to
be an individual?
While in the camps, Yu learns to see individualism as a peculiarly American trait.
When he is called upon to provide translations during the Communists’ kidnapping of the
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American UN commander of the camp, fictionalized in the novel as General Bell, he
overhears the captive Bell on the phone with another American general. He is “amazed”
to find that they speak not of military matters, but about Bell’s wife and family, physical
health, and mental well-being. “They treated each other as friends, not as comrades who
shared the same ideal and fought for the same cause,” he writes; “They hadn’t mentioned
any ideological stuff. What a contrast this was to Chinese officers, who, in a situation like
this, would undoubtedly speak in the voice of revolutionaries, and one side would surely
represent the Party” (181). Yu doubles down on this impression shortly thereafter, when
an American Lieutenant berates him and his comrades for ruining the career of General
Bell, who he claims is a good person. Yu finds that the Lieutenant “hadn’t thought of the
incident in the way an officer should”: “He took it personally, thinking of General Bell as
a specific individual…though he still regarded me as no more than a Red” (192). It is the
latter “obliteration of human particularities” that Yu thinks of as the greatest “crime of
war”: on both sides, war “reduces real human beings to abstract numbers” (193). It is for
this reason that he frequently recalls with appreciation one Dr. Greene, a woman doctor
from the U.S. who treated his potentially life-threatening wounds in a POW hospital in
Pusan when he was first taken prisoner by the UN. Dr. Greene speaks Mandarin, and Yu
speaks English; they strike up a friendship, trading gifts and language lessons. Later, as
he healed from the surgery that saved his injured leg, Yu concluded that what made Dr.
Greene “different from others” is that she “treated [him] with genuine kindness, which
must have stemmed not just from her professional training but from real humanity” (66).
With the others around him, including his Chinese Communist comrades, Yu confides, he
could not feel safe, because “there was always some ulterior motive behind every activity
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and every statement, and I had to take care not to be victimized” (66). In contrast, with
Dr. Greene, he could sense the inherent “goodness” that “[flowed] out like water from a
fountain, constant and effortless” (66). Amidst all the ideological violence in the prison
camp, it just so happened to be the American doctor, radiating maternal energy and a
genuine care for Yu’s individual health and happiness, who reminded Yu of his
humanity. Long after their meeting, Yu sees Dr. Greene as a role model for himself and
his children and grandchildren; he hopes his grandson will become a doctor so that he,
too, can one day help people in need.
Yu’s abhorrence of the party mentality understandably amplifies his distress at
both versions of the tattoo forced upon him – first “FUCK COMMUNISM” and later
“FUCK …U…S.” Yet it is oddly fitting both that he is willing to once again play the
maverick, choosing to enter the country in spite of the tattoo, and that he will finally be
able to remove the tattoo in America, the land of personal liberty. He is inspired to finally
look into having the tattoo removed through the most mundane of American activities:
watching reruns of The Simpsons on television. “These days I often watch The Simpsons,
which I like very much,” he writes (348). “Last week I saw Bart, the mischievous boy,
get a tattoo removed from his arm. This gave me the idea of having mine erased” (348).
Of course it is watching The Simpsons, the iconic American cartoon that lampoons both
the nuclear age and the nuclear family in the post-Cold War era, that resolves his
lingering and outdated Cold War anxieties.25
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For an analysis of the Simpsons’ satire of the nuclear age, see Mick Broderick’s “Releasing the Hounds:
The Simpsons as Anti-Nuclear Satire.” For a study of how The Simpsons upholds and defends the nuclear
family form even as it satirizes the family and flouts “family values,” see Paul Cantor’s “The Simpsons:
Atomistic Politics and the Nuclear Family.”
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The episode in question, “Simpsons Roasting on an Open Fire,” is in fact the
series premiere, which first aired on December 17, 1989, just over a month after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, the event conventionally used to mark the end of the Cold War; as
such, it may be said to be the first ever post-Cold War television show.26 In the episode,
Bart Simpson, like Yu Yuan, must deal with a tattoo gone awry and a misdirected
message. While doing Christmas shopping with his family at the mall, Bart sneaks into a
tattoo parlor and asks for a tattoo of a red heart emblazoned with the word “MOTHER.”
Hearing his cries of pain, Marge, his mother, barges into the parlor, interrupting the
session before the tattoo is completed, and so instead of “MOTHER,” the tattoo now
reads, “MOTH.” Marge decides to use all of the family’s Christmas money to have Bart’s
tattoo removed at a clinic, not knowing that her husband Homer will not be receiving a
Christmas bonus from his job at the nuclear plant this year. As a result, Homer is
desperate to find a way to buy Christmas presents for the family. During a trip to the
races where Homer tries, and fails, to win money by betting on racing greyhounds, Bart
convinces him to adopt the losing dog, Santa’s Little Helper, which has been abandoned
by its owner. The dog finds a home with the Simpsons and becomes a beloved addition to
the family, and the episode thus ends on a happy note.
In the episode, Bart’s tattoo serves several functions: it’s a sign of Bart’s
rebelliousness, a nod to the show’s countercultural milieu, and a linguistic and visual gag.
But most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, it’s a tattoo that binds together the
26

The conditions of the production of The Simpsons are also bound up in the history of U.S.-Asian
relations since the Cold War: from the first episode through the present, the show has been animated in
South Korea through overseas contractors. See the 2010 article in Time magazine, “South Korean
Cartoonists Cry Foul Over The Simpsons,” for a brief discussion of the ongoing relationship between The
Simpsons’ producers in the United States and its animators in South Korea. See the Simpsons wiki for
credits and details on the production of different episodes: http://simpsons.wikia.com/wiki/Simpsons_Wiki.

50

nuclear family. Bart intends for the tattoo to express his love for his mother; the familial
crisis that the tattoo and the cost of its removal sparks sets off a chain of events that
ultimately brings the family closer together. And although the episode displays the
anarchic, juvenile yet self-aware brand of humor that becomes the show’s trademark, its
message is remarkably sincere: it’s an episode that affirms by satirizing the
heteronormative nuclear American middle-class family. Together, the Simpsons learn to
eschew materialism and value one another, and on top of this, they complete their family
with the addition of the dog Santa’s Little Helper, a creature that was abandoned and left
to fend for itself once it was no longer of use to its previous owner. Hence Yu’s passing
reference to the episode yields more than just proof of his familiarity with American
culture and humor. In one sense, he’s Bart, the mischievous boy, stuck with a problematic
tattoo that doesn’t say what it should. In another, he’s Homer, just trying to provide a
decent living for his family. At the same time, he’s Santa’s Little Helper, mistreated by
his homeland and seeking a loving home and family. And like the Simpsons episode, the
novel ends by affirming the American family and its future.
In fact, I would argue that it is Yu Yuan’s Asian American family that cements
the status of his memoir as an American story. As we know, Yu Yuan fondly addresses
his entire memoir to his grandchildren, Bobby and Candie, whom he takes shopping for
Chinese treats in the Asian strip mall in the Atlanta suburbs – “Asian Square on Buford
Highway,” where they buy “a chunk of hawthorn jelly and a box of taro crackers” – in a
ritual familiar to all readers of immigrant literatures. He mentions in the novel’s opening
pages as well Karie, his “Cambodian-born daughter-in-law,” from whom he carefully
hides the secret of his tattoo even though she “knows I fought in Korea and want to write
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a memoir of that war while I am here” (4). Specifying his daughter-in-law’s ethnicity
helps us to better picture his family as a multi-generational, multi-ethnic, multicultural
immigrant family. At the same time, mentioning that she is Cambodian-born evokes other
unspoken histories of war and trauma, reminding us of the other hot wars the U.S. has
waged in Asia and of the way that the post-Cold War nation has been able to absorb
many of those who survived them.
But where The Simpsons makes a joke out of the idea of “playing with the
alphabet” through Bart’s unfinished tattoo – you can’t write MOTHER without MOTH! –
the matter of Yu’s tattoo in War Trash is deadly serious. That you can’t write
COMMUNISM without U.S. is no laughing matter for Ha Jin, who seems to find the
group mentality that either version of Yu’s tattoo represents equally reprehensible. Both
versions of the tattoo would seem to tell an “our story,” but Yu wants us to read in the
journey from one version of the tattoo to the other a “my story” instead. In the end, Yu
Yuan bears allegiance to no land. Whereas the anti-Communists and pro-Nationalists in
the camp imagined becoming Americans by espousing pre-given beliefs and adhering to
party lines, for Yu Yuan, it was choosing to return to China on his own terms that most
clearly proved his Americanism. He was able to get here, the novel suggests, by valuing
education, working hard, and listening to his own conscience—even when it meant
standing up to authority. In this sense, the tattoo etched on his body for the past five
decades serves as a fitting personal slogan for his journey from Communist soldier to
American subject: fuck “us,” there’s only me.
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Chapter 2

From the 38th Parallel to the Río Grande:
Genealogies of U.S. Empire in Rolando Hinojosa’s Klail City Death Trip Series

What is found at the historical beginning of things
is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the
dissension of other things. It is disparity.
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”

I. Introduction

Early in Rolando Hinojosa’s Claros Varones de Belken, or Fair Gentlemen of
Belken County, the narrator, Rafe Buenrostro, shares the following story in a vignette
entitled “Where Another Life of Rafe Buenrostro is Seen”:
Raul Serna, Lorenzo Castillo, and Armando Ledesma took no part during that
business in Korea; in June of that year of 1950, the People’s Army of the
Republic of North Korea crossed the dividing line of the now well-known 38th
parallel; a month later when the Immun Gun armies were advancing toward the
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Pusan Peninsula, those three took off across the border by way of Jonesville-onthe-River. (16)27
Here, Hinojosa collapses the physical space between two national borders, bringing the
38th parallel dividing the newly constituted North and South Koreas and the Río Grande
separating Mexico and Texas into the same narrative universe. The crossing of the
“dividing line” at the 38th parallel by North Korean troops in June 1950 not only gives
rise to this escape across the Río Grande, but – more to the point – it also takes our
narrator and many other “Texas Mexicans” from the Río Grande Valley halfway around
the world to fight in Korea.28 Rafe and his friends find themselves leaving one site of
border conflict only to encounter, and to police, another. And while the abovementioned
three men who crossed over to Mexico in 1950 “did very well” there, the narrator informs
us, those “who did not do at all well in Korea were Charlie Villalón, Pepe Vielma, Tony
Balderas, David the ‘uncle,’ and others who died some 10,000 miles away from Belken
County,” the fictional home of Buenrostro’s recurring cast of characters throughout his
fifteen-volume Klail City Death Trip Series (CV 16).
Rolando Hinojosa, a pioneering author in Chicano literature since the 1970s, is
best known for his wide-ranging portrayal of a fictionalized Mexican American
community in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of South Texas in the Klail City Death Trip
Series [KCDTS], a set of works written in Spanish and English that span multiple literary
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I cite Julia Cruz’s English translation of Claros Varones de Belken from the original bilingual edition of
the book here. Hinojosa has published different versions of the same books in Spanish and English
(Estampas del Valle y otras obras and The Valley; Klail City y su alrededores and Klail City; Mi querido
Rafa and Dear Rafe, Becky and Her Friends and Los Amigos de Becky); however, these different editions
are not English or Spanish translations of the original texts, but rather, in Hinojosa’s words, “recastings.”
28
“Texas Mexican” is the term Hinojosa uses throughout the series for Mexican Americans from Texas; I
use the same term in this chapter when discussing Hinojosa’s work.
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genres and forms, including poetry, short stories, detective novels, and epistolary fiction.
These works tell and retell stories in different voices, iterations, and languages, and in
this chapter, I read them as a continuous archive. Of the fifteen works that comprise the
KCDTS to date, two have been wholly devoted to recounting Rafe and his friends’ time
served in Japan and Korea during the Korean War: Korean Love Songs (1978), a book of
poetry, and The Useless Servants (1993), a novel composed of Rafe’s diary entries and
letters written from Korea.
Given that the Klail City Death Trip Series [KCDTS] is generally understood to
be a chronicle of Mexican-American communal life in South Texas over the twentieth
century, critics have been largely undecided about how to interpret the Korean War
stories in relation to the larger narrative. Some have chosen to bracket this Korean War
content entirely, while others have acknowledged the place of the Korean War as an “allinforming event” in the narrative arc of the series (Calderón 166).29 Few critics, however,
have offered substantive readings of Hinojosa’s Korean War stories. In this existing
scholarship, it has been argued that the Korean War functions primarily as an allegory of
or parallel to the historical-fictional world of the Río Grande Valley in Texas, as in a
review of The Useless Servants that sees “parallels between war-torn Koreans and warriddled Texas Mexicans” as “inescapable” in the novel (Doyle 124). Cultural critic
Ramón Saldívar reads the “theme of war” in Korean Love Songs as an allegory more
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In an example of the former, Helena Villacrés Stanton states in “Death in Rolando Hinojosa’s Belken
County” (1986) that she omits Korean Love Songs from her analysis of the series “because, focusing on the
Korean War scene, it introduces a different perspective” (Stanton 9). In examples of the latter, Rosaura
Sanchez states that Korean Love Songs serves to crucially “connect” the works in the series (76), and Klaus
Zilles observes that Korean Love Songs is the first book to feature the phrase “Klail City Death Trip Series”
on its title page, thus officially inaugurating an understanding of Hinojosa’s work as an ongoing serial
project (23).
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broadly of Chicano struggle. In his reading, the characters’ American military units and
bases in Korea and Japan, like their hometowns back in the Valley, become sites of
Chicano struggle for “cultural integrity, communal identity, and social justice” in the face
of racial prejudice and alienation (136). For this reason, Saldívar argues that even though
the book takes place in Korea, Korean Love Songs is still ultimately “about South Texas
and Mexican American life in a moment of crucial self-formation” (136).
This chapter proceeds from a different premise. If the figure of a parallel evokes
straight lines that run side by side, never intersecting, then, I contend, the Korean War
does not parallel the wars and conflicts in Texas’ past and present. Rather, I argue that in
the Klail City Death Trip Series, Rolando Hinojosa sketches a genealogy of U.S. imperial
border wars whose crisscrossing lines of descent connect the Korean War to past and
present wars and conflicts on the Texas-Mexico border. His work insists that we see the
Korean War as a part of the history of Chicano life, and the history of Texas and Mexico
as a part of the Cold War division and consolidation of the two Koreas. It reveals South
Texas, Japan, and Korea to be ongoing and enmeshed U.S. imperial projects. Reading the
Korean War in a genealogy of U.S. imperial border wars, I argue in this chapter that
Korea and Japan become the sites of these characters’ recruitment into an American
imperial apparatus. As I will show, the experience of fighting in the Korean War on the
side of the colonizer irrevocably alters Rafe and his fellow Texas Mexican soldiers’
relationships to U.S. empire.
I use the term genealogy advisedly here, with regard to both how we read
Hinojosa’s work and how we narrate histories of the Cold War and U.S. empire. As Juan
Bruce-Novoa has observed, genealogies, in the sense of naming and tracing family
56

lineages, lie at the heart of Hinojosa’s literary project (155).30 In a nonfiction piece,
Hinojosa explains this genealogical sensibility by way of the following example:
[A Texas Mexican] could look at a plaque commemorating the dead of World
War I, II, Korea and so on, read the names listed there, and see something
different from what an outsider would see … The outsider’s eyes would also see a
flat surface with names, while we would see differing configurations with
extending and extensive bloodlines… We would see lines crossing and
crisscrossing across the years and across the wars that would cause the flat
surfaces to show us another reality. (“Baroque” 109)
In this example, genealogy gives rise to different modes of seeing and knowing: it crafts
what appear to be given facts on a flat surface into differing configurations, or what
Hinojosa describes later in the essay as “vistas not always clarified nor clearly seen”
(114).31 Such an aesthetic guiding principle shares an affinity with what Wendy Brown,
following Foucault, calls the “genealogical work of defamiliarizing” (95). Brown
explains that a genealogical method aims to “denaturalize existing forces and
formations…to take that which appears to be given and provide it not simply a history
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Bruce-Novoa argues that Hinojosa’s work “has evolved into a history of land claims closely interwoven
with family relations,” making genealogy the key to what he calls the “recuperative venture” of the texts,
that is, the recuperation of oral tradition as an object under the threat of erasure in contemporary society
through the production of the Chicano literary text (156). José David Saldívar, too, argues that the KCDTS
functions in part as a genealogy of South Texas (“Chicano Border Narratives” 178).
31
The figure of the commemorative war plaque appears in Hinojosa’s fiction as well: in Klail City
(published in Spanish 1976 as Klail City y su alrededores, 1977 as Generaciones y semblanzas, and 1994
as El condado de Belken – three different editions of the same text – and in English in 1987 as Klail City,
cited here), Hinojosa’s narrator tells the story of Ambrosio Mora, a young World War II veteran shot in the
back and killed by the Anglo sheriff outside of a shopping center. Afterwards, Mora’s father smashes a
plaque commemorating those who had died in World War II. After he is done “breaking the living hell and
memory a-the damn thing,” he explains that Mexicans in Texas are “Greeks … Greeks whose homes have
been taken over by the Romans” (38). This story is retold several times and referenced repeatedly
throughout the KCDTS.
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but one that reveals how contingently it came into being and remains in being, the degree
to which it is neither foreordained nor fixed in meaning” (103).
Taking on a genealogical approach, this chapter critically engages the histories of
race, the Cold War, and U.S. empire contained in the Klail City Death Trip Series.
Focusing on Hinojosa’s Korean War stories, I make the case that in these works, the
Korean War serves to broker the inclusion of Mexican American soldiers into the
American mainstream. In return for risking their lives and being willing to kill to serve in
the U.S. military, these subjects are offered newfound access to institutions of power and
the promise of upward mobility. José Davíd Saldívar has argued that Hinojosa’s series
“subverts the lofty tradition of the Spanish chronicle by focusing not on the powerholders
in south Texas, but on the powerless, not on the colonizers, but on the colonized men of
Belken County” (“Limits” 257).32 In critical conversation with this reading, I contend on
the contrary that in Hinojosa’s work, the Korean War fundamentally transforms these
colonized subjects’ relationship to U.S. empire. After fighting in the U.S. military
overseas, these soldiers must newly negotiate the terms of their American national
belonging. The first part of this chapter discusses several key frameworks for
understanding U.S. empire and the origins of the Korean War, and makes a case for the
importance of theorizing empire comparatively across space and time. Then, turning to
the Klail City Death Trip Series, I examine Hinojosa’s representation of the military
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José David Saldívar and other Hinojosa scholars including Rosaura Sánchez, and Héctor Calderón have
discussed the way in which Hinojosa situates his work in a tradition of chronicle writing through his
manipulation of form and the allusive titling of his works: for example, Saldívar points out that Claros
Varones de Belken references Fernando del Pulgar’s medieval Spanish chronicle, Claros Varones de
Castilla, and Sánchez discusses Estampas del Valle in relation to 18th century European “sketches of
manners” and Generaciones y semblanzas in relation to a 15th century Spanish text of the same name by
Fernán Pérez de Guzmán.
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during the Korean War as an institution that facilitates the integration of Rafe and his
fellow Texas Mexican soldiers into dominant structures of American citizenship. Then,
following the disparate trajectories of Hinojosa’s core group of characters after the war, I
trace the long-term impact of that institutionalization under the rubric of Cold War racial
liberalism. In these readings, taken together, I aim to bring out the reciprocal effects of
one imperial situation – the longstanding U.S. annexation of Texas – on another – the
U.S. occupation of South Korea. In a coda to the chapter, I consider a third space that
both illuminates and further complicates these readings: Japan after World War II, at
once an imperial power recently dispossessed of its colonies, including South Korea, and
a nation itself newly occupied by the U.S. military. This coda takes up the case of Sonny
Ruiz, a character in Hinojosa’s novels who comes to reject his affiliation with the U.S.
military while serving in the Korean War and flees to settle in Japan. Examining the
colonial situation of occupied Japan, I argue that even in this act of refusal, Sonny cannot
evade the gendered power dynamics of colonial and racial control under global capital.

II. Empire(s) of the Cold War

Conventional readings of the Cold War locate its origins most immediately in
geopolitical dynamics following the Second World War. For example, Robert McMahon
explains in a recent historical overview of the Cold War that at the end of World War II,
the prior Eurocentric world order had vanished and was replaced by a struggle for power
between the United States and the Soviet Union; the Cold War resulted from this sudden,
shattering overturning (5). In his influential two-volume The Origins of the Korean War,
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historian Bruce Cumings offers a timeline of the Korean War that also begins in the ashes
of World War II. His study locates the origins of the war in Korea’s liberation from
Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and the ensuing civil and revolutionary conflict that
overtook Korean society. As Cumings and other left scholars of the Korean War have
argued, the process of decolonization in Korea was interrupted by U.S. and Soviet
occupation at this time, and a number of “domestic and international contingencies” came
to define the agenda for liberated Korea (xxi).33 These contingencies “remained
unresolved in the period from 1945 to 1950 and gave the ostensible solutions forced upon
Korea by the great powers (national division, alter regimes) a distinctly temporary quality
in the minds of all Koreans” (xxi). Such a perspective opposes conventional
understandings of the Korean War as a proxy war originating in superpower conflict.
Whereas most American scholars saw the war as “a thunderclap that burst in the summer
of 1950, a sudden hot war in a distant and unexpected place amid a Cold War focused in
Europe” (xxix), Cumings explains in the second volume that his project is to show that
June 25, 1950, the given starting date of the Korean War, is actually “a denouement
mistaken for a beginning” (9). To understand the Korean War, he argues, we must first
investigate the “unbroken chain of critical events linking August 1945 with June 1950”
(xxii), that is, Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945 and its subsequent division and
occupation by the United States and Soviet Union.
Revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams and Thomas
McCormick see the roots of U.S. Cold War policy far earlier in U.S. history. McCormick
33

For example, see Chungmoo Choi’s “The Discourse of Decolonization and Popular Memory: South
Korea” (1993), in which she argues that South Korea’s postcoloniality was deferred by these overlapping
occupations.
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traces the Truman Doctrine – the U.S. imperative to “support” the world’s peoples in
their struggles against communist takeovers, announced in 1947 – back through
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points negotiating peace among the European powers after
World War I, the Open Door Policy of 1899 securing Chinese markets for international
trade, and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declaring U.S. hegemony over the western
hemisphere (21). According to McCormick, the Truman Doctrine served essentially to
globalize the Monroe Doctrine: it was a “declaration that America’s proper sphere was
not just the New World but the whole world” (74). Williams similarly argues that the
Open Door notes, which “became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 –
1958,” came to shape U.S. Cold War foreign policy (52). He sees the Open Door policy
as essentially a Monroe Doctrine for Asia (64), and the Monroe Doctrine as itself a
logical extension of American Revolutionary thought. America “matured in an age of
empires as part of an empire,” he writes, and Americans “thought of themselves as an
empire at the outset of their national existence” (21). In this way, Williams and
McCormick draw a through line from the Cold War era back through the earliest days of
U.S. settler colonialism and westward expansion.
According to historians Melvyn Leffler and David Painter, scholarly interest in
the origins of the Cold War has been renewed since the “end of the Cold War,” usually
understood to refer to the period encompassing the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In their analysis, prior
interpretations of the Cold War’s origins such as those discussed above were “grounded
in deep, if unacknowledged, ideological and philosophical differences” that were
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themselves shaped by the ongoing Cold War. Thus the ending of the Cold War has
presented “an opportunity to reassess its beginnings” from a clearer perspective (1).
As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon states, the only consensus about the
beginning of the Cold War is that “there is no consensus about the question of beginning”
(1). However, for Kwon and other recent scholars, the matter of “ending” the Cold War is
just as untidy as that of its origins. As Kwon points out, the current story of the Cold War
may be said to have “an open-ended beginning and a closed ending” (1), but the Cold
War did not “end” everywhere in the same way or at the same time; indeed, he argues,
this disparity in ending of the war shows that “there has never been a conflict called the
cold war” (6). Kuan-Hsing Chen similarly points out that although the Cold War may
appear to be over in Europe, its structures in Asia “have been weakened, but by no means
dismantled” (119); because the “effects of the cold war have become embedded in local
history” in East Asia, he argues, it is “not yet the post-cold-war era” (118). Jodi Kim also
problematizes the question of endings, noting that “the Cold War is not only a historical
period, but also an epistemology and production of knowledge, and as such it exceeds
and outlives its historical eventness” (3). Her project reads this “protracted afterlife” of
the Cold War in Asian American cultural productions, which she argues “[generate] a
critical genealogy of the Cold War as a genealogy of American empire” (8).
Each of these takes on the origins of the Cold War tells a certain kind of story
about U.S. empire. A reading of the Cold War that places its origins in the Open Door
policy, the Monroe Doctrine, and the founding of U.S. settler colonialism, for example,
sees a continuous line of colonial conquest throughout U.S. history that moves further
and further west. Placing the Cold War’s origins squarely at the end of World War II, in
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contrast to this long view, marks the postwar period as the moment of U.S. global
ascendancy, in which the United States takes the reins from the dying European and
Japanese empires and becomes newly invested in far-flung locations such as Korea.
Finally, insisting that the Cold War is not yet over, especially in Asia, points to the
diffuse effects of U.S. empire in the present. Each of these timelines offers valuable
insight into the historiography of the Cold War, and yet, in different ways, I think they
each risk reproducing what Amy Kaplan terms a “teleological narrative that empire tells
about itself, the inexorable westward march of empire” (18). Kaplan argues in The
Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture that this teleological narrative revolves
around “a central geographic bifurcation between continental expansion and overseas
empire, and the related, yet not identical, division between territorial annexation and
deterritorialized forms of global domination” (17). This “spatial splitting,” she further
argues, often “takes the temporal form of a developmental narrative that moves from
continental national expansion in the nineteenth century to formal colonial annexation at
the turn of the century to the neo-imperial exercise of military and economic might in the
twentieth” (17).
Such a view of a spatial and temporal split between continental expansion and
overseas empire as a progress narrative has also contributed to the misreading of the
Korean War in Rolando Hinojosa’s work as a bounded event totally separate from the
history of U.S. imperial border conflicts in Texas and Mexico. On the contrary, I show in
this chapter that Hinojosa’s work helps us to apprehend the Korean War as a site of the
articulation of multiple, co-present, ongoing formations of empire. One scholarly
example of such an approach is Takashi Fujitani’s comparative analysis of U.S. and
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Japanese empire during World War II, which takes the mobilization of Japanese
American soldiers for the United States and colonized Korean soldiers for Japan as
“optics through which to examine the larger operations and structures of the two
changing empires, which were based on the nation-state form, as they struggled to
manage racialized populations within the larger demands of conducting total war” (6).
Reading across these two imperial sites and histories allows Fujitani to broadly theorize
the military as an institution that facilitates the national inclusion of racialized and
colonized populations at mid-century. In discussing the U.S. military’s simultaneous
employment of and disavowal of racism during World War II, Fujitani looks specifically
at Japanese American soldiers, but his insight about the integrative function of the
military and his argument about the cross-pollination of different imperial systems over
space and time hold for the “Texas Mexicans” that Hinojosa writes about as well. The
Klail City Death Trip Series invokes multiple imperial sites and histories, most notably
including the U.S. occupation of Japan, the U.S. occupation of Korea, Japan’s occupation
of Korea, the U.S. annexation of Texas, and the Spanish colonization of Mexico. To
consider the status of the Mexican American soldier in the Korean War is necessarily to
critically engage the overlay of these disparate histories and think them together. In this
sense, the readings that follow in this chapter represent an attempt to heed Lisa Lowe’s
recent call for scholars to investigate the “forgotten intimacies…of four continents” in
their studies of race, empire, and capital (207).
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III. “After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas”: Racial Belonging in the Korean War

In the Klail City Death Trip Series, Hinojosa repeatedly compares the Korean
War to other wars in U.S. history. These wars – especially but not exclusively wars
fought in Texas and Mexico in the 19th and 20th centuries, including the War for Texas
Independence, The Mexican-American War, and the Mexican Revolution – appear as
structuring reference points in the historical memory of the Valley across the works in the
series. For example, in Rites and Witnesses (1989), a town elder named Abel Manzano
narrates the family history of Esteban Echevarría as a history of various wartimes. He
tells us that Echevarría was born “just a few years after the Americans fought between
themselves; in their own war” (109), and that one of Echevarría’s uncles fought for the
Confederates while another fought for the United States; that Echevarría’s family land is
near the site where “the Texas Rangers shot the three Naranjo brothers in 1915” during
the time of the Seditionists’ raids in the Mexican Revolution (109);34 and finally that the
town sheriff, an ex-Texas Ranger suspected to be involved with that same shooting, has
recently murdered a young Texas Mexican veteran of World War II. Such a compression
of historical time through references to war is typical of Hinojosa’s narration throughout
the series.
Hinojosa has explained that part of his motivation for making the Korean War so
prominent in his work is to “show that that the military had been another experience (as
34

The Seditionists, or the “Texas-Mexican Liberating Army,” as Hinojosa sometimes refers to them,
appear several times in the KCDTS, perhaps most memorably in Claros Varones, in which we learn about
Rafe’s family’s support of the Seditionists, and Dear Rafe, in which Jehú recounts an argument he has with
an Anglo woman over dates and places of events of the Mexican Revolution. In The Valley, the narrator
Jehú Malacara tells us that the Mexican Revolution of 1910 appears as a living event for those around him
in such a way that a “conventional term when speaking of the Mexican Revolution” is “yesterday” (37).
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had the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World
War II, etc.) of [Mexican Americans in Texas]” (Jason 299). In Korea, the characternarrator Rafe Buenrostro finds that his experiences there are constantly referred back to
these and other wars, both recent and long past, by those around him. After one
particularly grueling battle, he writes in his journal that “the Marine Old Guys must’ve
thought they died and were being forced to fight the Pacific wars all over again” (US 47);
after another, a wounded fellow soldier from Jonesboro, Arkansas tells him that the “fight
with NK was like the French-and-Indian War…all guerrilla fighting by both sides” (US
62); after he watches his own forces blow up a bridge that thousands of Korean refugees
are attempting to cross, he records, with no small amount of horror, the response of one
of the “Old Guys,” who comments nonchalantly that “it’s not the first bridge. The Union
Army did it in the Civil War. Bound to be other examples” (90). In fact, Hinojosa has
stated that his process of writing about the Korean War was essentially comparative from
the start: it was literature on World War I – he names Paul Fussell’s The Great War and
Modern Memory, Robert Graves’ Goodbye to All That, and the poetry of Siegried
Sassoon, Isaac Rosenberg, David Jones, and Wilfred Owens – that inspired him to begin
Korean Love Songs (Jason 298).35
“The Eighth Army at the Chongchon,” a poem in the first section of Korean Love
Songs, takes place in the fall in 1950, as the Eighth United States Army (the commanding
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In that interview and elsewhere, Hinojosa discusses his experimentation with form in composing Korean
Love Songs. As he explains, he initially attempted to write the book in Spanish, but came to realize that,
given that army life happened in English, he had “tried to write in the wrong language and wrong genre”
(Jason 298). Working through a process he documents in his essay “Crossing the Line: The Construction of
a Poem,” he comes to write the poems in the form of the arte mayor, a Spanish twelve-syllable form, in
English. As such, he sees the poems in KLS as poems “written in English using Spanish syllable norms”
(“Crossing” 65).
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formation of U.S. troops in South Korea to this day), positioned in the Ch’ongch’on
River Valley at the top of the Korean peninsula, is preparing to push the Chinese army
out of the war. Instead, defeated by the Chinese in a surprise counteroffensive in what
becomes the weeklong Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River in late November, U.S. troops are
forced to retreat south. In Hinojosa’s account of this battle, the brutality of the fighting
that Rafe observes haunts him for the rest of his time in Korea and beyond. But in this
poem, Rafe has other things on his mind. I quote it in its entirety here:
Creating history (their very words)
by protecting the world from Communism. I suppose
one needs a pep talk now and then, but what
Gen. Walton H. (Johnny) Walker said
Was something else.
Those were darker days, of course,
And the blinding march South
Cannot be believed
Unless you were there. But the point is
That the Chinese
Were stoppable, so Gen. Walker believed.
And he was right; later on he was killed
At one of the fronts, standing up
On a jeep. We understood.
This wasn’t Ketch Ridge or Rumbough Hill
Or the Frisco-Rock Island RR Junction at Sill,
But then, it wasn’t the Alamo either.
And those who survived
Remember what he said:
“We should not assume that (the)
Chinese Communists are committed in force.
After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas.”
And that from Eighth Army Commanding
Himself. It was touching.
And yet, the 219th
Creating history by protecting the world from Communism,
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Brought up the rear, protected the guns, continued the mission,
And many of us there
Were again reminded who we were
Thousands of miles from home. (24)
“The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” offers a few unexpected reference points for the
battle at hand. Ketch Ridge and Rumbough Hill are locations in southwest Oklahoma that
have historically been used for artillery training. The nearby Fort Sill is the site of Rafe’s
basic training (RW 15) and a U.S. Army post that, according to the Oklahoma Historical
Society, has “played a significant role in every major American conflict since 1869” and
was especially important in “policing Indian Territory and fighting against American
Indians” during westward expansion.36 And as is well known, in the Battle of the Alamo
in 1836, the Mexican army, attempting to retake land in Texas, attacked and defeated a
garrison of Texan soldiers stationed at the Alamo Mission, leaving only a handful of
survivors. It is memorialized in the United States as a rousing moment of patriotic
sacrifice (“Remember the Alamo!”) that galvanized the Texans into eventual victory over
Mexico.
These references in “The Eighth Army” to past outposts of U.S. empire in
Oklahoma and Texas set the stage for General Walker’s analogy between Chinese
Communists and Texas Mexicans, repeated several times in both Korean Love Songs and
The Useless Servants and often quoted in Hinojosa scholarship: “We should not assume
that (the)/Chinese Communists are committed in force./After all, a lot of Mexicans live in
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The history of Fort Sill is discussed by Lance Janda on the website of the Oklahoma Historical Society at
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/F/FO038.html. References to Ketch Ridge and
Rumbough Hill appear in a World War I-era text entitled Notes on Training Field Artillery Details:
Practical Instruction for Field Artillery Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Members of Special
Details.
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Texas.” Just as Mexicans living in Texas are not always loyal to our government, Walker
implies, Chinese troops impressed into military service by their Communist government
may not be “committed in force” to the North Korean cause. That someone lives in a
certain country – is risking his life for that country – doesn’t necessarily prove his loyalty
thereto, a belief Walker stakes on the apparently paradigmatic example of Mexicans
living in Texas.37 General Walker’s hypothesis about the disloyal Chinese is, of course,
proven wrong at Ch’ongch’on: the Chinese troops are apparently quite committed to
fighting this war, and the UN forces face a resounding defeat.38 Walker and thousands of
the soldiers he leads pay for his wrong guess with their lives.
The tension between Rafe and his fellow soldiers and U.S. military authority – the
opposition of “us” and “them” – animates “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon.” When
General Walker proclaims, “We should not assume that (the)/Chinese Communists are
committed in force,” his first-person plural pronoun seems to refer to the entirety of the
forces under his command, the U.S. soldiers fighting in Korea. And yet the next words
out of his mouth – “After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas” – would appear to perform
37

This inherent suspicion of Mexican Americans speaks to the entrenchment of the ideological apparatus
that B.V. Olguín argues “prefigures Mexican Americans as potential enemies whose loyalty – and
nationality – cannot be determined until they have made the ultimate sacrifice” (90). In “Sangre
Mexicana/Corazón Americano: Identity, Ambiguity, and Critique in Mexican American War Narratives,”
Olguín ties this characterization of Mexican American soldiers in the U.S. military to Juan Nepomuceno
Seguín, who fought with Anglo and Mexican Texans against Mexico in the 1836 Texas War of
Independence and for Mexico ten years later during the Mexican American War. He argues that Seguín
becomes the paradigmatic Mexican American soldier, “repeatedly forced to take sides against family,
friends, and the warring peoples to whom he feels equal amounts of filiation and antipathy” (88).
38
In fact, in The Useless Servants, the racialized American troops who are characterized as not being
“committed in force” are not Mexican Americans, but African Americans: in a journal entry dated
December 5, 1950, Rafe records the story of the “Negro arty guys” who “ran away twice when their CO
volunteered them as Inf to help truck convoy. Negroes kept separate from us; they have their own units.
I’ve no idea how I’d behave if I were an Amer Negro in the service. Separate, but in combat just the same.
Am told most of the Os are white in those units. Don’t know if this is true or if it makes a difference” (114).
The Korean War was the first American war fought after Truman’s executive order to desegregate the
military, but this order was unevenly implemented during the war; for a longer discussion of the
participation of African American soldiers in the Korean War, see chapter three of this dissertation.
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a fundamental exclusion of our narrator, Rafe Buenrostro, and the other Texas Mexican
soldiers present for Walker’s speech, interpellating them as untrustworthy elements in
“our” midst. In Hinojosa’s Korean War stories, Mexican American soldiers have been
deployed by the U.S. government to protect its geopolitical interests with their bodies and
lives, the same bodies and lives that have been systematically devalued by the white
supremacist power structures back at home over a period of centuries. Even as they fight
alongside other American soldiers in Korea, Rafe Buenrostro, Jehú Malacara, and other
Texas Mexicans are marked again and again as racially, regionally, linguistically, and
culturally alien, and their loyalties to the U.S. state are constantly cast under suspicion by
their superiors as well as their fellow grunts. Thus, Rafe’s final lines in the poem tell the
reader that “many of us there/Were again reminded who we were/Thousands of miles
from home,” pointedly emphasizing the differential status of Mexican American soldiers
within the U.S. military.39
Rafe’s “we,” then, stands in for a racially marked and colonially inflected subject
position that is separated from the larger collectivity of the U.S. army, and by extension,
of U.S. society. If the (white) leadership of the U.S. army represents an opposing “they,”
then the poem’s opening lines, “Creating history (their very words)/by protecting the
world from Communism,” give the troops their mission in the guise of an order from
above. The omission of this parenthetical statement when the lines repeat toward the end
of the poem, “Creating history by protecting the world from Communism,” reinscribes
39

As B.V. Olguín (see note 8 above) points out, Mexican American veterans have chosen to respond to this
racialized suspicion in varying ways. He cites an anthology of writing by Mexican American veterans titled
Among the Valiant: Mexican Americans in WWII and Korea whose mission is to “revise the lingering
notion that Mexican American soldiers cannot be trusted” (89). Underwritten by a “patriotic Mexican
American veterans organization” called the G.I. Forum, Among the Valiant, according to Olguín, offers a
“racist and immanently masculinist prescription for Mexican American citizenship” (89).
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Walker’s performative exclusion by underscoring how the (racial) majority of the troops
have adopted the mission and its given rationale. Rafe’s “many of us,” then, maintain a
necessary and bitter distance from “their” mission. Elsewhere in the Klail City Death Trip
Series, Texas Mexicans back at home voice the same skepticism about “their” wars. An
elderly character, reminiscing about past days in the Valley in Claros Varones, talks to
Rafe about “the wars … Those in the Valley, your brother’s overseas, and your own,
Rafe, and those other wars of theirs in which they always involve us” (208). Another
character puts it more baldly in Becky and Her Friends: “In thirty years now, this country
of theirs has been in half-a-dozen wars, hasn’t it? and what for? The Germans? Friends
again. The Japanese? Same damn thing. And the dead? Dead” (51).
Hinojosa’s “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” thus tells a story about racial
exclusion and the long memory of colonial war, as Rafe carries the histories of conquest
at the Alamo and the Río Grande with him to the Ch’ongch’on and the 38th parallel. But
I’d like to return to the omission of the parenthetical, “(their very words),” in the
repetition of the slogan, “Creating history by protecting the world from Communism,” at
the end of the poem. As I have stated above, one way to read this poem is to see an
irreparable breach between the “many of us” who were “reminded who we
were/Thousands of miles from home” and the “we” who would liken Chinese
Communists to Texas Mexicans. But I’d like to suggest that the poem also effects a
suturing of those two collectivities through the repetition-with-omission of those opening
lines. That is, if the repetition of “Creating history by protecting the world from
Communism” without the parenthetical demonstrates the extent to which Rafe and other
Texas Mexican soldiers have also adopted “their very words,” then we must also read the
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poem’s last three lines differently. What if General Walker’s words interpellate Rafe and
his friends not just as Mexican outsiders, but also as American soldiers abroad? What if
his “we” is at once exclusionary and performatively inclusive? In this sense, the Texas
Mexican soldier in the poem is just like the Chinese Communist in Korea: a member of a
foreign occupying army, committed in force only because he is under orders to be so.40
The poem’s final lines – “And many of us there/Were again reminded who we were” –
thus speak not just to a minoritarian Texas Mexican “us,” reminded of collective
subjugation in and by U.S. imperial history, but also to a universalized and imperial
American “we,” creating U.S. (imperial) history by protecting the world from
Communism.

IV. “A new life?”: Racial Liberalism after the Korean War

I have argued thus far that the combat experiences of Rafe and his fellow Texas
Mexicans fighting in the Korean War serves to underscore their exclusion from the white
American mainstream at the same time that it compels their identification with that
mainstream. This tense dynamic of conditional liberal inclusion has been described by
historians and scholars of postwar and Cold War U.S. culture as part of the ascendancy of
a newfound attitude of domestic liberal pluralism with regard to race in the postwar
United States. Mary Dudziak argues in Cold War Civil Rights that from 1946 through the
40

Indeed, in The Useless Servants, Rafe Buenrostro’s last journal entry before being sent back home to
Texas is dedicated in part to “all the other useless servants, the CCF, who also fought for their masters in a
foreign land” (184). Such a characterization puts the Chinese and American troops on the same side, that of
the foreign invader. In the same entry, we learn that the phrase “the useless servants” comes from Luke
17:10 in the Bible: “Well, will we then be like the useless servants who did nothing more than that which
was commanded of us?” (184).
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mid-1960s, the federal government “engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story
about race and American democracy: a story of progress, a story of the triumph of good
over evil, a story of U.S. moral superiority”—even if American race relations did “not
always stay neatly in this frame” (13). And as Mae Ngai argues in Impossible Subjects:
Illegal Aliens and the Making of America, this story necessarily enlisted pluralism as an
assimilationist strategy that “recognized difference in order to efface it within the
universality of liberal democratic politics” (234).
Dudziak, Ngai, and other scholars also show that this progress narrative of race
relations became important in the unfolding global Cold War, as the U.S. state attempted
to prove the superiority of liberal capitalist democracy over Soviet Communism by
pointing to its gradual accommodation of civil rights reforms, ostensibly achieved
through civic participation as a hallmark of democratic process, at home (13). In this
way, as Jodi Melamed argues, racial liberalism and U.S. global ascendancy were
mutually constitutive in this period (4). In Melamed’s analysis, the postwar liberal racial
formation “sutured an official antiracism” – that is, an official state antiracism – “to a
U.S. nationalism itself bearing the agency for transnational capitalism” (5). This “official
antiracism” in the context of the Cold War also curtailed the conversation about different
visions for change. As Dudziak notes, the postwar racial formation limited the purview of
civil rights reform “to formal equality, to opening the doors of opportunity, and away
from a broader critique of the American economic and political system” (252). The
dominant fiction of postwar race relations was one of the ethnic subject assimilating into
an ever more accepting U.S. society, helped along by the democratic state.

73

In Hinojosa’s depiction of his characters’ return home to Texas after the Korean
War, this dynamic of gradual racial assimilation and class attainment is facilitated by
their affiliation with the military. The time that Rafe and his friends have served in the
war yields material benefits that were previously beyond their reach because of staunchly
enforced class and racial barriers. For Rafe and Jehú, these benefits come about largely
through their access to the Veterans’ Adjustment Acts of 1944 and 1952, popularly
known as the GI Bill. The GI Bill promoted what has been called a “bridging process” for
many Mexican-American veterans in the postwar period, providing a new avenue for
gaining access to education, improved health care, and higher income—even if the
distribution and implementation of these benefits was still decisively marred by racial
discrimination.41 In Hinojosa’s work, this process comes to bear clear rewards for both
Rafe and Jehú. Before the war, Rafe is a farmhand on his family ranch, but after returning
from the war and earning a degree at the University of Texas in Austin, he finds a job as a
teacher at his old high school, earns a law degree, and eventually becomes a lieutenant in
the Belken County Police Department. Jehú similarly goes from working odd jobs before
the war – assistant to a Bible salesman, stagehand in a traveling carnival, migrant farm
worker – to holding a position at the Klail City First National Bank as a successful banker
and loan officer after receiving a college diploma.

41

In his article “Fighting the Peace at Home: Mexican American Veterans and the 1944 GI Bill of Rights,”
Steven Rosales refers to “the many potential opportunities that have benefited veterans as compared to their
non-veteran counterparts, such as preferential hiring practices, military training, and exposure to
mainstream bureaucratic organizations, as well as the GI Bill” as a part of the “bridging environment” that
aided Mexican American veterans after World War II and the Korean War. He further argues that “veteran
status for socially marginalized and other working-class groups seemed to enhance this bridging process
even more because of their previously disadvantaged position in U.S. society” (599).
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The Korean War in this way becomes integral to Hinojosa’s depiction of Rafe and
Jehú’s upward mobility in the Valley.42 But an anecdote Rafe shares in The Valley
illustrates how racist assumptions continue to pervade the implementation of the
technically color-blind GI Bill. After returning home from Korea, Rafe goes to see a
Veterans Affairs adviser for advice about the potential benefits and uses of the GI Bill.
The adviser, an Anglo, suggests that Rafe use his GI Bill to sign up for a “two-year
course in boat-building,” and perhaps after that, another in “cabinet making” (53).
Remembering the same story years afterward in Claros Varones de Belken, Rafe adds
that the VA adviser “told me that if I had any ambition I could well attend high school
with the same GI Bill” (24). It is not lost on the reader that Rafe ends up teaching, not
attending, high school later in the same volume. In the version of the story told in The
Valley, Rafe merely comments to the reader, “Some adviser; some advice,” and
announces that he is leaving the Valley for Austin, where he has registered at the
University of Texas. Wondering about his prospects there, he writes, “It’ll be a new town
for me. Will it be a new life? We’ll see” (53).
Rafe’s university education does indeed offer him a new life, one that maps onto
the emergent progress narrative of racial liberalism. The anecdote about the “rowboat
gringo,” as Jehú calls him, reveals how race and class continue to circumscribe Rafe’s
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Hinojosa has also commented on this phenomenon in relation to his own career. In his opinion, “what
happened in the Seventies [when he began to publish] is that the Veterans’ Entitlement Acts of World War
II and Korea had produced a sizable and critical mass of educated U.S. Hispanics by the Fifties and Sixties”
(Ibarrola-Armendariz 219). He adds that he feels “privileged to have witnessed and to have participated in
the changes in the US academy” (Ibarrola-Armendariz 224). His novel We Happy Few (2006), the most
recent book in the KCDTS, is set on a fictional state college campus in the Rio Grande Valley and
dramatizes some of these changes, particularly with regard to the inclusion of people of color in the
academy since the 1950s. Hinojosa earned his Ph.D at the University of Illinois in 1969 and is currently a
Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin.

75

life choices even as new opportunities are systematically being made available to him.
But his service for the state in the U.S. military fuels his ability to transcend residual
racial barriers. That is, the “official antiracism” of the U.S. state places him alongside
Anglo American soldiers in Korea and funds his education, allowing him to break out of
a racialized and classed trajectory that, in the new postwar liberal racial formation, is no
longer his sole option. Over time, he and Jehú do manage to penetrate some of the most
cherished centers of power in Belken County (and U.S.) society – the bank and the police
– but that is not to say that they find unmitigated acceptance among the white Anglo
elites of Belken County. Jehú in particular finds that even with the institutional
imprimatur of the Klail City First National Bank, his leapfrogging into a higher
socioeconomic status is met with resistance by the still-racist Anglos around him who can
only barely disguise their distaste at his attempt to join their ranks. At the same time, he
encounters disbelief verging on resentment from some of the Texas Mexicans whom he
has “left behind,” so to speak. In Dear Rafe, for example, an old acquaintance of Jehú’s,
Emilio Tamez, complains, “And Jehu? Well? Well? When has he ever faced anybody
down in this cantina? In any cantina? College has ruined that guy; got himself educated,
and then he couldn’t measure up in the street or in the Bank!” (117).
While Rafe and Jehú’s careers after Korea and the GI Bill appear to make good
on the promises of racial liberalism, other characters’ trajectories in the KCDTS challenge
and disrupt the operative terms of that progress narrative. Unlike Rafe and Jehú, for
example, Charlie Villalón does not get to access the GI Bill as a reward for his military
service in Korea, because he is killed in combat. In his case, the military’s liberal
inclusion is fatal. In Klail City, Rafe tells a story about his junior year in high school
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when “Charlie Villalón was awarded a letter and a football jacket to go with it: K C in
purple inside a white map of Texas” (72). Rafe is given a letter, but no jacket: he is told
he “hadn’t played enough quarters as per University Interscholastic League
requirements” (72). But that was “bullshit,” he continues: “The Texas Anglo kids all got
sweaters or jackets. Oh yes.” The following year, he and the other overlooked Texas
Mexican football players collectively refuse to participate in practice. When the coach
asks them why they “ain’t out there running wind sprints and getting your licks like the
rest of ‘em,” they explain the situation. He gets the point, and soon after, “the schoolboard, somehow, came up with enough money for sweaters for all the eligibles” (72).
So far, this story reads as a parable of racial progress through a collective struggle
for civil rights: the Texas Mexican students discover a clear-cut case of racial
discrimination, fashion a collective plan to fight it, and successfully manage to claim full
and equal status on the team. But it turns out that the story’s ending is far from
celebratory in nature. Rafe concludes the story by commenting that their victory “didn’t
mean much, really. In fact, it didn’t mean a thing: Charlie Villalón and a couple of the
other guys on the team died in Korea in 1951 at the Chongchon River crossing” (72). We
find that the narrative of upward mobility for Charlie ends before it can really begin. He
never gets to access the promised benefits of the GI Bill because the one precondition for
those benefits, fighting for the U.S. military in the Korean War, leaves him dead. In
Charlie’s case, the actual Cold War interrupts the Cold War racial formation that would
allow him to fulfill his youthful quest for full and equal citizenship.
If a model of racial liberalism aspires to efface racial difference within the
universality of liberal democracy, to repeat Mae Ngai’s words, then the poem
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commemorating Charlie Villalón’s death in Korean Love Songs also presents an
interesting rebuttal of that model. When Rafe and his friend Joey Vielma finally find out
a few months after the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River that Charlie, whose whereabouts
had been unknown since that battle, died in that battle, they decide to visit his presumed
burial site during their time off to pay their final respects. To their chagrin, they are also
joined by an army chaplain named John McCreedy who drinks with them at the gravesite.
In “Boston John McCreedy Drinks with Certain Lewd Men of the Baser Sort” from
Korean Love Songs, Rafe depicts their evening in part as follows:
He’s from New England, Charlie;
A true descendant of our Founding Fathers
Who settled on a cape
Not ten thousand miles from this very spot.
Lately, Boston John’s been wondering
What he is doing hee-ah.
The question is simple and direct,
But it doesn’t compare to ours:
Chaplain Mac (and we point we do to this Korean soil)
What the hell’s Charlie Villalón
Doing hee-ah?
And he cries, does Boston John
In his GI issue bee-ah. (56)
For Rafe, Boston John’s “why am I here?” is so “simple and direct” a question that he
and Joey can only deign to answer it with one of their own: why is Charlie here? What is
a simple and direct question about Boston John McCreedy apparently becomes more
complicated when it’s about Charlie Villalón from Belken County, Texas. In what sense
is it that these two men, to use the language of the poem, don’t “compare”?
Chaplain John McCreedy is figured in this poem as incontestably American, a
“true descendant of our Founding Fathers” from New England. Later described more
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humbly in the poem as a “descendant of whalers and traders,” he can apparently
nonetheless trace his lineage back to a proud and classically American tradition. Charlie
Villalón’s lineage reveals him to be the virtual opposite of Boston John McCreedy in this
regard. In Claros Varones de Belken, we learn that the Villalóns run a goat ranch on an
estate that is “among the largest and also the poorest in the Valley,” which the narrator P.
Galindo informs us has been “goat land” since before “Escandón brought the first
settlers” (114). According to the Texas State Historical Association, José de Escandón, a
Spanish colonizer of Mexico born in 1700, is “sometimes called the ‘father’ of the lower
Rio Grande valley” in Texas (García). Where John is a “true descendant of the Founding
Fathers,” then, Charlie is the descendant of Mexican settlers led by a foundational Texas
Mexican – not American – colonial figure. Where John is the “descendant of whalers and
traders,” Charlie is the descendant of Mexican goatherds.43
John McCreedy’s conspicuous Boston accent as rendered in the poem – hee-ah,
bee-ah, and so on – reveals that he comes from a distinctive American culture. It marks
him as more, not less, American. Charlie, Rafe, and Joey, on the other hand, find that
their regional dialect at turns interests, annoys, and threatens their fellow soldiers. Rafe
notes such occurrences throughout his journals in The Useless Servants. For example, his
entry for August 6 notes that “Skinner and Stang [two members of his unit] are forever
after Joey, Charlie and me about speaking Spanish… The three of us will prob have it
out…with Skinner and Stang and whoever else wants some after this is over” (41). On
43

It is noteworthy that this discussion of the Villalón family roots is one of the few moments in the KCDTS
that directly discusses Spanish settler colonialism in Mexico, a history that largely goes unspoken in the
series’ characterizations of Mexico. Hinojosa’s elision of settler colonialism in his depictions of U.S.
empire on the Texas/Mexico border is a topic in need of of further critique and investigation in scholarship
on his work.
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September 15, he notes that the three of them “got to speaking Spanish and then went
into English and then mixed both as we always do,” driving a nearby member of their
unit “crazy” (72). 44 In perhaps the most pointed example, on October 21, he writes that
one Lieutenant Brodkey “asked if we spoke Spanish and we said, ‘Sure, Lt. All the time.’
Said our English was very good, and we told him we were Americans, just like him”
(79). (He continues, “We call ourselves Mexicans, we said, and our fellow Texans call us
that too. Wanted to know if that bothered us. At this, Charlie said it depended on how it
was said.”) In this exchange, Brodkey’s naïve compliment about their “good English”
and his confusion about what to call them show to what extent Charlie, Joey, and Rafe
are viewed as something other than American even as they are serving in the U.S. army.
To return to the scene at Charlie’s burial site in Korea, then, the poem’s question
about what John and Charlie are each doing “hee-ah” in Korea brings out a bitter irony:
the question of why John is in Korea has apparently only occurred to him lately, while
Rafe, Joey, and Charlie have had that question foisted upon them by other soldiers in
Korea – recall General Walker’s comments in “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” –
ever since they arrived there. Indeed, they have asked and been asked why they are where
they are back in Texas for their entire lives. Now, in this poem, they pose that same
question to Boston John: “Chaplain Mac (and we point we do to this Korean soil)/What
the hell’s Charlie Villalón/Doing hee-ah?” The universal, existential question here – why
is our friend dead? – goes unanswered, as does the more basic question of what exactly
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These entries recall similar conflicts over the use of Spanish in the stories in the KCDTS set in Texas as
well. In Rites and Witnesses, for example, an older Anglo woman named Rebecca Ruth Verser complains
to the narrator, “If they like Spanish so much, why don’t they go to Mexico? It’s right there. It’s right there,
right on top of us, for crying out loud” (97).
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the U.S. army is doing in Korea and why. But the question Rafe dwells on is both blunter
and more pointed: what is Charlie Villalón doing here, in Korea? And did he ever really
belong here?
Rafe addresses these questions, among others, with a psychiatrist whom he is
assigned to see before being discharged in May 1951. By this point, Joey, like Charlie,
has been killed in action, and his friend Sonny Ruiz has gone AWOL. But, he writes
grimly, “I’m still here.” When Dr. Perlman asks if he feels guilty for surviving, he replies
that it’s not guilt but a sense of loss that he feels. He writes in his journal,
Dr. Perlman has always listened attentively and (I guess) sympathetically, but
even he doesn’t know about us, about home, Texas. I explained that we were
different; that that part of Texas is home, our home. We’re not like the rest of the
guys in our outfit; they can go live anywhere in the United States, and many of
them talk about moving to California, wherever. We can’t, and don’t want to,
either. That some of us leave for a while, but that we have to come back. Home.
And so on. (Useless 167)
Just as Charlie Villalón is different from Boston John McCreedy in the poem above, in
this passage, “we” are “not like the rest of the guys in our outfit.” Rafe insists that unlike
other Americans, who can choose where in the country they’d like to settle, he and his
people have one place, “that part of Texas,” that constitutes home—and he despairs over
the fact that Charlie, Joey, and Sonny will not be returning there with him. In effect, he
repeats the same bitter question about Charlie Villalón’s death that we encountered in
Korean Love Songs (“what the hell’s Charlie Villalón/doing hee-ah?”) in the form of a
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now-impossible injunction: “some of us leave for awhile, but we have to come back.” For
Rafe, Charlie did not belong in Korea, or at least not forever.
Rafe claims that Texas Mexicans “can’t, and don’t want to” live in different parts
of the United States in the same way that other Americans can and do, the formal equality
of postwar racial liberalism be damned. Recall that in “The Eighth Army at the
Chongchon,” he also discloses the distrust that “many of us” felt about “their very
words,” a we/they formulation that I argued must be read as ambiguous. In this passage,
more than the pairing of “we” and “they,” which represent clearly articulated groups, I
am interested in the conceptual gap that Hinojosa opens up between “can’t” and “don’t
want to.” We encounter this rhetorical slippage elsewhere in Hinojosa’s work as well.
Earlier in The Useless Servants, for example, Rafe and his friends go to Mass at a Roman
Catholic cathedral in Tokyo while there on “R&R,” rest and recuperation, and they notice
“some people sitting in two marked-off sections” (80). When they ask about “the people
in the boxed-in benches,” they find out that they are Korean Catholics living in Japan
who “couldn’t and didn’t sit with the rest of the faithful” (80, my emphasis). (When the
white American soldier with them is shocked, Charlie responds, “Hell, Lt, I don’t even
know where the Klail Anglos go to Mass or if they even have a church.”) Similarly, in
Rites and Witnesses, an Anglo woman shopkeeper, recalling when the first Mexicanowned business opened up in town, voices her suspicion about where the MexicanAmerican owner acquired the startup funds for his business: “Vicente was a hard worker,
don’t you know. It was just that it was a lot of money in those days, see…? And since he
couldn’t, I mean, he didn’t-a, didn’t have a bank account, at the First … Know what I
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mean?” (78, my emphasis).45 Each of these three stories concerns the nature of a
particular instance of racial segregation: a country that is not equally welcoming to all, a
boxed-in section among the pews in a church, a bank that is not open to everyone. What
inheres in the space between “can’t” and “don’t want to,” between “couldn’t” and
“didn’t” in these stories?
In the latter two examples, “didn’t” presents a softer, friendlier, more
happenstance version of the proscriptive, ugly “couldn’t.” After all, the Korean Catholics
“couldn’t and didn’t” sit with the Japanese because they were prevented from doing so,
just as Vicente Vizcarra, Jr. “couldn’t, I mean, he didn’t-a, didn’t” open a bank account at
the Klail City First National Bank because he wasn’t allowed to. In both of these cases,
the hopeful “didn’t” provides a kind of cover for the coercive reality of “couldn’t.” The
rhetorical slide from “couldn’t” to “didn’t” thus marks an understanding that the logic of
segregation is, however slowly, becoming unacceptably antiquated in the postwar
moment of racial liberalism. That is, it maps onto a historical transition in understandings
of race and racism.
Rafe’s version of these words – “we can’t, and don’t want to” move anywhere
else – name a different relation. In the other two cases, we imagine that both parties did,
in fact, want the option to do what they were barred from doing. That is, they didn’t
because they couldn’t: they didn’t have a choice. Here, in contrast, Rafe essentially
argues the opposite: he and the others can’t move away from Texas, but more
importantly, they don’t want to. He desires the same proscription that he instates: he
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The First, or the Klail City First National Bank, is the same bank that hires Jehú some years later, a fact
that demonstrates the extent of the racial “progress” that the bank achieves in a short amount of time.
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clings to the “can’t” and refuses to want otherwise. Refusing to abide by the lie that
smoothly replaces “couldn’t” with “didn’t” over time, he articulates an inversion of the
formula that follows a progress narrative of racial liberalism.
Rafe believes that Texas is the place for Texas Mexicans to live, then, now, and in
the future. But ironically, at the end of the Korean War, he is one of the only Texas
Mexicans from the Valley who gets to return home. While most of his friends from home
are killed in Korea, making a return to Texas impossible, one of them makes a choice that
goes against his strict formulation in this passage: Sonny Ruiz can and does choose to
remain in Japan after the war. To conclude this chapter, I’d like to turn to his story as it
appears in Korean Love Songs. In this chapter, I have argued that the U.S. military served
as an institutional access point for the Texas Mexican characters of Hinojosa’s narrative
universe in the period of Cold War civil rights, allowing these characters opportunities to
enter spaces of power and privilege that previously excluded them. I have argued that this
transformation brings together two histories of U.S. empire often viewed as completely
separate: U.S. empire in Texas and Mexico and U.S. empire in South Korea, and in doing
so, I have made the case for a comparative mode of reading colonial and imperial texts.
The coda that follows attempts to take such a reading practice further, examining
Hinojosa’s ambivalent engagement with the subsumed history of Japanese colonialism,
which prefigures the U.S. occupation of South Korea and predates the U.S. occupation of
Japan. In doing so, I aim to highlight the value of not just reading across different
instances of U.S. empire over time and space, but contending with the multiply layered
histories of race and empire in the spaces we study—in this case, in occupied postwar
Japan.
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V. Coda: “To Americans he looks Japanese”: Competing Racism(s) in Occupied
Japan

In the KCDTS, Sonny Ruiz is the one character serving in the Korean War who
comes to actively refuse to participate in a system that would trade in his willingness to
risk his life for the promise of future benefits. After being wounded twice, Sonny picks
up and leaves Korea, literally walking away from the military after filling out his own
missing-in-action card. According to Rafe’s journals in The Useless Servants, Sonny
“was wounded lightly both times, but he said the third time could be a charm, and he sure
as hell wasn’t going to take a chance” (158). In the third and final section of Korean Love
Songs, which begins in September 1951 during Rafe’s second “R&R” in Japan, Rafe
goes to see his old friend:

Not long after, cards started to arrive from Nagoya and signed
By Mr. Kazuo Fusaro who, in another life,
Had lived as David Ruiz in Klail City,
And who, in this new life,
Was now a hundred and ten per cent Japanese.
There he is, punctual as death: Business suit, hat, arms at his side,
And as I approach, he fills the air with konnichi wahs,
As he bends lower and lower, arms still at his side, smiling the while.
He and I are the only ones left:
Charlie Villalón, Joey Vielma, Cayo Díaz
And a kid named Balderas
Have all been erased from the Oriental scene. (98)
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When Rafe confronts Sonny with the question of home, he responds, “‘This is home,
Rafe, Why should I go back?’” (100). When the army’s “Board of Inquiry” finally gets
around to investigating his disappearance, Sonny calls on Rafe to “swear/That, to the
very best of my knowledge,/Cpl. Ruiz is dead” (114). Rafe acquiesces, and with that, the
case is closed. Sonny settles down with a Japanese schoolteacher named Tsuruko – news
that Rafe responds to with the line, “And didn’t we/As Cayo said,/Make out better with
Japanese girls because we were Chicanos?” (100) – and plans to live the rest of his life in
Japan. Sonny’s mother back at home will receive “something to eat and live on” from the
army, and Rafe swears to never reveal to her, the rest of his family, or anyone else back
in Texas that Sonny did not die in Korea.
Rafe doesn’t think the army will ever find Sonny, for “to begin with/To
Americans he looks Japanese” (98). In the poem “Brief Encounter,” the ineptness of the
U.S. army’s racial perception is on full display. As two military police officers stop Rafe
to check his papers on the street,
Just then, Sonny Ruiz passes by and tips his hat, showing,
As he carries, the biggest, the loudest, the most glorious bouquet
In the whole of Honshu.
One of them grunts and says:
“Pipe the gook and them flowers, there.
Damndest place I’ve ever seen.” (102)
Without his uniform, it seems, Sonny is just another “gook” in a foreign land. As
someone who grew up under the shadow of U.S. empire, Rafe, our narrator, is sensitive
to the peculiar capaciousness of the term “gook.” Early in his war journals in The Useless
Servants, he learns that “K’s call their homeland Hanguk (Han-Guk?),” and at the same
time that he wonders whether “gook come[s] from that,” he notes that a fellow American
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soldier who was once married to a Puerto Rican told him that “Puerto Ricans were called
gooks by GIs stationed in the Caribbean” (39).46 Under this occupation, then, Sonny is
one kind of “gook” disguised as another. The lazy racism of the U.S. military allows him
to pass undetected, even to flaunt his freedom after his criminal act of desertion, under
the very eyes of its occupying guards. After all, in this scene, it is Rafe in his U.S.
military uniform, not Sonny in his racial drag, whose papers are being checked by the
police.
As Ramón Saldívar argues in “Chicano Border Narratives as Cultural Critique,”
these scenes of Sonny’s new life as Kazuo Fusaro in Nagoya, Japan “seem to project a
utopian fantasy about cultural synthesis” (145). Sonny chooses to see a “cultural affinity
between Japanese and Mexican American life” that offers him a “turn away from an
oppressed, self-negating home in South Texas” (143). For him and Rafe, Saldívar argues,
this “alien world seems rich…in contrast to the one to which they must return” (145).
Although Sonny and Rafe are both susceptible to a romanticized view of Japan, it is
Sonny whose certainty that he will “find in Japan what he cannot possess at home” leads
him to the radical decision to settle there (145). As Saldívar points out, this decision
entails his repudiating not just the U.S. military and its exploitation of his person, but his
former home and the Chicano community along with it. Rafe, in contrast, “chooses not to
turn against his American home,” a decision that Saldívar reads as an affirmation of the
“community and collectivity which has been the historical heritage of the border
46

In Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War, Jodi Kim outlines the “enduring, varied,
and infamous etymology of ‘gook’” as a marker of “America’s long-standing history of military
intervention and war not only in Asia, but in other parts of the world” (2-3). Citing Paul Kramer and David
Roediger, she notes that “gook” has been recorded as a pejorative term against Filipinos, Asians, Haitians,
Arabs, and other people of color since at least the Philippine-American War, which began in 1899.

87

communities of South Texas” (147). Indeed, Saldívar concludes that Sonny and Rafe
represent two different “solution[s] to the confusion of serving one’s own oppressor”:
“assimilation to another world” for the former and “the determination to return to the
contradictory but familiar one” – and a renewed sense of commitment to the Chicano
community – for the latter (146).
Hinojosa depicts Sonny’s choice to settle in Japan as extreme but understandable,
given the duress he faced as a soldier and the oppression he lived under back at home.
Saldívar critiques Sonny’s escapism as both a romanticization of Japan and a rejection of
Chicano culture. But I want to point out here that Saldívar’s characterizations of the
Korean and Japanese settings that these characters encounter – the “masking quality” of
their cultures, the “ritualized Japanese way of life” (141) – also draw upon a familiar set
of tropes about the Far East as an alluring yet alien place for drifting Westerners. “It is no
wonder,” he writes, “that [Rafe and Sonny] are charmed by the allure of Japanese selfsufficiency, integrity, and family solidarity in the face of an occupying American army”
(145). But such a rendering of postwar Japan flattens the complexities of race and empire
that persist in that space. It also elides the peculiar status of these characters, colonized at
home in Texas but part of the colonizing force in Japan. As I will show below, far from
an idealized site of escape from racism and colonialism, Japan in the Cold War era was
deeply bound up in both residual and newly emerging racial and colonial systems. Sonny
Ruiz’ unique status as an outsider in Japan – and as a persona non grata in the eyes of the
U.S. military following his desertion – would not exempt him from participating in these
systems. The white American soldiers that Sonny encounters mistake him as just another
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“gook”: “to Americans he looks Japanese.” But what does Sonny Ruiz look like to the
Japanese?
At the time of the Korean War, Japan was simultaneously a nation under
occupation and a decolonizing power. In the early twentieth century, Japan had promoted
the “master ideology” of the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,”
another name for the Japanese empire which, in historian John Lie’s words, “promised
Asian unity and liberation from Western rule” (102). Under these auspices, it colonized
East and Southeast Asian and Pacific territories including Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria
in the first half of the twentieth century. After its defeat in World War II, Japan was
occupied by the U.S. military from 1946 to 1952, a period in which, according to John
Dower, Japan “had no sovereignty,” as “no major political, administrative, or economic
decisions were possible without the [U.S.] conquerors’ approval” (23). At the same time,
Japan was rebuilding as a capitalist regional power under the protection of the United
States in the context of the emerging Cold War. Put otherwise, as historian Bruce
Cumings has argued, Japan in the twentieth century functioned as “‘core’ vis-à-vis Korea
and China” but “semi-peripheral vis-à-vis the United States” (86).47 Takashi Fujitani
similarly argues that the United States made Japan into a “puppet” or “client state”
through occupation after World War II in the same manner that Japan had set up client
states across Asia in the first half of the twentieth century (103). The terms of Japan’s
surrender in World War II called for its immediate withdrawal from its colonial
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Cumings outlines the following timeline for Japan in the 20th century world system: 1900-22: Japan in
British-American hegemony; 1922-41: Japan in American-British hegemony; 1941-45: Japan as regional
hegemon in East Asia; 1945-70: Japan in American hegemony; 1970-1990s: Japan in American-European
hegemony (103).
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territories. But Japan’s conquest of Asia had already resulted in an influx of Taiwanese,
Koreans, and other colonized peoples to Japan. These colonized subjects had either been
conscripted as forced laborers or migrated to Japan in search of work, and like Japan’s
indigenous ethnic minorities, they faced widespread discrimination and conditions of
poverty (Lie 110). No longer considered Japanese nationals after Japan’s surrender, they
were also stripped of citizenship and referred to as daisankokujin, or “third-country
people,” rather than gaijin, the conventional term for “foreigner” which “was reserved for
Caucasians” (Dower 578). Given these conditions, many ethnic minorities in Japan
adopted Japanese names and attempted to “pass as ‘ordinary’ Japanese and hide their
ethnic background” for fear of discrimination (Lie 5).48
The Japan that Rafe, Sonny, and their fellow soldiers encountered, then, would
have been a space rife with racial and colonial tensions. As members of the U.S.
occupying forces, they are partly shielded from these dynamics, but in his journals in The
Useless Servants, Rafe registers his recognition of Japan’s erstwhile colonial relationship
to Korea. At one point, as his unit heads northwest toward the border between North
Korea and Manchuria, he learns from an officer that “both Korea and Manchuria were
under Jap domination for years. Korea was called Chosun or Chosen by the Js and
Manchukuo was their name for Manchuria” (77). Rafe goes on to wonder “who named it
Korea,” but concludes that “One thing is sure: the Old Guys all agree that Koreans don’t
like the Japs one damned bit” (77). In a conversation soon after that, he recounts an
48

Fujitani argues that the ideology of the “supremacy of the pure Yamato race” was fading in the last years
of the war, in large part because of the Japanese empire’s need to mobilize ethnic minority soldiers to fight
for Japan in World War II. As such, he considers the World War II period a moment of a shift to what he
calls “inclusionary racism,” in which ethnic minorities in Japan were newly being interpellated into the
Japanese nation (77).
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instance of having attending Mass at a Catholic cathedral in Tokyo during which he “saw
some people sitting in two marked-off sections” (80). He learned that the “people in the
boxed-in benches” were “Korean Caths” who “couldn’t and didn’t sit with the rest of the
faithful” (80). He reports that his white lieutenant was surprised at the story “until Charlie
said, ‘Hell, Lt, I don’t even know where the Klail Anglos go to Mass or if they even have
a church’” (77). Here, Charlie draws an immediate structural comparison between the
segregation of the dominant Japanese and colonized Koreans in Tokyo and the
segregation of the dominant Anglos and colonized Mexicans back at home in Klail City.
Significantly, it seems that the Mexican-American soldiers’ experience of colonial and
ethnic oppression at home gives them a framework for understanding the colonial and
ethnic oppression they have witnessed in Japan.
At the same time, however, as soldiers in an occupying military, they have come
to see Japan as their “home.” As Rafe narrates in his journals, after being dispatched from
Japan to Korea at the start of hostilities, he and his fellow troops almost immediately
begin “dreaming about ‘home’ in Japan” (US 81). After deserting the army, Sonny finds,
as Rafe puts it, “increasingly good reasons” to call Japan “home” (KLS 100). In his
postcards to his friends, Rafe remembers, he “dribbled bits and pieces of how he made it
back to Yamato; Sonny always uses the poetic name for Japan, and he says he’s at home
here” (US 158). Tellingly, what Sonny thinks of as the “poetic” name for Japan,
“Yamato,” is the name of the dominant and ruling ethnic group in Japan. An outsider in
Japan, Sonny remains unfamiliar with structures of racism and histories of colonialism in
his new home. Rather, Japan is a place that American soldiers associate with modern
comforts, leisure, and safety. Particularly in a city such as Nagoya, host to a U.S. military
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base, U.S. soldiers out on “rest and relaxation” would have been a common part of the
landscape of occupation. His act of desertion has severed his ties to the military, but
Sonny still occupies a position of privilege as an American man making his home in
postwar Japan.
Sonny’s relationship with his Japanese girlfriend constitutes perhaps his biggest
reason to call Japan home. Hinojosa’s depiction of that relationship, and of the sexual
relationships between Rafe and various Japanese women, illustrates the gendered nature
of the power that American servicemen maintain in occupied Japan. Sonny’s girlfriend,
Tsuruko, is a Japanese schoolteacher; when Rafe describes his visit to their home in “At
Sonny’s and Tsuruko’s” in Korean Love Songs, he paints a domestic scene in which
“Sonny, kimono-wrapped, pours the tea” while Tsuruko shows Rafe the gifts that Sonny
has given her (104). She is not the first Japanese woman to make an appearance in
Korean Love Songs. In fact, just before and after going to see Sonny and Tsuruko in
Nagoya, Rafe visits his favorite brothels as a part of his “R&R.” He makes a stop in
Honshu to visit “Shirley’s Temple of Pleasure Emporium,” and see a “good
acquaintance” – that is, a prostitute for whom he has been a regular client – whose “love
duties” for Rafe include massages and tea service in addition to the “usual bath and mat
and bath” (92). Just after leaving Sonny’s, he travels to the “Pages of Wisdom geisha”
and goes on to “call on” another prostitute, who also bathes, massages, and serves him
(112). Rafe’s periods of “R&R” in Japan seem to be synonymous with his ability to
access the sexual labor of women in Japan.
Such encounters were, of course, widespread during the U.S. occupation of Japan.
According to historian Naoko Shibusawa, “As was typical of soldiers in conquering
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armies, American GIs who wanted to procure sexual services could count on the
desperation of women, including young war widows, in the defeated nation” (38).49 Sex
between women in Japan and U.S. servicemen took place under a range of auspices, from
the government-endorsed “Recreation and Amusement Association” (composed of
Japanese women “volunteers” who vowed to “defend and nurture the purity of our race”
by acting as a “breakwater to hold back the raging waves” of U.S. troops’ sexual
voracity) to the independently run “emporia” that Rafe visits to the frequent sexual
assault of women on and near military bases (Dower 126). According to John Dower,
many U.S. servicemen held a “characteristic colonial attitude” toward women in Japan,
regarding them as “little more than available sexual objects” (138). But at the same time,
as Shibusawa puts it, women who had sex with U.S. troops “helped, with their
ministrations and their bodies, to mediate, attenuate, and manage the hostility the U.S.
servicemen felt toward Japan” (39). That Rafe repeatedly (and euphemistically) describes
the women he visits as “old friends” (92), for example, shows how the intimacy he
experiences with these women colors his remembrances of Japan.
Does it matter that these particular GIs are Chicanos, as in Rafe’s recollection of
his friend Cayo Díaz’s words—“And didn’t we make out better with Japanese girls
because we were Chicanos?” Indeed, race did mediate American servicemen’s access to
sex in Japan. In the early stages of the occupation, prostitutes in Japan were segregated
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Hinojosa mentions this very phenomenon in the context of Texas and Mexico in an interview with Aitor
Ibarrola-Armendariz. Discussing the many mixed-race Mexicans with hyphenated Anglo surnames living
in Texas, he notes that “most of these [came from] marriages between World War I soldiers and Texas
Mexican women from Mercedes” (216). During World War I, U.S. troops were stationed in south Texas
due to perceived threats from Germany regarding the so-called “Zimmerman Letter,” a secret telegram in
which the German state offered to help Mexico regain its ceded territories in Texas, Arizona, and New
Mexico if Mexico joined the German effort in the war.
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into hierarchical “districts” reserved for U.S. officers, white enlisted men, and black
enlisted men; later, as the sex industry developed over the course of the occupation, the
“panpan girls” were lauded as “transcend[ing] racial and international prejudice” because
many of them “consorted openly and comfortably with both white and black GIs”
(Dower 133). Even the systematic sexual exploitation of women in Japan can thus be
mapped onto a narrative of the racial liberalism of the U.S. military in the postwar period:
American soldiers of all races could equally “make out” with Japanese girls, a dubious
achievement in the annals of desegregation. However, Japan’s own racial others did not
enjoy the same egalitarianism with regard to matters of sex and marriage. As John Lie
points out, historically, ethnic minorities in Japan have faced extreme discrimination in
the realm of marriage (5). At the same time, sex work has long been the principal
occupation of women migrant workers, who are among Japan’s most vulnerable
populations (Lie 11); many of the estimated fifty-five to seventy thousand women who
worked as prostitutes in the immediate postwar era were women “of third-country
origin,” that is, migrant women from Japan’s former colonial territories or Japanese
ethnic minorities (Dower 132). Sonny’s Japanese sweetheart is eager to marry him, then,
but her willingness to date and marry Sonny is less a marker of racial solidarity than a
measure of Sonny’s status as an American in postwar Japan. Despite his apparent
repudiation of his Americanness, his relationship to Japan is mediated by sex and power
over women’s bodies.
Rafe’s relationships with the prostitutes he patronizes and Sonny’s relationship
with his girlfriend fall on different ends of the spectrum of intimacy between American
soldiers and Japanese women, but they each take place as a well-established part of the
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postwar social order. Relationships between American soldiers and Japanese women
were structured by the exploitation, power, and control that marked the U.S. military
occupation of Japan. The fact that sex between GIs and Japanese women in general was
marked by the gross power imbalance and domination of occupation may not have
determined the content of any given individual relationship between a GI and a Japanese
woman, but it did circumscribe the range of options available for such relationships.
If we are able to conceptualize different sites of empire together, as I have made a
case for in this chapter, then we can see that Sonny Ruiz is neither simply rejecting a
Texan brand of American racism by settling in Japan nor simply acting as an agent of
U.S. empire in occupied Japan. Rather, he is engaged in a struggle between these two
apparently contradictory roles, a struggle that reflects the overlapping histories of empire
in the global Cold War. The decision by Rafe, Jehú, Charlie, and Sonny to join the U.S.
army is one inflected by the colonial legacy of the Texas Mexican border, but as I have
argued, that is not the only colonial legacy at issue in our readings of Hinojosa’s work.
Reading Sonny Ruiz as a neoimperial presence in Japan does not negate his own past as a
colonized subject, nor does viewing Japan as an occupied nation after World War II
discount its own legacy of colonial occupation across Asia in the half-century before that
moment. Rather, I have argued in this chapter that the Korean War operates as a point of
articulation, allowing us to contend with the multiplicity and heterogeneity of these
discrete yet connected histories of colonialism and empire. Understanding these
connections necessarily complicates our narratives of the racial legacies of U.S. settler
colonialism and of the ongoing histories of U.S. empire in the Cold War era into the
present.
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Chapter 3

Going Color-Blind:
The Black Soldier in Toni Morrison’s Home

What I am determined to do is to take what
is articulated as an elusive race-free paradise
and domesticate it.
Toni Morrison, “Home”

I. Introduction

In an essay entitled “Home,” drawn from a talk she gave in 1994 at a conference
on race, Toni Morrison writes, “I have never lived, nor has any of us, in a world in which
race did not matter…[but] I prefer to think of a-world-in-which-race-does-not-matter
as…home” (3). For Morrison, using the term home “domesticates the racial project” (3).
She explains that her writing has always been driven by the question of “how to convert a
racist house” – the racist house to which we are all consigned – “into a race-specific yet
nonracist home” (5). In a talk entitled “Color Blindness, History, and the Law,” given at
the same conference and anthologized in the same volume, the legal scholar Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw discusses the ideology of color-blindness and the principle of formal
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equality that underpins it. She argues that in the forty years since Brown v. Board of
Education, the legal doctrine of color-blindness, usually celebrated as a hallmark of racial
equality, has been deployed to legitimate rather than dismantle racial hierarchy. Arguing
that “formal equality in conditions of social inequality becomes a tool of domination,
reinforcing that system and insulating it from attack” (285), Crenshaw concludes her talk
by urging her listeners to “understand the distributive consequences of legal ideology”
(287).
Nearly twenty years later, Morrison published a novel that shares its title with her
earlier essay: Home. Set in the early 1950s, the novel centers on Frank Money, a recent
veteran of the Korean War, and his sister Ycidra, or Cee, a pair of siblings forced to
navigate the racial architecture of the postwar United States as they separately leave their
home in the fictional town of Lotus, Georgia and then make their way back together.
Alternating chapters of third-person narration that follows different characters through
the events of the novel are punctuated by short chapters of italicized first-person
commentary in the voice of Frank Money, addressing and often challenging the narrator
(“Write about that, why don’t you,” for example, or “You can’t imagine it, because you
weren’t there”). Throughout the novel, these two narrative voices supplement each other
in telling the story, and by the end, they are colluding to unlock the novel’s secrets. Home
details Frank’s journey across the country to find and rescue his sister, who is on the
verge of death, and their shared difficulty in reconciling with the home they left behind.
Along the way, Frank must face his own struggles with the traumatic aftereffects of his
experience fighting in Korea—effects that are expressed in disorienting episodes of
color-blindness.
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Early in the novel, for example, the narrator recalls the first time that the recently
returned veteran Frank Money experienced a “break” after returning home from Korea.
After returning to the U.S. from Korea, Frank has drifted for a year without a steady job
or a permanent home. Fixated on memories of his best friends from home dying beside
him on the battlefield, and on one particular image of a hungry Korean child shot pointblank by a U.S. soldier, he has alienated the people around him with his erratic and
occasionally violent behavior. Boarding a bus near Fort Lawton in Seattle, his discharge
papers in hand, Frank sits next to a brightly dressed woman:
Her flowered skirt was a world’s worth of color, her blouse a loud red. Frank
watched the flowers at the hem of her skirt blackening and her red blouse draining
of color until it was white as milk. Then everybody, everything. Outside the
window—trees, sky, a boy on a scooter, grass, hedges. All color disappeared and
the world became a black-and-white movie screen. He didn’t yell then because he
thought something bad was happening to his eyes. Bad, but fixable. He wondered
if this was how dogs or cats or wolves saw the world. Or was he becoming colorblind? (23).
In this incident, as in many more to come, color-blindness emerges as the somatic
expression of Frank’s trauma. As the world around him transforms into a black-and-white
projection, he speculates first that he is losing his vision, then that he is losing his
humanity; the question that lingers, however, is whether he is “becoming color-blind.”
It is clear that Frank’s combat experience in Korea has left him grappling with the
question of color. His direct memories of combat are also rendered in terms of red, white,
and black: in private moments, he cannot help but see “a boy pushing his entrails back
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in” on the battlefield and remember “stepping over [him]…to keep his own face from
dissolving, his own colorful guts under that oh-so-thin sheet of flesh. Against the black
and white of that winter landscape, blood red took center stage” (20). In this memory,
too, a world of color stands out against a black and white screen, and the unforgettable
scenes of “blood red” that Frank remembers from the battlefield here give us an
unmistakable referent for the red that drains out of the black-and-white world around him
on the bus back in Seattle. Moreover, if red is the color associated with communism, then
Frank’s visually draining the world of red recapitulates the very logic that placed him in
Korea: after all, the given rationale of the U.S. military presence and intervention in
Korea in these years was to rid the world of communism. It also evokes the domestic
environment of redbaiting to which he has returned.
That Frank’s memories of combat in Korea are ruled by the language of color also
marks the particular place of the Korean War in the history of desegregation in the United
States.50 In July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, declaring it to be
“the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for
all persons in the armed series without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin,”
to be implemented “as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to
50

In a 2011 article on Beloved, Florian Bast contends that the significance of color has been overlooked in
Morrison scholarship. He proposes that Beloved “negotiates issues of trauma using the color red,” and
argues that red “constitutes a text in and of itself” in the novel (1070). He goes on to examine the use of red
as a “highlighter” in the text, used to mark and amplify the trauma of slavery, and tracks the characters’
interactions with the color red throughout the text. Finally, he argues, by turning to the use of the color red
to mark instances of trauma, Morrison “performs the inability to use everyday language to portray a
traumatic event” (1082). This chapter similarly tracks the appearance of color in the novel, and I have
found that in Home as in Beloved, the color red is associated with trauma and its resolution. A 2014 article
by Melissa Schindler also briefly discusses Morrison’s use of color in relation to tropes of migration and
homecoming in Home. She notes that red is a color associated with the Korean War and scenes of travel in
the novel. However, my chapter departs from both Bast’s and Schindler’s work in linking color in the novel
and its absence with issues of race and racism.
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effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (Mershon 183).
As the first war fought under the sign of Executive Order 9981, the Korean War helped to
initiate the institutional desegregation of the military on a wide scale.
Color-blindness in Home is both the name of the postwar racial regime that sends
Frank Money to Korea as part of the army and the primary symptom of the trauma he
experiences while serving as a part of that army. Reading this novel against the history of
the desegregation of the U.S. armed forces during the Korean War, I argue in this chapter
that Morrison stages an encounter between pre- and post-45 racial regimes. She shows
how these regimes haunt each other in the form of two ghosts: the zoot suited man, a
ghost of past racial terror, and the child, a ghost of the contemporary regime of colorblindness. Moreover, I argue, this opposition between the pre-war and the post-45 racial
orders becomes essential to the novel’s resolution. Ultimately, Morrison’s novel shows
that the codes of color-blindness cannot heal past trauma: rather, it is recognizing the
value of color that gives Frank and Cee resolution. Going to Korea to fight alongside
white soldiers in an integrated army does not allow Frank to reckon with the past and lay
it to rest; rather, it is coming back home and being immersed in color that does that. In
this sense, I read Home in the tradition of Beloved: as Linda Krumholz argues, Beloved
“challenge[s] the notion that the end of institutional slavery brings about freedom by
depicting the emotional and psychological scars of slavery as well as the persistence of
racism” (396). Similarly, I argue, Home shows us that the paradigm of color-blindness
does not and cannot redress racism, but rather functions as a new and different system of
racial harm that brings about new forms of trauma. It is Frank and Cee’s return home to a
black community in Georgia—a “race-specific” home—that brings to light multiple
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layers of trauma. With the restoration of color to the surrounding comes the attempted
resolution of that trauma and the beginning of a process of shared reparation.

II. Color-blindness as a Racial Ideology

Scholars of race in the United States agree that the post-World War II era marks a
sea change in conceptions of race, which led to an official disavowal of racism by the
state and the endorsement of color-blindness as a doctrine and policy, with desegregation
as its centerpiece. Color-blindness names the legal doctrine that has governed post-1945
racialization in the United States, but the use of the concept of color-blindness as a
metaphor for racial tolerance extends well before 1945. As is well known, in 1896, the
Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson that racial segregation was constitutional, so
long as segregated facilities were “separate but equal”; in his dissent, Supreme Court
Justice John Marshall Harlan famously argued against the notion that one race or class
was superior to any other, stating that “our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.” When the Supreme Court overturned separate-butequal in the 1954 case Brown v. Board of Education, then, a “color-blind” interpretation
of the Constitution prevailed, setting the new standard for the Court’s future rulings
regarding racial discrimination. According to legal scholar Neil Gotanda in his article “A
Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’” the concept of color-blindness, which
holds that the state does not and should not “see” race when making legal decisions, thus
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“developed after the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
and matured in 1955 in Brown v. Board of Education” (2).
While the stated goal of color-blind racial ideology is to create “a racially
assimilated society in which race is irrelevant” (53), Gotanda argues that in fact a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution “legitimates, and therefore maintains, the social,
economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans” (2). Under a
color-blind constitutional model, “the prescription for racial problems in American
society is for the government to adopt a position of ‘never’ considering race” (7). But by
reducing race to its formal definition, treating racial distinctions such as ‘Black’ and
‘white’ as merely formal categories (“neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely
‘skin color’ or country of ancestral origin”) and evacuating race of its historical, cultural,
and social meanings, the “nonrecognition” of race has the effect of entrenching rather
than redressing racial disparities (18). As such, Gotanda argues that color-blindness
“ultimately supports the supremacy of white interests” (18) and ends up furthering the
subordination of people of color. He cautions that the concept of color-blindness is
“inadequate to deal with today’s racially stratified, culturally diverse, and economically
divided nation” (68).
In “Color Blindness, History, and the Law,” Kimberlé Crenshaw also shows how
color-blindness “has been deployed to do the ideological work of legitimating racial
hierarchy” (281). Crenshaw argues that by the time of her writing in 1994, exactly forty
years since Brown v. Board of Education, the law has come to endorse the narrative that
Brown constitutes a fundamental break with white supremacy, a “celebratory narrative”
about how Brown “marks the historical moment when African Americans were finally
102

granted full citizenship status” in America (280). But although Brown is popularly
regarded as having overturned Plessy, she argues, “it would be a mistake to focus solely
on the rejection of the formal doctrine [of separate-but-equal] while failing to uncover the
continuity of Plessy’s social vision and its analytic,” which are in fact “reincarnated in
color-blind jurisprudence” (284). In Plessy, the Court authorized segregation as the
“symmetrical” treatment of black and white passengers on a train, and the fact of the
inequality between the two kinds of cars was relegated to the private sphere, reflecting a
vision of a “racial marketplace” in which “the state [could not] interfere to redistribute
racial value” (283). The contemporary doctrine of color-blindness, she argues, endorses
this notion of a “free market of race” (287). For Crenshaw, the heart of Plessy was “its
admonition that the law could not be looked to in order to bring about social equality”
(283); a lesson to be drawn from both Plessy and Brown, then, is that “formal equality in
conditions of social inequality becomes a tool of domination, reinforcing that system and
insulating it from attack” (285).
As Crenshaw, Gotanda, and other critical race theorists have demonstrated, the
legal doctrine of color-blindness purports to legislate the public sphere of government
action, in which race is not be considered, rather than the private sphere of individual
freedom, in which race may be considered (Gotanda 8). But the concept of colorblindness has also taken hold in wider social understandings of race: as the sociologist
Howard Winant writes, in recent decades, “the ironic view has emerged that we are now
in a post-racial, color-blind world” (1). Winant attributes this view to what he calls the
“racial break” of the post-World War II period. He argues that the “upsurge of anti-racist
activity since World War II constitutes a fundamental and historical shift, a global rupture
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or ‘break,’ in the continuity of worldwide white supremacy” (2). As evidence of this
racial break, he points to: the racial dimensions of World War II and the anti-genocide
position it generated; the social movements and revolutionary uprisings that followed the
war, including the civil rights movement in the United States and anti-apartheid
movement in South Africa; the scrutiny that the Cold War conflict placed upon the racial
policies of superpower nations; and the mass migration of formerly colonized peoples
from the global rural South to the metropolitan North (7). In this framework, colorblindness emerges as one symptom of the post-World War II racial break, which Winant
argues was “at best a partial shift away from formally avowed white supremacy,” a shift
that has now left us in a “racial interregnum … between the discredited but undead racial
past and the much anticipated but far from realized racial future” (6).
In a recent critique of Winant’s theory of the post-World War II racial break,
literary critic Jodi Melamed argues that rather than simply a “partial shift” away from
white supremacy, the “break” of the World War II moment “instantiated a new
worldwide racial project that…supplemented and displaced its predecessor: a formally
antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity articulated under conditions of U.S. global
ascendancy” (4). For Melamed, the advance of this new racial project signaled a decisive
move away from white supremacy, as the U.S. state newly came to embrace “official
antiracisms” in its administrative workings. The result of this process of racial reordering,
she argues, “was a new and old role for race as a unifying discourse,” as the narratives of
liberal antiracism – “of reform, of color blindness, of diversity in a postracial world” –
took precedence over prior narratives of the white man’s burden (8). Like Winant,
Melamed takes World War II to be a breaking point for U.S. and global racial orders, but
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she views the present racial order, which she dubs “neoliberal multiculturalism,” as less
an interregnum than a new mode that must be assessed on its own terms.
The sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva offers a slightly different periodization of
color blindness in his analysis of contemporary racism, proposing that the new racial
ideology he terms “color-blind racism” gained dominance in the late 1960s. “Whereas
Jim Crow racism explained blacks’ social standing as the result of their biological and
moral inferiority,” he argues, color-blind racism “rationalize[s] minorities’ contemporary
status as the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’
imputed cultural limitations” (2). He contends that in the post-Civil Rights era, the
“normative climate…has made illegitimate the public expression of racially based
feelings and viewpoints” (11), resulting in a framework in which “most whites assert they
‘don’t see any color, just people’” (1). As he points out, this professed color-blindness is
at great odds with the “color-coded inequality” that persists in the United States (2). For
Bonilla-Silva, this inequality is “reproduced through ‘New Racism’ practices that are
subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial” (3). He points to the “slippery, apparently
contradictory” language of color blindness as evidence of the dramatic changes in the
“normative climate” between Jim Crow and the post-Civil Rights era (53).
These scholars of race thus point to different moments as the breaking point of the
post-World War II racial break—World War II itself, the onset of the Cold War, Brown v.
Board, the Civil Rights movement. The Korean War, which falls between World War II
and Brown v. Board, does not factor into any of these analyses. The Korean War may not
mark the arrival of desegregation on a national scale; indeed, as I will discuss below,
desegregation was not evenly implemented throughout all of the units fighting in Korea,
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much less throughout all levels of the U.S. military. Moreover, because the battlegrounds
of the Korean War seem to be so far from home, the utility of Korea for assessing the
transformation of the postwar racial order on a wider scale may appear limited. But as I
argue in this chapter, the Korean War, the first war fought after Truman’s desegregation
of the military by executive order, is central to the development of color-blindness as a
state and popular discourse. As I will show in the following section of this chapter, it was
in the transnational, racially unfamiliar space of Korea, in the controlled environment of
the military amidst the uncontrollable circumstances of war, that color-blindness was
developed as a technique of racial management.

III. Desegregation and the Korean War

As Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman point out in their study of racial
desegregation in the U.S. military, the incorporation of blacks into the armed forces on
terms of formal, legal equality in the period between World War II and the Vietnam War
was one of the most sweeping – and contentious – changes in its history (xi). Such a “vast
reordering of their internal race relations between 1940 and 1965,” they argue, was
undertaken and achieved only “reluctantly and unevenly” by the leadership of the armed
forces (xiii).51 In fact, they claim that while it was black activism that brought
desegregation to the fore as a necessary and plausible change, Truman’s decision to end
the formal segregation of the armed forces resulted less from a magnanimous desire to
51

Mershon and Schlossman, writing in 1998, note in a preface to the book that they wrote it as a study of
the struggle to incorporate of gays into military in the 1990s, a framing of their work that speaks to the
abiding importance of the military as an institutional benchmark for American policies on integration.
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redress racism than from a need to “improve military efficiency” in order to better “serve
the national interest” (xiii).52 During World War II, they argue, military leadership came
to realize that racial segregation was “inherently costly in terms of money, space, and
time” (74) and “caused substantial waste of human talent through inappropriate personnel
placement and the rejection of qualified people on racial grounds” (75). By the time
President Truman assembled his “President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services” in 1949 to make recommendations on how to best
implement Executive Order 9981, his advisers recognized that the Army could no longer
“perpetuate inefficiency by failing to make full use of the talents and skills of its
personnel,” a situation that could change “only if [the army] permitted the assignment of
blacks to any unit—thereby initiating the dissolution of segregation” (209).
Despite Executive Order 9981’s proclamation of the principle of “equality of
treatment and opportunity” for people of all races, the military was still very much
segregated in practice when the Korean War began in June 1950. Given that the Army
maintained “almost exactly the same racially segregated organizational structure that had
existed in World War II,” the same “problems of inefficiency and morale” that derived
from racial segregation promptly resurfaced during the first year of the war (Mershon and
Schlossman 218). Because General MacArthur, commander of U.S. and UN troops in
Korea, was against desegregation, the Far East Command was not formally desegregated
until July 1951, a year into the war, when General Ridgway replaced MacArthur.
52

Of course, Truman’s decision did not emerge out of a vacuum; by 1948, the idea of desegregation had
entered the public imagination. Mershon and Schlossman also point to a number of Supreme Court cases
that “eroded the legal foundations of racial segregation” throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s,
including a 1944 ruling against racial discrimination in primary elections, a 1946 ruling against segregation
on interstate railroad and bus routes, a 1948 ruling against racial restrictions on private real estate sales, and
a 1950 ruling against segregation in graduate education at state universities (146).
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Ridgway ordered “race-neutral policies” and abolished the all-black 24th Regiment when
he assumed command.53 However, even before this official change, some field
commanders had begun combining black and white soldiers into the same units without
waiting for orders from above, “impromptu innovations [that] were reactions to military
necessity” (Mershon 223).54
The process of desegregating U.S. troops in Korea was thus neither rapid nor
complete: the active desegregation of troops during the war did not end racial
discrimination in the military or in society at large.55 But scholars agree that the Korean
War jumpstarted the active implementation of desegregation throughout the military in
the ensuing years. Mershon and Schlossman argue that the apparent success of largescale desegregation in Korea, “which began as a response to particular emergency
conditions in the Far East,” showed officers in other Army commands in the United
States and around the world that “implementing the Army’s nondiscrimination policies
was not only feasible but also desirable” (219). In July 1953, fighting ceased in the
Korean War; by 1954, according to Mershon and Schlossman, “the tradition of racial
segregation had collapsed throughout the armed forces” around the world (219).
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Before its dissolution, the all-black 24th Regiment had been viewed unfavorably as a unit whose soldiers
were especially prone to desertion, or “bugging out.” For a detailed history of the 24th Regiment and its
dissolution during the Korean War, see Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea by
William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, who show that institutional
racism limited the “effectiveness” of the unit in Korea.
54
Spontaneous decisions to desegregate combat units due to shortages during battle had happened before;
for example, there were partially integrated infantry companies in Europe during 1944 and 45. This time,
however, because of the change in larger policies, “the first racially mixed units in Korea generated
widespread interest and affirmation and became models for subsequent change. They provided hard
evidence that helped to convince skeptical officers of the viability and desirability of desegregation”
(Mershon 224).
55
After the Korean War, black soldiers continued to be systematically funneled into less desirable positions
within the military and were largely kept out of leadership roles. See Mershon and Schlossman, chapters
ten and eleven.
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Discussing the desegregation of troops in the postwar period, historian Michael
Cullen Green similarly argues that “a war was required to effect this revolution in
military affairs” (140). He agrees that mass casualties of U.S. troops in Korea
necessitated the rapid implementation of desegregation, but argues in addition that the
military leadership “recognized that their orders to desegregate would be less difficult to
carry out in Asia – where there were no off-base Jim Crow laws and few opportunities for
black-white heterosexual intimacy – than in the United States or Europe” (140).
According to his analysis, then, the desegregation of the U.S. military and U.S. military
occupation and war in Asia were not merely contemporaneous, but were rather coconstitutive: war and occupation in Asia both forced and allowed for a more rapid
desegregation of troops. Citing the large-scale recruitment of black soldiers in the
postwar period, Green argues that “[the Korean War] and its enduring consequences
sustained African Americans’ socioeconomic dependence on militarization, an empire of
bases … and foreign interventions” (137). In this way, desegregation helped to invest
African Americans in the aims of the state and its military power: “Black military service
abroad encouraged African Americans to…think of themselves first and foremost as
Americans … and to identify with their government’s foreign policy objectives in Asia”
(2). As the military became an early adopter of desegregation, African Americans
“increasingly viewed their nation’s armed forces a model for civilian society,” and thus,
“by the time the Supreme Court declared de jure segregation unconstitutional in its
landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, African American investment in
the state’s overseas military expansion was largely secured” (2).
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What the above scholarship shows us is that in desegregating the troops during
the Korean War, the state officially took up the rhetoric of color-blindness at a strategic
moment in its military expansion. It has been well documented that publicly disavowing
racism was a strategic move for the United States in the early years of the global Cold
War, and desegregating the military likewise served to project an image of the United
States as a forward-moving democracy. But as we have seen, desegregating the troops
did not serve to redistribute resources among racial groups in the interest of social justice,
nor did it primarily aim to do so. Rather, desegregation was a method of more efficiently
managing the human resources that constituted the armed forces during a period of rapid
military growth. In other words, the U.S. military needed to desegregate in order to
expand across the Asia Pacific and the globe. At the same time, the emerging rhetoric of
color-blindness needed the Korean War in order to learn how to put desegregation into
practice. Attempting to implement desegregation in the geographically and racially
foreign space of Korea allowed for the limited application of the policy of “equal
treatment and opportunity for all persons…without regard to race,” in the words of
Executive Order 9981, in a contained geographical and institutional space, and as such,
Korea became the temporary grounds on which the workings of a U.S. domestic policy to
come – that is, the policy of color-blindness – could be tested and improved.

IV. Navigating Color-Blindness in Home

In his critique of color-blindness, Gotanda briefly notes the difference between
“color-blindness” and what he refers to as “literal” or “medical” color-blindness. For
110

example, he writes, using the technique of “nonrecognition,” which the legal doctrine of
color-blindness advocates, is in fact “impossible”: “One cannot literally follow a colorblind standard of conduct in ordinary social life,” since one cannot not perceive race (18).
Whereas the “medically color-blind individual” is someone who “never perceives color
in the first place,” the “racially color-blind individual” perceives race and then attempts
to ignore it (19). Here, Gotanda acknowledges the literal referent for the term “colorblindness” in order to point out the deficiency of the metaphor when it comes to racial
matters.56 In Home, Morrison presents an unexpected connection between these two
definitions of color-blindness: the medical condition of color-blindness which afflicts
Frank Money derives from the trauma he experienced as a soldier in the Korean War, a
formative event for the state’s development and implementation of color-blind policies
regarding race. One form of color-blindness begets another. This literalization of the
metaphor of color-blindness allows us to examine the effects of the move to implement
desegregation in the post-45 United States.
The narrator of Home recounts Frank’s initial episode of color-blindness as both
confusing and frightening: as a “world’s worth of color” drains out before his eyes and
the world becomes a “black-and-white movie screen,” the narrator asks the question,
“was he becoming color-blind?” (23). Only when these episodes recur does he learn to
associate the visual loss of color with other uncontrollable expressions of psychic
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In fact, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, color-blindness in the medical sense “has been
considered by many scientists to be a misleading name,” since it refers only rarely to the complete absence
of color vision. The OED also defines color-blindness as not only the “disregard of differences in race,” but
also the “inability to perceive, experience, or distinguish between certain perspectives, moral choices,
emotions, etc,” a definition that is also applicable to the shell-shocked Frank Money in Home.
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distress. As the narrator puts it after this initial instance, once he steps off the bus and
watches the “grass [turn] green” again with relief,
he knew he wouldn’t shout, smash anything, or accost strangers. That came later
when, whatever the world’s palette, his shame and its fury exploded. Now, if the
signs of draining color gave notice, he would have time to hurry up and hide.
Thus, whenever a smattering of color returned, he was pleased to know he wasn’t
going color-blind and the horrible pictures might fade. (24)
Frank greets the return of color to his field of vision as a reassuring “no” to the question
the narrator earlier posits. But in Home, Toni Morrison takes great care to show the
extent to which life in the United States, far from going color-blind itself, continues to be
dominated by color in the 1950s. As the novel unfolds and Frank continues his journey
south to find his sister, he is forced to navigate the unabated color-consciousness of the
postwar United States. In this way, Home stages the contradiction between the rhetoric of
color-blindness and the realities of life reduced to black-and-white.
In fact, in Home, color emerges as a category paramount in shaping Frank’s
experience of the world, circumscribing the possible range of his movements and choices.
It becomes clear from the outset of the novel that race, far from receding from
importance, has structured Frank Money’s life circumstances from the moment of his
return back to the United States as a veteran of the Korean War. His time served in a
desegregating army overseas has left him experiencing disorienting bouts of literal colorblindness at the same time that he is faced with racism in all of his encounters with white
people and institutions. His experiences traveling across the country reveal to him a
United States whose racisms differ in important ways from those he grew up with in rural
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Georgia before the war. Frank’s journey to find Cee becomes a journey of discovering
the breaks and continuities of the post-45 U.S. racial order.
At the novel’s opening, Frank is planning his escape from the psychiatric ward of
the hospital in the Pacific Northwest where he’s been involuntarily confined, less to
receive care than to be sedated and incarcerated—or as another character wryly
comments, “They must have thought you was dangerous. If you was just sick they’d
never let you in” (10). When he escapes, penniless and shoeless in the middle of the
night, he seeks shelter at a nearby black church whose pastor, Reverend Locke, plots out
an itinerary of black churches along his route to help him reach his destination safely.
Calling Frank “another one,” Reverend Locke laments the unhappy state of the many
black veterans he has encountered, declaring that “An integrated army is integrated
misery. You all go fight, come back, they treat you like dogs. Change that. They treat
dogs better” (17). Locke also advises him not to sit down at just any lunch counter along
the way: “Listen here, you from Georgia and you been in a desegregated army and maybe
you think up North is way different from down South. Don’t believe it and don’t count on
it. Custom is just as real as law and can be just as dangerous” (19). It is just after this bald
enunciation of the dissonance between formal policies of desegregation (“law”) and the
continuing material reality of racial violence (“custom”) that the narrator recalls Frank’s
episode of color-blindness on the bus after he has been discharged from the army base.57
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After the Korean War, like World War II before it, black veterans, particularly in the South, were
frequently harassed, attacked, and subjected to mob violence by racist whites. These attacks, and the outcry
over these attacks by the NAACP and civil rights organizations, led to Truman’s initial investigations of
race relations and the military, which in turn led to Executive Order 9981. See Mershon and Schlossman,
161-167.
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Even before this explicit articulation of the gap between custom and law by the
reverend, however, the novel sets up both contrasts and continuities between past forms
of racial terror and their present incarnations. In the novel’s opening scene, for example,
as Frank plots his escape from the mental hospital, he worries about being arrested for
vagrancy once he has made it outside. “Better than most,” the narrator informs us, “he
knew that being outside wasn’t necessary for legal or illegal disruption. You could be
inside, living in your own house for years, and still, men with or without badges but
always with guns could force you, your family, your neighbors to pack up and move—
with or without shoes” (9). We learn that when Frank was four, his family and fifteen
others were threatened by white men, “both hooded and not,” and “ordered to leave their
little neighborhood on the edge of town” in Texas (9). While most of the families,
including his own, left town that night, one elderly man who refused to leave his property
was beaten to death. It is this incident that makes the Money family refugees, forced to
leave Texas on foot (Frank’s sister Cee is born on the road), and brings them to resettle in
Lotus, Georgia; it is this incident that gives Frank an intimate knowledge of the vagaries
of racist police violence, whether “legal or illegal,” “with or without badges,” that he
carries with him through adulthood. The novel thus stages a complex temporal and spatial
continuity between post-45 and pre-war regimes of racial violence: although the racial
terror and dispossession that the Money family survived in the South in the 1920s and
‘30s might seem far removed from Frank’s life in the Pacific Northwest in the 1950s,
Frank’s formative childhood experience of racist vigilante violence gives him a special
awareness of the policing of the geography of racial belonging that he must navigate and
manage as an adult. At the same time, the power of the police – with or without badges –
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to control the movements of communities and populations was being felt globally in this
same moment: after all, Truman famously referred to the Korean War as itself a “police
action.” The notion that “men…with guns could force you, your family, your neighbors
to pack up and move—with or without shoes” (9) must have resonated with Frank during
his time in the Korean War, when he was part of an army subjecting millions of Korean
civilians to precisely this situation.
Both the explicit connection that Frank draws between his present detention and
his past eviction and the connection left unspoken between his own refugee past and the
refugees he left behind in Korea demonstrate how racial logics and racist practices travel
across time and space in Home. Morrison more directly stages the encounter between past
and present forms and consequences of racist violence through the figure of a zoot-suited
man whose apparition confronts Frank and his sister several times over the course of the
novel. Frank first spots him on his train out of Seattle, when the small man wearing a
“wide-brimmed hat,” a “pale blue suit [that] sported a long jacket and balloon trousers,”
and white shoes with “unnaturally pointed toes” takes the empty seat next to him (27).
The man quickly and eerily disappears, leaving no indentation in the seat, but he
reappears in Frank’s bedroom during his overnight stop in Chicago. Frank regards the
man as an unwelcome “dream ghost,” and wonders whether his repeat appearance is “a
sign trying to tell him something,” perhaps about his sister (34). The narrator notes that
he “had heard about those suits, but never saw anybody wearing one” (33), but it is left to
the narrator to add that the zoot-suitors’ chosen costume “had been enough of a fashion
statement to interest riot cops on each coast” (34). Here, Morrison relies on the reader to
supplement this observation with its historical context: the zoot suit, popularly associated
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with urban African American and Chicano youth subcultures of the 1930s and 1940s,
became well known as a racialized symbol of rebellion and criminality.58 The weight
behind this historical referent is left unstated in the novel, in which the zoot suit, that
symbol of minority youth rebellion, race riots, and oppositional masculinity, is simply
glossed as outdated, even “comic,” through Frank’s eyes (34).
The only other appearance of the zoot-suited man, Frank’s “living ghost” (33),
comes at the end of the novel, when Cee briefly spots what “looked to her like a small
man in a funny suit swinging a watch chain. And grinning” (144). Frank has brought Cee
out to a field at the edge of town to locate and re-bury the skeleton of a man whose death
they had witnessed together years ago as children, a foundational trauma alluded to in the
novel’s opening pages (“we saw them pull a body from a wheelbarrow and throw it into a
hole already waiting”) (4). It is only after he has returned to Lotus with Cee that Frank is
able to access the repressed memory of that burial scene. Once he remembers, he goes to
his grandfather and other town elders to investigate what happened: he asks about the
“dogfights” that used to happen at a local horse farm, and one of them replies, “More like
men-treated-like-dog fights” (138). The men proceed to tell Frank a story about a boy and
his father who were forcibly brought there from Alabama and made to fight to the death
in front of a (presumably white) crowd who took bets on the outcome of the fight; the
corpse in the wheelbarrow that Frank and Cee saw from their hiding place – the remains
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The historian Kathy Peiss notes that while the zoot suit was a key element of Mexican American and
African American subcultures, it also “appeared across the main fault lines of social difference in the
United States—among Filipinos, Japanese Americans, men of Jewish and Italian descent, jitterbug-crazy
middle-class boys, and even Mexican American women and working-class lesbians” (13). While the zoot
suit has been viewed as a “symbol of disloyalty and disaffection of minority youth,” in contrast to the
“soldier’s uniform, which stands for a militarized white American culture,” Peiss views this interpretation
as a flattening of the multiple meanings of this “extreme fashion” (11).
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that Frank and Cee have come to lay to rest decades later – was the boy’s father.
Significantly, Frank’s grandfather Salem comments about these fights, “I don’t believe
they stopped that mess till Pearl Harbor” (139). The specific relationship of the zootsuited ghost to the man Frank and Cee bury is left ambiguous in the novel: as Colleen
Lye writes in an essay on Home, the ghost is “unlikely to be a representation of the actual
man” who was killed on that farm, but a clear connection between the two is that “they
both signify a pre-World War II racial order.” That both the zoot-suited man and the man
buried in Lotus haunt the narrative of the present suggests, however, that in Home, past
racial forms do not stay cleanly in the past.
Home thus offers several clear-cut examples of what racism looked like in
decades past: white mob violence, lynching, terror. But how do these examples frame
race as it operates in a post-45 United States newly embracing the rhetoric of colorblindness? For one, Frank’s experiences and observations during his travels underscore
the material realities of continuing color-consciousness in the postwar United States. He
watches as a black couple on the train is kicked out of a department store and injured by a
white mob throwing bricks; he befriends a black man whose son was maimed at the age
of eight by a white policeman who faced no consequences for his actions; he finds that he
must consult the black porter on the train to find a place where he can safely eat dinner
and rest between train stops without being ejected or attacked for his race. Each of these
examples of racial terror is described as routine, even humdrum, and each incident belies
the notion that the present has progressed beyond a more-racist recent past.
If anything, it is Frank’s status as a veteran of the Korean War that occasionally
affords him improved or exceptional treatment by the police. For example, in Chicago,
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Frank goes shopping at the Goodwill store with a new acquaintance named Billy, and
afterwards, in his new clothes, Frank feels “proud enough to take his medal from his
army pants and pin it to his breast pocket” (36). Outside of a shoe store, though, Frank,
Billy, and two other black men are subjected to a “random search” by the police, who
stop and frisk them.
Of the two other men facing the wall, one had his switchblade confiscated, the
other a dollar bill. All four lay their hands on the hood of the patrol car parked at
the curb. The younger officer noticed Frank's medal.
“Korea?”
“Yes, sir.”
“Hey, Dick. They’re vets.”
“Yeah?”
“Yeah. Look.” The officer pointed to Frank's service medal.
“Go on. Get lost, pal.”
The police incident was not worth comment so Frank and Billy walked off in
silence. (36-37)
Frank and Billy are released just as unilaterally as they are detained. Being black men
makes them automatic targets for everyday police harassment, but being visible as a
veteran removes Frank from the category of the criminal in the eyes of these policemen,
placing him in a different relationship to the state. His race is the reason why he is being
harassed, but his association with the military – and the pride he takes in that association,
which is what motivates him to display his medal – mitigates his perceived criminality
and provides the police with another vector against which to assess him. Earlier in the
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novel, Reverend Locke warned Frank not to expect the world around him to reflect his
experience in the “integrated misery” of a desegregated army, and Frank and Billy’s
unceremonious detainment, so ordinary it is “not worth comment,” is just one example of
the customary color-consciousness Frank must navigate on his travels after returning
from war. But the policemen’s recognition of Frank’s status as a veteran, and the special
treatment it affords him and his friend, marks one way that Frank’s association with the
military has affected his place in the postwar domestic order. Joining the military did not
rescue Frank from racism: he finds no systemic benefit from having participated in the
military’s experiment with desegregation. Even still, in this encounter, he is able to
garner a material benefit – however meager or ignominious – of his visible status as a
veteran.
Frank’s combat experience overseas thus materially affects his status back at
home. But the effects of the war extended to those who stayed at home as well,
particularly the novel’s female characters. Lily, for example, the woman romantically
linked with Frank at the start of the novel, finds that racialized Cold War conflict
infiltrates her everyday life in Chicago. When Frank meets her, she has temporarily taken
a new job at a Chinese-owned dry cleaner’s, a line of work that alludes to an earlier
historical formation of migration and labor between the United States and Asia.59 We
learn that she recently lost her previous job as a makeup artist because her employer, a
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As Colleen Lye observes, “The story does contain hints of amicable black-Asian encounters; for
example, Frank’s African-American girlfriend Lily receives a raise from her employer at Wang’s Heavenly
Palace dry cleaners, but even this only underscores the structural divergence between black wage-workers
and Asian American middleman minorities.”
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local theater, was closed down due to anticommunist paranoia.60 But it is in her attempt
to purchase a home that she encounters the coldest racism: after she makes an offer on a
house, the real estate agent turns her down and shows her an underlined passage that
reads, “No part of said property hereby conveyed shall ever be used or occupied by any
Hebrew or by any person of the Ethiopian, Malay, or Asiatic race excepting only
employees in domestic service” (72-73). In a novel that so obviously stages the moment
of transition to a post-45 racial order of color-blindness, the anachronism of this clause is
striking. And yet at the same time that its outdated racial categories place the passage
firmly in the past, the language of the passage also enunciates a finality and timelessness
– no part of the property shall “ever” be used or occupied – that belies its anachronistic
rootedness in the past. On the one hand, Lily’s frustrated attempt at buying a home marks
another soon-to-be-surpassed relic of race relations before Civil Rights. On the other,
though, Morrison deftly demonstrates in this brief encounter the inadequacy of the
doctrine of formal equality to address entrenched practices of racism: after all, as the
half-century since this moment has shown the contemporary reader, segregation in
property ownership has persisted well past the lifting of clauses like the one Lily
encounters.
Lily’s frustrated attempt to purchase a home also speaks to the gap between the
relatively progressive treatment black soldiers received on military bases in Asia and the
continued racism black civilians – by definition, disproportionately women – faced at
home in the same time period. As the U.S. military occupation of Japan after World War
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The play that shuts the theater down is an obscure work by the American writer Albert Maltz, who was
blacklisted and jailed under McCarthyism. The work is titled The Morrison Case.
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II took on a more permanent nature in the late 1940s, for example, soldiers who
volunteered for longer stays were allowed to request the transfer of their wives and
children to their bases.61 Soldiers and their dependents were housed in suburb-style
developments, complete with single-family homes, playgrounds, shopping centers, and
the like, and provided with free education and medical care – amenities and privileges
which were, of course, unavailable to the majority of black families in the United States.
In this way, Michael Cullen Green notes, “young black men of modest or impoverished
backgrounds…found themselves privileged occupiers” of Japan (54). In Home, Lily’s
real estate agent tells her that she can only live in the home she desires to own as an
“employee in domestic service” of a white resident; in contrast, black soldiers and their
wives on U.S. bases in Japan at the same moment were hiring Japanese maids, servants,
and domestic workers for their own homes.62 In other words, the dream of home
ownership denied to Lily in Chicago – one of many potential references for the “home”
of the novel’s title – potentially resided in the growing network of U.S. military bases in
Asia. But although she has been dating a veteran recently returned from Asia, Lily is no
mere housewife: when Frank leaves to find his sister, she greets his departure as a
welcome chance to redouble her focus on professional advancement. Along with her plan
to purchase a home, she aims to open a dressmaking shop and become a professional
costume designer for the stage, and with Frank gone, “[u]nobstructed and undistracted,
she could get serious and develop a plan to match her ambition and succeed” (80).
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See Green 50-52.
According to Green, at the height of the occupation, “some 15,000 U.S. military families employed more
than 25,000 servants” (49).
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In fact, it is a crisis of gendered domestic work that sets the entire narrative of
Home in motion: Frank is summoned to Georgia to rescue his younger sister Cee after
receiving a letter from an unknown person that reads, “Come fast. She be dead if you
tarry” (8). Over the chapters that follow, the narrator reveals to the reader that Cee has
been hurt, perhaps mortally, by a white doctor for whom she was a live-in domestic
worker in the suburbs of Atlanta. Cee had been living in Atlanta alone – she had moved
there with a man who left her just after their hasty marriage – and was seeking work
when she heard about a job working as a “maid-type person,” a “helper,” for a doctor and
his wife – “nice people” – outside the city (57). The racial geography of city and suburb
is clearly delineated: buses to the suburbs were “filled with silent dayworkers,
housekeepers, maids, and grown lawn boys” who, once outside the city, “dropped off the
bus one by one like reluctant divers into inviting blue water high above the pollution
below” (109). At their employers’ homes, they would “clean, cook, serve, mind, launder,
weed, and mow” (109). Unlike these transient laborers, however, Cee lived at her
employer’s home, a requirement that she regarded as a benefit allowing her to live in a
home “more beautiful than a movie theater,” with its cool air, velvet furniture, and silk
sheets (61). But, as Lily’s attempt to buy a house shows, Cee’s residence in such a home
hinges on her labor, rendering her vulnerable to the whims and demands of her employer.
There are immediate warning signs that Cee’s duties might fall outside of the
purview of those of a typical domestic worker. At her job interview, Dr. Scott’s wife tells
Cee that her husband “is more than a doctor; he is a scientist and conducts very important
experiments,” which “help people” (60). When Cee meets the doctor, he asks her about
her sexual history, and is “pleased” to hear that she was briefly married but never became
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pregnant (64). The Scotts’ other domestic worker, an older black woman named Sarah,
tells Cee about another “helper” who had been fired for arguing about with the doctor
about his practices; she explains that the doctor said he “wouldn’t have fellow travelers in
his house,” to which Cee innocently responds, in a moment of foreshadowing, “What’s a
fallow traveler?” (62).63 In her first days with the Scotts, Cee notices, and admires, that
the doctor’s primary clientele is poor people, “women and girls, especially,” rather than
the well-to-do white people from the surrounding neighborhood (64). She notices books
in his office, the titles of which include The Passing of the Great Race and Heredity,
Race, and Society, and “promise[s] herself that she would find time to read about and
understand ‘eugenics’” so that she can come to feel more at home in this “good, safe
place” (65). Finally, after all of these warning signals, we learn that Dr. Scott has been
experimenting on Cee and other women – working to develop and improve the speculum
and other gynecological instruments, testing medicines, researching women’s
reproductive systems, performing abortions – and that Cee has become extremely ill as a
result. It is Sarah who notices “Cee’s loss of weight, her fatigue, and how long her
periods were lasting” and sends off the “scary note” that brings Frank to Atlanta to take
Cee away (112).64
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In the era of redbaiting and McCarthyism, a “fellow traveler” was someone suspected of sympathizing
with Communist beliefs and objectives, even if he or she was not a card-carrying or professed member of
the Communist party.
64
This representation of Cee’s forced sterilization is in accordance with other representations of “disrupted
girlhood” in Morrison novels including A Mercy and The Bluest Eye, which, according to Susmita Roye in
a 2012 article, “present a number of ways in which girlhoods are aborted” (214). In the article, Roye argues
that “The disturbed girlhoods of Toni Morrison’s disrupted girls most powerfully register her angry protest
against a gender system that designates a woman a secondary rank and against a social system that
effortlessly overlooks what befalls a poor (black) female child” (212-213).
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Cee’s vulnerability as an unmarried woman and her youthful ignorance of the
meaning of terms like “fellow traveler” and “eugenics” eventually render her a “fallow
traveler” under the doctor’s predations. Her storyline in Home presents a companion
narrative of race and the Cold War to Frank’s story of returning from desegregated
military service in Korea. Frank’s employer during the Korean War is a state institution
that has strategically adopted an ideology of formal equality in its policies regarding race,
and thus, in the transnational militarized zone of Korea, black soldiers are integrated into
white units in a limited practice of desegregation that would be replicated with fanfare
and trepidation in historically white American institutions over the next decade. Cee’s
employer subscribes to no such theory of change. Rather, the ideology that drives his
life’s work is white supremacist on its face and, ultimately, genocidal. At the same time
that Frank is serving as the subject of a national experiment with color-blind racial
liberalism by serving in a newly desegregated army, Cee is the literal test subject of a
doctor conducting his own unauthorized racial experiments. Where the desegregation of
the military trumpets the arrival of a new, more enlightened moment after the postwar
“racial break,” the continuing practice of forced sterilization under the banner of eugenics
provides a disquieting corrective to this narrative, reminding us of the continuities of
racism amidst the arrival of a new era. Frank’s time served in the military nearly kills him
and leaves him with debilitating, traumatic flashbacks; Cee’s victimization by Dr. Scott
nearly kills her and leaves her weak, traumatized, and unable to have children. In their
travels away from Lotus, Cee and Frank thus encounter two versions of what Morrison
calls in this chapter’s epigraph from her essay “Home” a “race-free paradise”—one
apparently progressive, the other deeply sinister. That is, desegregation is one way to “get
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rid of” race, and eugenics is another. But the exploitation of Frank’s and Cee’s bodies
and labor by both of these systems brings about bodily and psychic trauma for these
characters. The next section of this chapter examines how Home imagines the resolution
of trauma for Frank and Cee through the language of color.

V. Restoring Color, Repairing Trauma

Finally reunited, Frank and Cee complete the last leg of their journey back home
together: he carries her, barely conscious, on the bus back to town and finds a cab willing
to drive them twenty miles to Lotus. Earlier in the novel, Frank had described Lotus as
“the worst place in the world, worse than any battlefield” (83), but now, returning there
for the first time since Korea, and leaving Cee in the capable hands of Miss Ethel
Fordham, an old family friend, he finds himself basking in a “feeling of safety and
goodwill” (118). Describing Frank’s return to Lotus, the narrator writes, “Color, silence,
and music enveloped him.” Indeed, Morrison’s description of life in Lotus at this moment
of the Moneys’ return is rich with color: “every front yard and backyard sported
flowers…marigolds, nasturtiums, dahlias. Crimson, purple, pink, and China blue. Had
these trees always been this deep, deep green?” (117). The sun, which “sucked away the
blue from the sky,” “could not scorch the yellow butterflies away from scarlet
rosebushes” (118). In the cotton fields, Frank watches “acres of pink blossoms…turn
red,” precisely the color that he had previously been horrified to find draining from his
field of vision (118); in a matchbox stored away over the years in a hole in the kitchen of
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their old house, he finds Cee’s baby teeth along with “his winning marbles: a bright blue
one, an ebony one, and his favorite, a rainbow mix” (120).
Color envelops Frank in Lotus, too, in that his and his sister’s return there is a
return to a predominantly black community. Each of them had left Lotus to work in white
institutions; each of them barely escaped with their lives. Back in Lotus, though, Frank
finds that nothing could “ruin the pleasure of being among those who do not want to
degrade or destroy you” (118).65 Being back in her home community literally saves Cee’s
life: she spends two months confined to Miss Ethel’s house, “surrounded by country
women who loved mean” and “handled sickness as though it were an affront” (121).
When she tells them that her sickness resulted from a white doctor’s machinations, their
“eye rolling and tooth sucking was enough to make clear their scorn” for the medical
industry (121). But it becomes clear that these women “knew how to repair what an
educated bandit doctor had plundered” (128). To combat the damage done by the “devil
doctor,” they put Cee under constant, watchful care and administer a variety of herbs and
medicines to rid her of fever and infection. The final stage of Cee’s healing requires her
to be “sun-smacked, which meant spending at least one hour a day with her legs spread
open to the blazing sun” to rid her of her “womb sickness” (124). This ordeal, along with
the “demanding love” she has received from Miss Ethel, gives her a newfound strength:
“Sun-smacked or not, she wanted to be the one who rescued her own self” (129). Cee,
like Frank, had left Lotus at the first available opportunity, but once she is well enough to
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In this sense, the novel insists on the importance of precisely the historical and cultural components of
race that the framework of color-blindness refuses to acknowledge. Put differently, as Barbara Christian,
discussing narratives of migration and shifts in geography in Morrison’s first three novels, writes,
“Segregation, enforced by law or custom, had restricted African Americans in material ways but it had also
placed them in contexts where they could create and retain their own languages, stories, and music” (415).
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leave Miss Ethel’s home, she proclaims, “I ain’t going nowhere … This is where I
belong” (126). Her newfound self-sufficiency and resolve are apparent to Frank when she
returns to live with him: she puts herself to work learning to quilt, intending to eventually
make quilts to sell to visitors and tourists to help support their household.
Cee thus emerges from her sickness with her health restored and self-confidence
strengthened through communal healing, but even Miss Ethel’s expert care cannot
reverse the permanent damage done by Dr. Beau’s operations: Cee is infertile. When
Miss Ethel tells her this news, she needs time to process the implications. Initially upset
with herself for having been “so stupid, so eager to please” (128), she comes to realize
that she must now become “person who would never again need rescue” (129). She
accepts that she will never have children and that she may never marry; she accepts that
she will “have to invent a way to earn a living” (130). But when she first tells Frank the
news, her grief overwhelms her. She tells him while sobbing, “I didn’t feel anything at
first when Miss Ethel told me but now I think about it all the time. It’s like there’s a baby
girl down here waiting to be born. She’s somewhere close by in the air, in this house, and
she picked me to be born to. And now she has to find some other mother” (131). She
continues:
“You know that toothless smile babies have? … I keep seeing it. I saw it in a
green pepper once. Another time a cloud curved in such a way it looked like…”
Cee didn’t finish the list. She simply went to the sofa, sat and began sorting and
re-sorting quilt pieces. (132)
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As Cee heals, she is able to mourn the loss of her unborn child, or children: thanks to her
newfound strength, she could “know the truth, accept it, and keep on quilting” (132).66
But her description of the “toothless smile” she sees in the world around her triggers an
unexpected reaction in her brother.
In fact, it is Cee’s haunting visions of the baby girl that bring together the novel’s
disparate threads and ultimately bring about the resolution of the Money siblings’ tale in
Home. Throughout the novel, Frank has returned to a disturbing memory of his time in
Korea: one day, while guarding his post, he notices a Korean child scavenging for trash.
He smiles as he watches her hand grabbing for food, and she returns to the site for days in
a row. But one day, according to Frank’s initial account of the incident, recounted in firstperson narration in the longest of the italicized chapter interludes, when a “relief guard”
approaches her, she reaches out and touches his crotch in “what looks like a hurried, even
automatic, gesture” (95). Frank reads the gesture as the handiwork of a corrupt adult who
was “not content with the usual girls for sale and took to marketing children,” a
disturbing consequence of war (96). The relief guard responds by immediately
“blow[ing] her away” (95).67
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Cee’s vision of her unborn child marks yet another way that Home recalls Morrison’s Beloved, which, as
Marianna Hirsch writes, is “a ghost story about a child who returns to reestablish connection” – about “the
murdered/abandoned child, here a daughter, returning from the other side to question the mother” (97).
Hirsch argues that Beloved “is not only about the child’s longing for a lost maternal object but about the
immense loss experienced by a mother who is unable to keep her children alive and rear them: It is about
maternal fantasies of reparation and recovery” (97). While the transmission of “unspeakable memories” in
Beloved is, as Hirsch argues, “a peculiarly maternal one” (109), Home addresses the question of reparation
and recovery through the representation of Cee’s unwillingly foreclosed maternity.
67
In a 2014 article, Melissa Schindler points out that the Korean girl is associated with a “rotting orange”
that she picks out of the trash, a poignant image “in a canvas largely devoid of adjectives of color” (86).
Later, she notes, the narrator asks the reader, “What type of man thinks he can ever in life pay the price of
that orange” (133).
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Before this full description of this incident, the novel makes several weighty,
oblique references to a Korean girl lurking in Frank’s memories of the war. Early in the
novel, before he departs on his trip to find Cee, he struggles with pictures in his mind of
the victims of his anguish and hatred after his friends had died on the battlefield: he
replays in his mind shooting women and children, an old one-legged man, and most of
all, “the girl. What did she ever do to deserve what happened to her?” (22). Later in the
novel, when he recalls meeting Lily for the first time at the dry cleaner’s where she
worked, he explains that he went to get his clothing cleaned because he had had a
breakdown when he saw “a little girl vomiting water”: “Blood ran from her nose. A
sadness hit me like a pile-driver” (69). Seeing the girl triggers an episode similar to the
one that left him institutionalized at the novel’s opening: he rushes off feeling shaky and
spends three nights sleeping on park benches, a “haunted, half-crazy drunk” (69). After
he and Lily become an item, he attends a church picnic with her and is again triggered by
the sight of a young girl, this time a “little girl with slanty eyes” who reaches for a
cupcake at his table (76). Frank pushes the plate closer to her, and when she smiles up at
him, he “dropped his food and ran through the crowd” (77). He stays out until dawn, and
when he returns to Lily, she asks, “Was it something to do with your time in Korea that
spooked you?” (77). He does not respond and simply tells her it won’t happen again.
Finally, in the chapter following Frank’s description of the girl’s death, as he thinks
through the deaths of his friends in gory detail yet again, the narrator writes, “But before
that, before the deaths of his homeys, he had witnessed the other one. The scavenging
child clutching an orange, smiling, then saying, ‘Yum-yum,’ before the guard blew her
head off” (99).
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In each of these cases of remembrance, Frank links the Korean girl’s death to his
own suffering. When he actively thinks of her, he cannot help but think of his friends
dying on the battlefield, and when he remembers his friends’ deaths, his mind turns to the
girl: he relives the horror of witnessing his friends dying on the battlefield, then
remembers channeling his anger into the sanctioned retaliatory killing of his enemies
(“There were not enough dead gooks or Chinks in the world to satisfy him”), and then
finally fixates on the girl as one of these dead. But because her death predated the loss of
his friends, this logic of compensation is disrupted (“What did she ever do to deserve
what happened to her?”). She becomes the ultimate figure of the senseless violence of
war, and thus, in both of the narrated instances in which he happens to encounter a visual
cue that resembles her in some way, he loses control of himself: being reminded of the
Korean girl’s pain (the blood and vomit of the girl on the sidewalk) and innocence (the
smile of the girl with “slanty eyes”) sets him off, forcing him to take leave of civilian
society as he relives the atrocities of a faraway war in his mind.
As Mary Dudziak notes in a short essay on Home, Frank’s “nightmares and rage”
reflect his utter isolation in a society in which “the experience of war itself is far away
and largely inaccessible” for the non-veteran. She reads the novel as a tale of the
“profound limits of empathy,” in which “society’s inability to fully empathize with the
soldier” presents a parable, and perhaps a warning, about “the commonality of this
profound human condition.” Frank’s memories of war entail that he cannot function
normally in society, and even his loved ones cannot fully access or comprehend what has
happened to him. But when it comes to the Korean child, the limits of empathy fold back
onto the soldier himself. Indeed, Frank’s narration of the girl’s death is filled with
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empathy for the child: he notes that she is “left-handed, like me,” and likens her to
himself and Cee as children “trying to steal peaches off the ground under Miss
Robinson’s tree” (95). He smiles when he sees her hand pawing for food among the
garbage, and the relief guard also returns the girl’s smile—just before shooting and
killing her. Frank’s tone of warmth and indulgence toward the child belies the brutality
and senselessness of her sudden death. In this way, even as Frank is isolated in his
torment, unable to respond to the outward reach of those around him, he struggles
inwardly with the question: to what extent can he empathize with this victim?
Frank’s description of the relief guard, in contrast to that of his victim, is cold,
distant, and uncertain: “Thinking back on it now, I think the guard felt more than disgust.
I think he felt tempted and that is what he had to kill” (97). In these two sentences, the
distancing mechanism – “I think” – is paired with the curious intimacy of “he felt.” The
reason for this inconsistency is finally revealed when Cee mentions seeing the visage of
her never-to-be-born child, a smiling baby girl, and in doing so unearths the truth for
Frank:
Then Cee told me about seeing a baby girl smile all through the house, in the air,
the clouds. It hit me. Maybe that little girl wasn’t waiting around to be born to
her. Maybe it was already dead, waiting for me to step up and say how.
I shot the Korean girl in her face.
I am the one she touched.
I am the one who saw her smile.
I am the one she said ‘Yum-yum’ to.
I am the one she aroused. (133)
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Here, Cee’s baby ghost converges with the ghost of the dead Korean girl, revealing Frank
to have been the “relief guard” that killed her. In this confession, the “I think” of Frank’s
earlier assessment of the guard has changed into an incantatory “I am”: the one who saw
her smile, yes, but also the one she aroused, and the one who killed her for it. Frank’s
reaction when Cee tells him that the doctor had rendered her infertile is a “fluttering in
his chest” that accompanies the questions, “Who would do that to a young girl? … What
the hell for?” (132). That he immediately afterwards confesses to his own act of sexual
violence against a young girl – “I have something to say to you right now” (133) – reveals
the fluttering in his chest to be not just a sign of his anger or grief over what Cee has had
to endure, but also a telltale response to the horrors he has inflicted on others. What is at
stake for Frank at this point in the novel, then, is not just whether society can empathize
with him, or he can empathize with his victims, but the extent to which he can empathize
with, or forgive, himself. 68
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Dudziak writes, “Frank’s nightmares and rages would now have a name: post-traumatic stress disorder.
Tying his violent outbursts to a medical diagnosis might earn a contemporary Frank our sympathy. But
even if broken soldiers received better care and resources, they would still confront the same emptiness –
the profound limits of empathy.” Here, she speaks to the necessary point that soldiers who return from war
face a lack of care, support, and understanding. But as Mimi Thi Nguyen points out, the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder – a phenomenon peculiarly tied to wars of American empire – “underscores the
ways in which historical events of imperial violation, especially those brutal acts continually committed
against racial, colonial others, are transfigured into unimaginable pain for their perpetrators” (116). She
reminds us that PTSD emerged from psychiatrists’ conjecture that soldiers, themselves “war victims,”
“might present disturbances identical with those of their victims” (114), and argues that “the genealogy of
[PTSD] and, concomitantly, the sidelining of the dead that evinces this disorder buttress an imperial project
that declares its own innocence” (115). Nguyen shows that the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder
for the “self-traumatized perpetrator” underscores the humanity of the soldier, even the soldier who
commits heinous acts, against the dehumanization of the soldier’s victims, whose pain and suffering are not
considered. Her discussion of the post-traumatic stress disorder paradigm suggests that Dudziak’s concept
of the “limits of empathy” for the soldier with regard to Frank’s predicament in Home is ultimately onesided. In fact, the novel reveals Frank’s “nightmares and rages” to be a response to the atrocities he himself
has committed. Moreover, I argue that Morrison is just as concerned with the breakdown in empathy
between Frank and the Korean girl – indeed, between the many perpetrators of violence in the novel and
their victims – as she is with that between Frank and the society around him after the war.
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Frank’s revelation moves him from the position of a witness to that of a
perpetrator, forcing him to contend with not just his sorrow at having lost his best friends,
but also his guilt at having taken an innocent life. “I hid it from you because I hid it from
me,” Frank claims before sharing his realization. “My mourning was so thick it
completely covered my shame” (133). At the start of the next chapter, the narrator writes
that Frank spent that night “churning and entangled in thoughts relentless and troubling.
How he had covered his guilt and shame with mourning for his dead buddies. Day and
night he had held on to that suffering because it let him off the hook, kept the Korean
child hidden” (135). Here, the narrator takes up Frank’s own language to explain his
prolonged forgetting and sudden remembering: mourning what he witnessed in Korea
(the death of his beloved friends) was more psychically manageable than facing up to
what he did there (killed a child point-blank).
By this point, just pages from the novel’s conclusion, the Korean girl has already
become an extraordinarily capacious symbol, standing in for his sister’s now-impossible
child as well as Frank’s and Cee’s own childhoods. Once the brutal truth of the
circumstances of her death revealed, she also becomes imbued with vast explanatory
powers for the narrative that has preceded this moment: we know now why Frank
struggled so mightily upon his return, and why he was so spooked by the sight of young
children during his initial months back, and why he was so reluctant to talk to Lily or
anyone else about his time in Korea, and why he was so evasive in expressing grief over
his friends’ deaths in Korea. For Frank, learning the extent of the trauma that Cee
suffered at the hands of the doctor unlocks this repressed memory of the suffering he
inflicted on the Korean girl. Articulating his culpability in turn unlocks for him the
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memory of another unspoken and unresolved, if apparently unconnected, trauma: his and
Cee’s childhood witnessing of the burial of the anonymous man at the horse farm, the
victim of the “men-treated-like-dog fights.” Immediately after Frank admits that he was
the one who shot the Korean girl, he springs to action to investigate the particulars of his
fuzzy memory of that night. And so it is at this moment, just after learning that Cee is
infertile and confessing his killing of the Korean child, that he talks to his grandfather and
learns about the makeshift burial of the man who died at the hands of his son in a forced
fight to the death. Frank’s psychic linking of these two apparently unconnected traumas
brings the novel full circle: it closes by returning to the site where it began, now plainly
depicting what was presented as a jumble of confusing images in the scene that framed
the novel in its opening chapter.
After finding out where the man was buried and why, Frank asks Cee to come
with him to the site of the old horse farm, which has since burned down, and he requests
that she bring the multicolored quilt she has just finished making. Cee sewed the quilt
while convalescing under the watch of the neighborhood women, who make quilts to sell
to tourists; it thus represents not just her healing, but her newfound community as well as
her potential future financial autonomy in Lotus.69 It represents her first attempt at
quilting, and is thus relatively crude; at the same time, “Sloppy as the quilt was, she
treasured its unimpressive pattern and haphazard palette,” which the women chose
together (142). They bring the quilt to the site where Frank remembers seeing the man
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As Janice Barnes Daniel describes in “Function or Frill: The Quilt as Storyteller in Toni Morrison’s
Beloved,” the patchwork quilt, along with other metaphors related to sewing and weaving, is a frequent
trope in feminist literary criticism. See her article for an analysis of Morrison’s use of the quilt as narrative
device in Beloved.
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being buried and perform a ritual of reburial.70 When they unearth his skeleton, Frank
arranges the bones on the quilt, which becomes “a shroud of lilac, crimson, yellow, and
dark navy blue” (143).71 Together, they wrap his bones in this “crayon-colored coffin”
and place it into a grave that Frank digs underneath an old sweet bay tree (144). The tree
itself is damaged, split down the middle, but as Frank testifies in his last words to the
reader, it, like he and his sister, is “Hurt right down the middle / But alive and well”
(145). The natural world around them mirrors the vibrancy of the quilt’s colors: Frank
puts up a grave marker underneath the tree that reads, “Here Stands a Man,” and “he
could have sworn the sweet bay was pleased to agree. Its olive-green leaves went wild in
the glow of a fat cherry-red sun” (145).
Echoing the scene of Frank and Cee’s homecoming to Lotus, the narration in
these final pages explodes with color. In particular, the combination of military green and
cherry-red reappears here as an unlikely testament to Frank’s psychic wellness: where the
color red appeared throughout the first two-thirds of the novel as a visual marker of
violence, death, and trauma – recall that Frank’s first episode of color-blindness
announced itself with the draining away of red – it here marks, for the first time, a happy
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Morrison has depicted ritual healing elsewhere in her work, most notably in Beloved. Linda Krumholz
writes that in Beloved, “ritual processes also imply particular notions of pedagogy and epistemology in
which—by way of contrast with dominant Western traditions—knowledge is multiple, context-dependent,
collectively asserted, and spiritually derived. Through her assertion of the transformative power of ritual
and the incorporation of rituals of healing into her narrative, Morrison invests the novel with the potential
to construct and transform individual consciousness as well as social relations” (396). Similarly, Lynda
Koolish argues that in Beloved, the characters’ “struggle for individual wholeness becomes a struggle for
ancestral healing” (173), and that in order to achieve psychic wholeness, the characters must “come to
accept [their] memories” (174).
71
The image of wrapping the bones in a cloth (“Together they folded the fabric and knotted its ends”) also
evokes the Korean pojagi, a traditional Korean wrapping cloth made of fabric scraps used to carry and
transport items. Like the quilt, the pojagi has been used as a metaphor for storytelling and women’s work;
for example, Elaine H. Kim and Eui-young Yu employ the metaphor of the pojagi and emphasize its
importance as an art form made by ordinary women to introduce their collection of Korean American oral
histories, East to America: Korean American Life Stories (xviii).
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moment for Frank. If Frank’s trauma was most dramatically allegorized in his episodes of
color-blindness, the warmth and saturation of color in this scene demonstrates his, and
Cee’s, hard-fought wellness. He and Cee have buried a skeleton, but they are also
symbolically laying to rest the several ghosts that have haunted this novel: it was Cee’s
vision of her unborn baby that triggered this pilgrimage and ritual, along with Frank’s
reinterpretation of that vision as the child he killed in Korea. In this midst of the burial
ceremony, too, Cee sees the zoot-suited ghost who had dogged Frank on his journey
across the country. I argued earlier that the zoot-suited man and the man buried outside of
Lotus represent a pre-World War II mode of racism and racialization: white mob
violence, legal and extralegal police terror. The siblings’ visions of the baby girl, in
contrast, invoke a post-45 genealogy of racial violence: atrocities committed by
desegregated troops against racialized foreign populations in imperial wars, the
systematic sterilization of women of color and the exploitation of their labor. These
ghosts of the pre-45 and post-45 converge in Frank and Cee’s ritual. For Frank, the
temporary debilitation of color-blindness has ended; for the United States in the early
1950s, the career of color-blindness as policy and doctrine is just beginning. But in
Home, Morrison suggests that if color-blindness is a denial of the social, historical, and
cultural realities of race, then it cannot repair the damage done by past racisms. Literally
burying the skeleton of the past in color, Home refuses the terms of color-blindness. In its
stead, the novel makes the case for revaluing race-specific histories, communities, and
experience—or as Kimberlé Crenshaw might put it, for redistributing racial value.
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Chapter 4

“June, from the war”:
Rescuing the Refugee in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered

I. Introduction

About halfway through Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered, the main character
June, now an older woman living alone in New York, thinks back on the years when she
was still getting settled in the city. She had emigrated there from Korea as a war bride,
but soon found herself raising her son Nicholas as a single mother. She recalls a time in
his youth when, because he “kept asking about where she was from and what other
Korean people were like,” she would take him to eat at Korean restaurants in the ethnic
enclave of Palisades Park, a town in northern New Jersey near Fort Lee (238). They
would take a taxi there from Manhattan, and on the ride back home, “Nicholas would fall
asleep while half-holding his nose because of the sewer-smelling radish kimchee and
dried cuttlefish beside him” (238). These trips were not sentimental opportunities for
cultural connection or ethnic affirmation. Rather, at these dinners, June found that “her
own spirit would dampen and sour” and her son “would hardly say anything and would
pick at his quarter-eaten bowl of bibim bap,” and the groceries they brought home would
“mostly rot before [she got] around to preparing” them (238). On what would prove to be
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their final trip out to Palisades Park, Nicholas “asked if he could stay in the taxi while she
shopped and even ate”; when she asked him why, he replied, “Because you get so angry
when we’re there” (238). At this, June “instructed the [taxi] driver to take them back to
Morningside Heights,” where she made them peanut butter sandwiches for dinner instead
(238). Accepting the failure of these field trips, June decided that “whatever nostalgia she
was hoping to conjure for [Nicholas] had long been obliterated,” and that “there was
nothing she wished to latch on to” in these excursions (238).
June’s attempts to forge a connection to the Korean immigrant community are
unsuccessful, but this alienation from other Korean immigrants does not result from an
easy embrace of American assimilation. Rather, June, who was orphaned when her entire
family was killed in the Korean War, seems to want to connect with others who share her
background of violence and survival. She seems to value, for example, her relationship
with the young superintendent of her Manhattan apartment building, Habi, a survivor of
“tribal conflict” in the Congo (34). June gets to know Habi after her husband passes
away; he helps her carry groceries to her apartment and she sometimes invites him in for
tea. She asks him about old scars on his face and hands, and in response he “simply said
he was orphaned when he was young” and tells her it was a “very difficult period” (34).
He asks her in turn about the scars on her own hands – scars that she usually conceals
from others – and she tells him simply that they were burned in an accident, choosing not
to disclose the details of the “difficult period” in her own childhood. He “nodded
somberly, but without the cloying concern that others might proffer, and said nothing
more” (34). These exchanges seem to elicit a feeling of unspoken understanding, private
yet open, far removed from the pain and rage that mar June’s visits to Koreatown.
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Both the distance June feels from the larger Korean immigrant community and
her affinity with a refugee whom she perceives as sharing her background reflect the
unorthodox nature of June’s immigration story in The Surrendered. As a child, after her
entire immediate family is brutally killed during the Korean War, June grows up in an
orphanage run by American missionaries and is made available for adoption,
unsuccessfully, to families in the United States; some years later, she immigrates to the
United States as the wife of an American GI, Hector, in order to gain citizenship. June’s
hidden refugee past thus intimately ties her to two practices directly tied to the aftermath
of the war that hold exceptional status in U.S. immigration history: transnational adoption
and marriage between U.S. soldiers and foreign women.
It was not until the passage of the landmark Immigration Act of 1965 that racially
restrictive quotas on immigration from Asia were lifted, allowing for the first time for the
mass immigration that would lead to the settlement of immigrant enclaves like the one in
Palisades Park, New Jersey. The shape and character of these immigrant communities
were determined in part by the preferences named in both the 1965 Act and the 1952
McCarran-Walter Act that preceded it – preferences for immigrants with specialized
occupational skills and for those with familial ties to existing U.S. citizens. Together, the
McCarran-Walter Act and the Immigration Act of 1965 defined postwar American
immigration policy. In historian Mae Ngai’s assessment, they “ended the policy of
admitting immigrants according to a hierarchy of racial desirability and established the
principle of formal equality in immigration” (227). But in the decades before the 1965
Immigration Act made the heteronormative family the cornerstone of Asian American
immigration, special provisions were created for the “nonquota” immigration of Asian
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war brides of American soldiers and of Asian orphans adopted by American families. It
was thus the privileging of the family, in conjunction with the violence of war and
military occupation, that also expedited the immigration of women and children from
Asia throughout the 1950s and beyond, through the practices of transnational adoption
and GI marriages. But the adoptee and the war bride have been largely left out of
traditional accounts of Korean immigration. Indeed, as sociologist Grace Cho observes,
the war bride has been viewed as a “subject with a hidden or shameful history” (36).
In The Surrendered, June and her son Nicholas represent just one of the many
family units that cohere around the figures of the war bride and the war orphan. There is
June’s original family in Korea, torn apart by the war and killed off before her eyes one
by one until she is left utterly alone. There is the makeshift family that she comes to rely
on at the orphanage in the 1950s, with the American Reverend Tanner and his wife
Sylvie standing in as idealized parental figures for June and the other orphans; then, there
is the reality of the Tanners’ own marital discord, complete with cheating, lying, and drug
abuse hidden from the children. There are the Stolzes, the American couple – Lee’s
fictional version of the real-life Holts, the white couple from rural Oregon who laid the
foundation for transnational adoption from Korea in the 1950s – that wants to adopt an
entire brood of Korean children, including June, who shockingly refuses their offer. And
finally there is June own brief marriage to the GI, Hector, and the son that it produces, all
three estranged by the novel’s current moment of the 1980s. These unconventional
families define the contours of the novel’s fictional world and, together, trace a trajectory
for the Korean American war orphan and war bride over the second half of the twentieth
century.
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This chapter argues that The Surrendered’s depiction of the family formations
created by the adoptee and the war bride disrupts the standard narrative of Korean
American immigration. It examines how the newly transnational reach of both the
institution of marriage and the practice of adoption in the 1950s enabled the first wave of
postwar Korean immigrants, beginning a decade before the immigration reforms of 1965
that would place the heteronormative family at the idealized center of Asian American
immigration. At the same time, I show that the privileging of the heteronormative family
has facilitated the disappearance of the war orphan and the war bride, producing these
figures as unstable and illegible within our dominant understandings of both the
immigrant and the refugee. My aim in this chapter is thus to consider, following David
Eng, how the war bride and the transnational adoptee might be considered “proper
subject[s] of Asian America” (107). What kinds of different conclusions might we draw
about Asian American racialization and citizenship if we place these figures at the
forefront of our analyses? How do Lee’s representations of the practices surrounding
transnational adoption and GI marriages in The Surrendered intervene in the stories we
tell about immigration, the family, and post-1965 multiculturalism?
I begin the chapter with an overview of the crucial, and under-studied, place of
Korean war brides and adoptees in Asian American histories of immigration and
citizenship. In this opening section, I show that the family histories of war brides and
adoptees prefigure the privileging of the heteronormative family as the foundation of
Asian American immigration after 1965. Next, I turn to the novel’s depiction of June’s
childhood at an orphanage in Korea after the war, reading a series of scenes that show
how emerging institutions and codes of transnational adoption work together to produce
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the war orphan as a subject of U.S. intervention. In this way, I show, the novel disrupts
the given liberal story about adoption as a humanitarian practice, overturning the power
dynamic of need and rescue that characterizes humanitarian intervention. Finally, the
chapter turns to June’s attempt late in the novel to reunite her only extant family –
herself, Hector, and their son Nicholas – at the site of the birthplace of humanitarian
discourse itself, a chapel in Solferino, Italy. This rendering of the afterlife of the war
orphan/war bride and her fractured family in the United States across the decades
following the war marks the novel’s recognition of violence of the Korean War as the
condition of possibility for past and present modes of Asian American citizenship.

II. Producing the War Orphan and the War Bride

Between 1875, when the Page Law forbade the entry of Chinese women to the
United States, and 1945, when the War Brides Act permitted GIs stationed in Asia to
marry and bring their wives back to the United States, immigration from Asia was
dominated by single male workers. In the second half of the twentieth century, however,
Asian American immigration patterns underwent a decisive transformation. In the
postwar era, for the first time, immigration law was changed in such a way as to give
preference to women and children under the rubric of familial reunification. As
sociologist Yen Le Espiritu argues, prior to World War II, “America’s capitalist economy
wanted Asian male workers but not their families” (17), and thus immigration policies
“treated Asian male workers primarily as temporary, individual units of labor” (9). After
the initial repeal of Chinese exclusion in 1943, however, a 1946 act permitted Asian
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spouses and children of U.S. citizens to enter the country as nonquota immigrants, and
the War Brides Act of 1945 allowed GIs to marry and bring Asian wives, otherwise
racially ineligible for admission, to the United States. As these measures brought an
unprecedented number of Asian women and girls to the United States, Asian immigration
in the postwar period became “overwhelmingly female” (54).72 Historian Mae Ngai
views these reforms as particularly significant in that they “laid the basis for Asian family
immigration, which had been a near-impossibility under the exclusion laws” (233).
An additional piece of legislation that neither Espiritu nor Ngai addresses is the
1953 Refugee Relief Act, which issued orphan visas to Asian children, primarily girls,
being adopted by American families. As Catherine Ceniza Choy argues, these early
adoptees’ racialized integration into American families is also “part of the diversity of
family formations in Asian-American history: bachelor communities, picture brides,
military brides, transnational households, and post-1965 family reunification” (164). The
preference given to Korean orphans, who were newly being viewed by middle-class
white Americans as “potential family members,” as historian Arissa Oh puts it, allowed
adoptees to circumvent the racial and national origins quotas that would have otherwise
kept them from entering the United States: as Oh shows, 4,190 children from Korea
immigrated to the U.S. between 1955 and 1961, a number far greater than the annual
quota of 100 allotted to Koreans in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. Indeed, Oh argues
that American’s “acceptance of [adopted Korean children] as legitimate citizens (and
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Espiritu notes that the War Brides Act of 1945 was amended in 1947 to include veterans of Asian
ancestry, a change that allowed 6,000 Chinese American soldiers and veterans to marry women in China –
or reunite with their wives who had previously been barred from immigration – and bring them back to the
U.S. before the act expired at the end of 1949. Most Japanese, Korean, and Filipino brides, in contrast,
married non-Asian men. See Espiritu 54-55.
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potential citizens) helped to erode some of the anti-Asian racial thought behind the
national origins quota system” which would be dismantled in the 1965 Immigration Act
(37). She concludes that adopted Korean children “were instrumental to the larger
refiguring of Asianness that occurred in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s” (46).73
The development of institutions of transnational adoption in Korea rested upon
the figure of the “orphan” on the one hand and the ideal of the normative American
nuclear family on the other. As Eleana Kim argues, “legal norms, social conventions, and
cultural representations in the Euro-American West reinforce the idea that children who
are adopted are orphans in need of immediate rescue,” and orphans are often construed as
the “ultimate figure of global humanitarianism” (263). She explains that in adoption
procedures, “much bureaucratic and emotional labor is directed toward the severing of
networks and connections in order to produce an ‘eligible orphan,’ who is then free to be
exchanged and transformed through Euro-American models of kinship into someone’s
as-if genealogical child” (11). This severing of prior familial and social relations – often
characterized as the “clean break” needed to facilitate a “smooth” adoption – constitutes
the “[prerequisite] to rendering a child adoptable” both symbolically and legally (11). In
other words, before the adopted child could be transferred from the legal status of
“eligible orphan” to the more privileged category of “immediate relative,” as mandated in
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See Oh 36-41 for a detailed overview of the legislative changes that allowed Korean adoptees to enter the
United States in the postwar period, including the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which made 5,000 visas
available to children from Europe affected by World War II; the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, which she notes
was also originally intended to address problems in Europe; the Act of September 11, 1957, also known as
the Refugee-Escapee Act, which allowed entry for an unlimited number of “alien orphans” adopted by U.S.
citizens for two years; and the Act of September 26, 1961, which made nonquota visas permanently
available for foreign-born adopted children.
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1961 legislation governing the entry of adoptees, came the necessary process of making
the child into an orphan (Oh 41).
That nearly all children placed for inter-country adoption have had existing
parents and relatives in Korea, however, has not suspended widespread credence in the
narrative that adoption is a humanitarian practice that rescues “orphans.” During the
postwar period, the idea of placing needy Asian children under the care of white middleclass American families took hold in the developing Cold War rhetoric of U.S. global
dominance.74 Arissa Oh calls the ideology that supported these new feelings about Asian
orphans “Christian Americanism,” or “a fusion of Cold War patriotism and vaguely
Christian values” (35). According to Oh, the “constant narration and re-narration of the
journey from wretched Korean waif to beloved American son or daughter” positioned
adoption as a practice that “resonate[d] with Christian Americanist Cold War
imperatives” (36). Similarly, Eleana Kim suggests that during and just after the war,
Korean children functioned as what she calls “tranquilizing conventions,” helping
Americans to understand the war and “converting what might have been viewed as
postwar occupation into a humanitarian intervention” (76). Laura Briggs characterizes
this enduring narrative as the story of “children who will die without ‘us’ – middle-class
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The notion that Americans could adopt Korean war orphans as an act of humanitarian rescue had entered
popular consciousness before the Korean War. As Christina Klein discusses in Cold War Orientalism, the
symbolic adoption of needy war orphans became a popular practice, trope, and fundraising tool for
American missionaries working in Asia starting in the late 1930s. She argues that the rhetoric of “moral
adoption” represented the Cold War as a “sentimental project of family formation” that would allow
everyday Americans to feel connected to global politics (159). In this way, as she points out, transnational
adoption became a “story that Americans in the 1950s liked to tell themselves” in addition to a lived social
practice (174). Laura Briggs similarly argues that beginning in the 1930s, Americans “learned a way to feel
about foreign children” (158), mediated by images of suffering women and children. In her analysis, the
iconic image of the “Madonna and waif” became “part of the architecture of Cold War liberalism, which
constructed an overseas role for the United States that was at once compassionate and interventionist”
(135).
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white families in the United States – who need the home and emotional investment that
only ‘we’ can provide” (130).75 And as David Eng argues, in return for this care, the
adopted child must then “[help] to consolidate the affective boundaries of the white,
heteronormative middle-class nuclear family” (108).
Whereas the “orphan in need of rescue” provides an idealized figure for the
practice of transnational adoption, the figure of the “war bride” evokes a different set of
associations.76 As sociologist Grace Cho argues, the “yanggongju [Western princess],”
75

Such a narrative of rescue ignores that the practice of transnational adoption was largely brought about
due the lack of social welfare and legal protocols in a chaotic post-war South Korea. As Eleana Kim notes,
“Between 1951 and 1964, the number of abandoned children at orphanages increased from 715 to 11,319—
a remarkable figure that suggests, as Richard Weil notes, that the ‘presence of efficient foreign adoption
facilities encouraged the abandonment of children’ (1984: 282). It could well be argued that orphanages
(which were largely funded by Western relief organizations), and, later, state-subsidized adoption agencies,
functioned as a surrogate welfare system and a conduit for foreign exchange” (32). As Kim points out,
there were no laws or policies governing domestic, much less international, adoption in postwar Korea.
U.S. and European aid organizations thus moved into Korea in the midst of not just a humanitarian crisis
but a “legal and social policy vacuum”; for example, Holt International Children’s Services, founded in
1955, quickly developed a “vertically integrated system of orphanages, baby homes, medical services, and
adoption administration” that operated independently of Korea’s virtually nonexistent welfare system (74).
For this reason, one might argue that transnational adoption has harmed women and children in Korea as
much as it has “aided” them: as Kim puts it, the institutionalization of transnational adoption “not only
retarded the development of domestic adoption and child welfare policies, but also provided a quick-fix
solution that has been complicit in the social disenfranchisement of Korean women” (25). According to
Kim, social welfare in Korea today is in fact “largely based on the models provided by Western
humanitarian organizations after the war, and it was profoundly influenced by American social work
consultants who designed programs and trained women in the field” (56). Many scholars and activists
working on issues regarding transnational adoption in Korea have linked the ethical failures of the adoption
industry to the systemic lack of social and financial support for Korean unwed mothers and linked the
struggle for justice for adoptees to advocacy for unwed mothers and alternative family structures in Korea.
See for example the work of TRACK [Truth and Reconciliation for the Adoption Community of Korea], an
advocacy group for adoptees and unwed mothers in South Korea.
76
Of course, the figures of the war bride and the orphan are not unconnected: transnational adoption in
Korea began as a way to manage the problem of mixed-race children resulting from sexual encounters
between Korean women and American soldiers. These children, often abandoned by their families due to
the dual stigmas of illegitimacy and miscegenation, were among the first sent from China, Japan, and Korea
to the United States for adoption (Kim 51). Their adoptions were promoted by organizations such as the
Welcome House, founded by the writer Pearl S. Buck, who “[could not] bear to see Americans, or even
half-Americans, growing up ignorant and at the lowest level of Asian society … Do we, their fathers’
people, not owe them something?” (Briggs 152). Chang-Rae Lee’s 1999 novel A Gesture Life tells the story
in part of an older Asian American man who adopts a mixed-race Korean child. For a discussion of that
novel’s treatment of transnational adoption as well as a broader analysis of transracial adoption in the U.S.,
see Mark Jerng’s Claiming Others: Transracial Adoption and National Belonging. For discussions of
mixed-race adoptees, see essays by Choy and Oh (2005).
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the “woman who provides sexual labor for the U.S. military,” is “a figure built out of
layers of collective trauma” dating back to the earliest days of the U.S. military
occupation of Korea (4). The Korean War created the conditions for sexual encounters
between American soldiers and Korean women, encounters that Cho shows “were not
motivated simply by personal desire and romance,” but rather were “thoroughly
implicated in the power dynamics of U.S. military dominance, the material destruction of
war, and the whitewashing of violence through the narrativization of the United States’
role in Korea as benevolent” (13). Because the Korean war bride could be embraced as a
beloved “GI bride” only to the extent that her past as a “Yankee whore” was erased, she
argues, the story of the arrival and assimilation of the GI bride “makes sense only through
a willful forgetting of the everyday life of the [U.S. military] camptown and of the violent
and intimate history shared by Korea and the United States” (130). Indeed, immigration
to the United States through the institution of marriage has “[represented] an opportunity
for the Korean woman who is associated with military sex work to shed the stigmas of
the past by legitimizing her sexual labor” (14). Consequently, despite the fact that war
brides and the family members they later sponsored for immigration constitute “about
half” of all Koreans in the United States, Cho contends that their stories are often omitted
from accounts of Korean immigration and discourses about Korean Americans due to
unresolved wartime traumas as well as shame and secrecy surrounding sex work (23).
Like the adoptee, then, the war bride is a “pioneer of Korean migration” to the
United States (Cho 14). Yet each of their stories has been obscure within larger histories
and understandings of Korean American immigration, a lacuna reflected in the scholarly
discord over the very status of these figures. For example, Arissa Oh points out that
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Korean adoptees are absent in histories of refugee orphans as well as in histories of
refugee law and policy, a “historiographical disappearance” that she argues “reveals how
these Korean refugee orphans have been reimagined as little immigrants. Indeed, the fact
that Korean orphans are typically described—if they appear at all—as an early group of
immigrants in Asian American and immigration histories shows how thoroughly their
refugee roots have been erased from our historical imaginations” (35). But the adoptee
garners only rare mentions in canonical accounts of Asian American and immigration
history. David Eng observes that “the figure of the transnational adoptee has until very
recently been noticeably absent in diaspora and immigration studies, in Asian and area
studies, and in ethnic and queer studies” (94), and Catherine Ceniza Choy agrees that
Asian American historiography “has not incorporated the history of Asian international
adoption in the documentation and analysis of the Asian-American experience” (164).
The adoptee is thus paradoxically claimed as neither a refugee nor an immigrant.
Meanwhile, Grace Cho shows that the war bride does not appear in the sociological
literature on immigration, which generally classifies Koreans as part of the ethnically
diverse post-1965 wave of immigration, overlooking that the “main impetus” for
Koreans’ arrival came before 1965, namely in the war that “set migration in motion”
(12). For Cho, understanding the genealogy of the war bride must lead us to reconsider
the boundary between forced and voluntary migration: she urges us to view the war bride
as not just another immigrant, but a “displaced subject” of war (14). The war bride, too,
sits between the poles of immigrant and refugee.
How can we account for the multiple and overlapping erasures and silences that
have surrounded adoptees and war brides? In order to understand and address these
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archival erasures, I argue, we must critically examine the very structure into which these
figures and their contested histories have disappeared: the normative family. Of the
adoptee, David Eng writes, “The movement of the transnational adoptee from ‘over
there’ to ‘over here,’ and from public charge to private family, individuates her while
simultaneously working to encrypt colonial histories in the domestic space of intimate
family and kinship relations” (103). The war bride, Grace Cho writes, “operates as a
figure for the disappearance of geopolitical violence into the realm of the domestic” (14).
Whereas the immigrant family has been hyper-visible as the primary framework for
understanding post-1965 Asian America, the Asian diasporic family formations that
preceded and indeed prefigured this model, including marriages between American
soldiers and their Asian wives and adoptive American families and their Asian daughters
and sons, have been both invisible and incomprehensible according to our dominant
narratives of the immigrant and the refugee. As Cho insists, the happy story of the
immigrant – of “the Korean war bride who shows gratitude toward her hospitable new
family and country, who later brings the rest of her Korean family to the United States so
that they, too, can enjoy America’s gifts” – “can make sense only through exclusions”
(14, my emphasis). By dwelling in these exclusions, we can begin to apprehend a fuller
picture of Asian American immigration, racialization, and citizenship in the postwar
period.
As a novel whose protagonist is a Korean War orphan who eventually immigrates
to the United States as the war bride of a GI and ends up raising a mixed-race child as a
single mother, The Surrendered is clearly invested in bringing to light the subjugated
histories of war brides and adoptees within the larger story of U.S. participation in the
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Korean War. That June, who partially grows up in an orphanage, grows up to be a
Korean woman raising a child fathered by an absentee GI also marks a peculiar way in
which the novel’s plot comes full circle, given that transnational adoption is a practice
that has capitalized on the stigma attached to unwed mothers and interracial children.
Over the course of the novel, we see June travel from being an orphan, the supposed
beneficiary of the system of transnational adoption, to being a single mother, the category
most often dispossessed by that same system. In other words, over time, she cycles
through the various positions historically associated with Korean transnational adoptees
and war brides. In this way, The Surrendered unambiguously writes the adoptee and the
war bride into our narratives of Korean immigration. At the same time, in my reading, the
novel problematizes that simple gesture of inclusion, delineating the distance between
figures of war like the adoptee or the war bride and the conventionally understood figure
of the immigrant associated with post-1965 multiculturalism. If, as I stated above, the war
bride sits between the poles of refugee and immigrant, then how can we read June’s
disidentification with the category of immigrant and her later turn toward what could be
thought of as a refugee genealogy? This chapter turns next to this character’s trajectory in
The Surrendered.

III. Rescuing the Orphan in The Surrendered

From the beginning of The Surrendered, June presents herself as an
unconventional orphan. For example, several months after their arrival at the orphanage,
the American missionary Reverend Tanner and his wife Sylvie decide to have new
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photographs taken of all of the orphans to include in their adoption files. The existing
photos, in Tanner’s estimation, are “lugubrious, stern portraits, joyless and hard, and
didn’t show off a single one of the children well,” and he is confident that new, happier
photographs “would get them all placed” (156-157). Reverend Tanner and Sylvie find
that they need to coax the children into smiling for the photographs, with Tanner eliciting
their laughter by making funny faces and playing tricks behind the camera. But June, the
last child to be photographed, refuses to smile for her picture, “not even offering the
slightest smile, any break of the lips” (158). Despite the Tanners’ attempts to convince
her to “look happy and friendly for her file,” they “ended up taking the image of June that
any of them who cared to remember her might someday see in his mind, that iron gaze
that was hers alone” (158). June’s refusal to smile for the camera puts her at odds with
the logic that makes the humanitarian enterprise of the orphanage function smoothly. As
we have seen, her insistent singularity – “that iron gaze that was hers alone” – grates
against the logic of exchangeability that the open market of the orphanage demands.
Unwilling or unable to act the ideal orphan, June is marked as an unadoptable child.
As June’s story unfolds, however, we find that she does not think of herself as
unadoptable as such; she wants to be adopted, but only by Sylvie, to whom she cathects
almost immediately after arriving at the orphanage. She is not alone in this wish. It is
known to everyone at the orphanage that Reverend Tanner and Sylvie are planning to
eventually bring an unspecified number of children back to Seattle with them, and all of
the children want to be among those chosen. Hector, the former GI working as a
handyman at the orphanage, thinks he knows what draws the orphans to the kind and
charismatic Sylvie; in fact, he finds that even he is susceptible to the fantasy of a future
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with Sylvie, to the feeling that he “might like to be adopted away, too” (151). But what
June wants from Sylvie is not what “any orphan” wants. After secretly reading Sylvie’s
diary and learning that Sylvie herself is an orphan who lost her family in a war, June
comes to view her relationship with Sylvie as “not just [a bond] of mother and daughter
but that of comrades who by the curse of war had been sentenced to be alone” (326). She
imagines herself in the future – in their “resumed lives” once they leave the orphanage –
as “Sylvie’s secretary and housekeeper, her girl-in-waiting, her handmaiden, someone
she could use and count on at any moment of the day or night” (327).
In fact, the narrator explains, June has always been ill-equipped to act as a
properly needy orphan: rather than grooming herself to be chosen by a family that will
take care of her, she finds herself angling to figure out how take care of Sylvie and thus
to be needed in a different way. That is, she imagines not a mother-daughter relationship
of unconditional love between Sylvie and herself, but a relationship in which she
becomes indispensable to the Tanners by figuring out how to provide what they need.
After June reads Sylvie’s diary and finds out that she has been unable to bear children of
her own, she feels that she can
begin to understand what [the Tanners] were doing in Korea, certain there must be
reasons besides goodness and charity for them to have come to a place as awful as
this. They could not possibly be there only to give of themselves. They were
hoping for something, too, and in the tireless device of her mind she was figuring
how she could give them what they wished. It was finally within her power. (326)
Here, June perceives that the Tanners’ humanitarian mission is not a one-way gift, but a
two-way transaction, and she intends to use this knowledge to her benefit. She
152

understands that the Tanners’ choice to come to the “awful place” that is Korea to work
with orphans was never purely selfless. If she can mold herself to fill the gap they are
looking to fill, then she will win the prize of being taken back to America with Sylvie.
June’s inversion of the dynamic of need and care that characterizes the
humanitarian mission is one that Reverend Tanner cannot abide. In an argument with
Sylvie one evening after an incident with June, Tanner apologizes to Sylvie for “[losing]
control,” telling her that he “can’t stand [June’s] speaking to us like that” (163). When
Sylvie responds that June is “only a child” who “doesn’t know what she’s saying,” he
replies,
“Oh please, darling! She’s smart as a whip. Nothing is an accident with her. When
she said she would be sure to ‘take care’ of us it made me crazy. Her arrogance is
astounding.”
“But you couldn’t have been meaner,” she said to him, her voice low and hard.
“To tell her that we would never need her.” (163)
According to Tanner’s script – the standard script of transnational adoption – the
American missionary “takes care” of the Korean war orphan. When June attempts to flip
that script, he lashes out in anger and disbelief, giving utterance to the unspoken power
dynamic at the heart of every exchange between missionary and orphan: you need me, but
I will never need you. He is “astounded” by June’s calculation and manipulation, but he
cannot imagine that she is actually empowered to “take care” of him or his wife in any
real way.
Later in his argument with Sylvie about June, Tanner explains that part of why
they cannot adopt June is precisely her unmalleability. As he puts it, “The fact is, the girl
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has already grown up. She’s who she is now, through and through. She’s not going to
change” (164). Because he sees her as already fully formed, he believes her to be
impervious to all of the Tanners’ benevolence, unable or unwilling to be molded and thus
unfit to be one of his charges. When Sylvie protests that he doesn’t know “what she’s
been through” (“If you did you wouldn’t talk like this,” arguing that June’s particular
circumstances should be taken into account in judging her character, he answers,
“I don’t know what happened to her. That’s true. But I know plenty about some of
the others, as do you. None of them has a more profound story than any of the
rest. Not in sum, at least. They all have nothing, and we agreed that we would
start with them from this point on. It’s all we can do. There are thousands of
needy children in this country. Maybe tens of thousands. And we’re only helping
the orphans! We were warned by our colleagues, remember? What was their
saying? ‘So many pretty stones in the river, but you can’t pick them all up’? How
right they were—so many of them, right here with us. But you chose the stone
that’s razor sharp.” (165)
When Sylvie demurs in response, “She chose me,” Tanner accuses her of encouraging
June “over all the others,” and Sylvie ends the conversation by declaring, “No one else is
going to adopt her. They won’t and you know it” (165). Tanner sees all of the children at
the orphanage as interchangeable, by definition: they all have an equally profound story
of loss, and they all equally have nothing, and they are all equally worthy of care. But
June is different. Because she does not assent to her own interchangeability as an orphan,
she is less worthy of being, and ever less likely to be, adopted. In Tanner’s view, June’s
cathexis to Sylvie is inappropriate, deluded, and distracting, and it marks her as an
154

improper object for his benevolence. Sylvie and her husband agree that June is
unadoptable in her present state, but whereas Sylvie wants to give June the attention she
seeks because of her difference, Tanner is concerned only with rehabilitating June into a
better kind of orphan.
Later in the novel, however, Reverend Tanner realizes that there is something that
June can provide for him after all. He makes a special request of June, and it is only after
this exchange takes place that June’s behavior changes. In a one-on-one conversation,
Tanner asks June to keep Sylvie company and to let him know if she ever seems to be
“particularly unwell,” which June interprets as a request for her to report to the Reverend
about Sylvie’s illicit activities—namely, her drug abuse and her ongoing affair with
Hector (328). But before she fully agrees, June has a request of her own for Tanner. She
asks if he and Sylvie still want a family of their own, and he responds cagily that they are
“still thinking about that” (330). She replies, “There are so many children here … You
must meet so many children on your visits,” and he answers, “Yes, I do. So many. All
worthy and good. Really every last one of you” (330). Upon hearing these words, June
“took his implication whole; she went back to her chores with the conviction that
Reverend Tanner had made a bargain with her,” a bargain to adopt her if she did what he
asked (330). After this conversation, she follows and watches Hector and Sylvie during
their trysts as per the Reverend’s requests. But along with this, she “[begins] to practice
her new way”: in English class and Bible study, she “[surprises] him with a new
enthusiasm and the demeanor of a girl who was respectful and demure” (378). She
decides to “show him her restraint,” to show him that “she was a worthy girl at core,
exactly the kind of hard soul he must be here to save” (378). Her change in outlook
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represents not an awakening, but a “differing form of the same capacity for self-discipline
and self-direction she’d always possessed and counted on,” a capacity she was now
“applying…to self-reform,” a “jubilant feeling” (378). Tanner’s secret bargain with June
transforms her into an exemplary Korean orphan.
The terms of June’s transformation are perhaps starkest in a scene late in the
novel, when the Tanners announce that the children are to be photographed one more
time. At first, as in the earlier photography scene, June refuses to participate, “for there
was no reason for her to do so, she was already spoken for” – that is, already spoken for
by the Tanners – but she then decides she “ought to take every chance to better herself, as
much as stay in line” (384). But rather than being photographed, it turns out that the
children are to meet an American couple, Mr. and Mrs. Stolz of rural Oregon, who had
traveled to Korea in order to adopt up a group of orphans. When it is June’s turn to be
introduced to the Stolzes, a demure, well-behaved young woman is on display. Reverend
Tanner notes that she is “self-possessed and highly independent,” and when they ask her
whether she can speak English, she “answered that she spoke it well, surprising and
impressing them” (385). June explains that her father had been highly educated and
attended a top university in Japan – notably, the first time we ever hear June speak about
any member of her family to anyone at the orphanage – and elicits “approving nods”
from the Stolzes (385). The old June shows herself briefly when the Stolzes attempt to
take her photo and her “instinct [is] to put her hand over the lens,” but her newfound
discipline overcomes that unbecoming instinct (385). Far from the sullen orphan that “no
one else is going to adopt,” June shows herself to be intelligent, mature, attractive, and
friendly, and after this initial meeting, the Stolzes decide to adopt her. As a fourteen-year156

old, they reason, she will be old enough to help them with the five younger children they
will be bringing back to Oregon, and her excellent English skills will also make her a
useful translator.77
When the Stolzes come to June’s room to deliver the good news, however, they
encounter a different child. Mrs. Stolz envelops June in a hug, and Mr. Stolz declares,
“You have a family again” (388). Even before they speak, June is reduced to a “fallen
pile of child, sobbing and shaking,” in their eyes a sure sign of her joy and relief at finally
being chosen for adoption (387). Indeed, one of the only sentences June utters in their
encounter is, “Nobody chose me before,” to which Mrs. Stolz coos, “We’re all the more
fortunate, then!” and promises that June will “be safe and sound with us. You’ll always
have our love and support” (388). Mrs. Stolz is stunned and confused, then, when June
suddenly breaks out of her embrace, forcibly pushes her away, stomps on her husband’s
foot, and runs away.
What the Stolzes cannot understand is that even as they are announcing
themselves as June’s new family, her mind is fixated on her own existing familial ties.
Early in the novel, just before the death of her twin siblings, we see a younger June
asleep on the roof of a train car and dreaming that her mother and sister are still with her.
In her sleep, she “could still believe that all of them would eventually reunite,” since she
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In this scene, we see that June’s adoption is contingent on her domestic and intellectual labor – taking
care of the other children, translating and teaching English – as well as her affective labor, thus evoking
David Eng’s important work on transnational adoption and the affective labor of the adoptee. He writes:
“…the consumption of the transnational adoptee by parents in the global North completes the ideal of
newly emergent multicultural families as a supplement to capital precisely through the exploitation of the
child’s affective, rather than wage, labor. In other words, while Third World women from the global South
have traditionally been exploited for their wage labor in the manufacturing sector, their emotional labor and
care work in the domestic sphere, and now their reproductive labor as birth mothers, the exploitation of the
transnational adoptee is largely an emotional affair. She helps to consolidate the affective boundaries of the
white, heteronormative middle-class nuclear family” (108).
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never actually witnessed her mother’s and sister’s deaths or found their remains, nor did
she witness the deaths of her father and older brother (26). She holds out hope, “despite
the surety of her instinct,” that, for example, her older brother is “hiking north through
the hills with the Communists, beleaguered but alive” (26). This is the “waking picture in
her mind,” the picture of her own reunited family (26). Although we never see June talk
or even think about her family during her time at the orphanage, the Stolzes’ sudden
interest in adopting June seems to reawaken that picture of her family. Like the Stolzes,
her parents were “country people,” and when the Stolzes come to her room to tell her
they have chosen to adopt her, a “tide of longing unexpectedly washed over her” (387). It
is this longing for her dead father, mother, sisters, and brothers, not relief at being
matched up with a new family, that renders June “not mature or resolute or strong in the
least but a fallen pile of child, sobbing and shaking” (387). When the Stolzes try to
“choose” June, they cannot replace the “waking picture” of June’s family in her mind;
rather, they reanimate it.
June’s persistent attachment to her own family disrupts the normal process of
adoption. Her enduring cathexis to Sylvie poses a similar problem. As we know, June has
already “chosen” Sylvie as her family, and she fully believes that she will be imminently
returning to the U.S. with the Tanners. After meeting the Stolzes, June is hurt and
confused by Sylvie’s failure to let the Stolzes know that she is already, in her own words,
“spoken for” (385). She wonders, “Did [Sylvie] know what the old couple was here for?
… Was she hoping that someone like them would take her? Relieve her of this burden?”
(387). As we have just seen, when the Stolzes do come to take her away, June is
emotionally overwhelmed by the memory of her family, but it is Mrs. Stolz’s unwitting
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invocation of Sylvie that finally triggers June’s physical outburst. Just before this
incident, the Tanners had announced that they would be leaving soon, an announcement
that June greeted by preparing her things for departure. While taking stock of her
belongings, she takes special care with a butterfly-shaped tortoiseshell hair clasp that
Sylvie had given her as a gift. She liked to use the clip to “remind herself to keep her hair
and face and fingernails neat and clean, to be polite, even smiling and pretty, just as the
younger girls who had been adopted before had been polite and pretty, so eager to please”
(384). Here, we see June negotiating the reigning codes of adoptability at the orphanage.
Secure in the knowledge that “her time here was truly ending, that her life was about to
begin anew” (384), she disciplines herself into the kind of orphan who gets chosen for
adoption: pretty, polite, accommodating. The hair clip is a sign of this conscious decision
to change her behavior to align with what is expected of her. This transformation pays
immediate dividends: out of all of the children at the orphanage, June is the Stolzes’ first
choice. But at the end of their encounter in June’s room, as Mr. Stolz photographs his
wife hugging June, Mrs. Stolz compliments June on her hair clasp. She strokes June’s
hair and says, touching the clasp, “What a lovely thing…You know, it’s the first thing I
noticed when I saw you. I thought it made you look so beautiful and graceful” (389). For
June, this comment on the hair clip, a beloved gift from Sylvie, is the last straw. She
breaks away from Mrs. Stolz’s embrace, stomps on Mr. Stolz’s foot, and literally runs
away from the Stolzes as fast as she can. June’s brutal rejection of the Stolzes marks
another refusal by June to abide by the script of adoption. The adoptee is not allowed to
choose her adopter or to say no. June’s attempt to engineer her own adoption by the
Tanners and her rejection of the Stolzes marks the culmination of her unadoptability.
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After the Stolzes’ departure later that evening with six other children, June mulls
over what to tell Sylvie about what happened. She decides that if asked, she will explain
to her that
despite the woman’s kindness and the very fine life she described, June had
realized just in time that she was not meant to go with them. She would not be a
part of any other family again. In a different lifetime she would have her parents
back, her older brother and sister would be healthy, the twins happy and whole;
but in this one she had been paired up, she and Sylvie aligned like twins
themselves, if by one of them not quite acknowledged. (391)
Needless to say, for June, there has been no “clean break” to facilitate her smooth
adoption. She remembers her own family, and she has already chosen Sylvie as her new
family. But just as June reveals herself to be an unfit adoptee, Sylvie has come to realize
that she is, in the end, unfit to be an adoptive parent. Although she and Tanner have not
explicitly discussed the matter, she knows that they will be returning to the United States
alone. She had “always assumed that they would take four with them, or five, or ten, as
many as they could. But now they could return childless, which, she could now begin to
see…was a mercy for all” (405). The time Sylvie has invested at the orphanage has
transformed her understanding of mercy: she now believes that electing not to bring any
children to the United States is the merciful choice.
In the novel’s final scenes at the orphanage, we see a more mature June reflecting
on her fate and that of the other remaining children:
June watched the other children, and she thought how their numbers were
thinning… because of their character, or young age, or plain luck, and that those
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who remained would be only less fortunate, and grow older, simply settle ever
deeper into the fixed molds of their selves, the selves that had already been passed
over. (436)
This passage highlights the “passed over” subjectivity of the unadopted orphan, unlucky
but not unworthy. By the time it becomes clear that the Tanners will not be adopting any
children from the orphanage, June has settled into the idea of being passed over as well.
But even when the Stolzes announced that they wanted to adopt her, her first words were,
“Nobody chose me before.” Min, a young disabled boy who is one of the smallest
orphans at the orphanage, also remains among the orphans yet to be adopted at this
point.78 From his point of view, the case for each of them is clear: he tells June that he
knows that there is little chance of his being adopted—“not when there are so many
others with nothing wrong with them” (439). When June responds, “There’s nothing
wrong with me,” he counters, “You can say it ten thousand times over, but it’s not going
to make it true. You’re the way you are. Everybody knows it. The way you’ll always be.
You’re trouble, just like me” (439). He recognizes that from the perspectives of the
orphanage and prospective adoptive families, there is too much “wrong” with each of
them, physically or otherwise, for them to be desirable as adoptees.
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Ironically, Min’s disability occurred at the hands of his caretakers at the orphanage in an accident early in
the novel, and it is precisely this disability that renders him unadoptable. His story thus serves as a parable
of humanitarianism’s dynamic of rescue and harm: as Laura Briggs puts it, this dynamic entails a belief in
the idea that “only US intervention could solve the problems that US intervention had wrought” (“Mother”
187). The irreversible harm that Min suffers at the hands of his intended protectors leaves him in a
permanent state of dependency. The injury that the orphanage causes him is material, marked on his
physical person in his missing toes and the associated limp that will dog him for the rest of his life. But,
Lee’s novel suggests, the orphanage inflicts less visible but no less damaging forms of harm on the other
children as well as their caretakers.
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The night of this conversation, June and Min of them sneak out of their bunks to
sleep in the orphanage’s chapel, where they light a fire in the stove to keep warm. Min
brings the footlocker containing his belongings to the stove and begins to throw things in.
June follows suit, until she has burned up everything she owns save for a special book
that Sylvie gave her. She offers it to Min, who replies that he doesn’t want it. After some
hesitation, she asks Min to put the book in the stove, then immediately regrets it and
fishes it out with her bare hands, badly burning the skin on her hands and arms. As they
throw a large kerosene lamp into the stove, they huddle together, and June says to him,
“We don’t need anyone …We’re going to stay here now” (444). The lamp in the stove
creates an explosion and a conflagration that consumes the chapel. The Reverend, Sylvie,
and Hector all run into the chapel to save June and Min; June drags Hector out of the
wreckage as the walls cave in. They are the only two to emerge from the fire.
In this final scene at the orphanage, although June and Min may have been
“passed over” for adoption for the flaws they cannot change or correct, they prove that
they can enact their own rejection of the orphanage by literally destroying it. Affirming
that they do not “need anyone” or “want anything,” they first burn up the things that have
been donated to them at the orphanage, then burn down the chapel that the Tanners and
Hector worked so hard to erect in order to better carry out the orphanage’s mission, and
finally attempt to annihilate themselves in the fire. In a final reversal of the script of
humanitarian intervention, it is June, the orphan girl, who rescues Hector, the GI who
initially found her starving on the side of a road and brought her to the orphanage. In this
way, the novel completes the series of inversions that characterizes June’s tenure as an
orphan: she takes care of the caretakers, refuses their gifts, rejects her prospective
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adoptive family, and ultimately burns down the institution responsible for saving her life,
all apparently without regrets. Having sabotaged her future as an adoptee, June must find
another path. In the concluding section of this chapter, I turn to June’s unexpected choice
to resurrect a narrative of humanitarianism at the end of her life, as she dwells upon the
conditions that have produced her as a figure of war.

IV. “This is our place”: Relocating the Refugee

After June immigrates to the United States under circumstances not detailed in the
novel – all we learn is that she marries Hector in order to gain legal status, and that he
fathers a child with her before they separate and lose touch for decades – she finds a way
to make a life for herself and her son in New York. She eventually remarries an
American man and sells antiques at a store she owns in Manhattan, earning a good living;
as I noted in the opening of the chapter, she maintains a deliberate distance from the
Korean American immigrant communities in the New York area. But, in a dramatic
gesture appropriately epic given the scale of this novel, when she is diagnosed with
cancer after the death of her husband, June hires a private detective to locate Hector for
her so she can enlist him in a search of their now-adult son Nicholas, who has
disappeared somewhere in Europe. As it happens, June’s private investigator finds that
Hector is living and working in the growing Korean immigrant enclave of Fort Lee, New
Jersey, just across the river from upper Manhattan. Hector works as a janitor in a rundown Korean mall for a Korean entrepreneur named Jung, whom Hector finds to be “the
most slothful of their kind, a man who was, literally, born in a roadside ditch during the
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war but didn’t remotely know or care a thing about it now” (102). That Hector has taken
a menial job working at a modest Korean mall marks an irony not just of world history,
as he notes, but of his own personal history too: thirty years before, Hector had stayed in
Korea to work as a janitor and handyman at an orphanage run by American missionaries.
Now, in New Jersey, he is cleaning up after the next generation of Koreans. His former
status as a liberator has been reduced to a simple epithet—“GI,” “Joe,” or “Rambo.” The
Korean Americans who populate New Jersey in the 1980s are, for the most part, recent
immigrants like Hector’s boss, largely unconcerned with a war they cannot remember.
But Hector connects the dots: even if Jung doesn’t “care a thing” about the war, Hector
knows that the Korean immigrants of Fort Lee have ended up in the United States in large
part because of the war that he helped to fight.
But it is not so odd that Hector, the working-class white veteran from upstate New
York, has chosen to settle in the Korean immigrant community in northern New Jersey.
Like many GIs and veterans, he is himself an erstwhile member of an Asian American
family, after a fashion, through his short-lived marriage to June. But June does not share
his bemused take on the war’s disappearance from the American cultural memory. In
fact, when the private investigator she has hired locates Hector, she instructs him to
identify her as “June, from the war” (81). Hector’s response – “June, from the war. As if
he could forget from where” (81) – indicates that June’s name and memory for Hector are
in themselves so evocative of the war that no such identifier is necessary. Indeed, June’s
very name indexes the war itself: June is the month when the war began in 1950, and
June 25, the date when the war began, is often used metonymically by Koreans to refer to
the war itself. It is clear that “June, from the war” has no desire to efface her roots.
164

In fact, it is a relic of her refugee roots that sends June and Hector on their voyage
to Europe to find their son Nicholas. June suspects that he has gone to Solferino, a town
in Italy that has a special significance to her. In their quest to find Nicholas, June and
Hector travel to Solferino, this historic site of the Battle of Solferino, the decisive final
battle in the Second Italian War of Independence in which allied French and Italian forces
defeated the Austrians, contributing to the eventual unification of Italy. The tale of that
battle is told in a book in June’s possession, A Memory of Solferino by J.H. Dunant.
Filled with horrific descriptions of the wounded and dying on the battlefield, A Memory
of Solferino offers, according to the narrator, an “account of the aftermath of a battle
between two immense armies totaling 300,000 men, fought on the 24th of June, 1859, one
army comprising the allies of France and the other the allies of Austria,” written from the
viewpoint of Dunant, a “a young French-Swiss banker who was traveling in northern
Italy” when he happened upon the bloody battle (140). For Hector, who reads the book
while working at the orphanage after the war, these descriptions “[match] any number of
his memories from the war” (141), memories he’s “dying to forget” (143). For Sylvie
Tanner, the descriptions of the wounded also serve as a reminder of past violence she has
witnessed. Inscribed “To our steadfast daughter. May you be an angel of mercy,” the
book was initially a gift to Sylvie from her late parents, missionaries in Manchuria who
were killed before her eyes by Japanese imperial soldiers (249). For the young June, the
book constitutes a memento of her intense attachment to Sylvie during and after her stay
at the orphanage. Stealing the book from Sylvie before leaving the orphanage, June reinscribes it decades later for her son – “To Nicholas, my dearest wayfarer. May you find
great treasure and riches” – who in turn steals it from her when he leaves home as a
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teenager (450). By the novel’s end, the tattered, charred book has survived a fire, passed
from Sylvie in Manchuria to June in Korea to Nicholas in New York and Italy, and
finally become a guidebook of sorts for June as she and Hector search for her estranged
son in the town of Solferino itself.
June first discovers A Memory of Solferino in her early days at the orphanage.
When Sylvie assigns June the coveted task of cleaning the Tanners’ cottage, June notices
A Memory of Solferino on Sylvie’s nightstand. Other books come and go, but that one –
“the only book, besides the Bible and a hymnal, they had brought with them from the
States” – always remains, piquing her curiosity (247). June asks Sylvie to read it aloud to
her, but Sylvie refuses, telling her that the book is “not like poetry, or a children’s story,
something to be enjoyed; it was an account of war, and she said that June didn’t need to
read about it” (247). But June observes how Sylvie handles the book “with indeed a kind
of enjoyment, a certain somber savoring,” and eventually steals it to read on her own
(247). Because she is only just learning to read English, she must struggle through the
text, particularly the sections that give dry historical background. But once the narrative
of the battle begins, she becomes engrossed. She lingers especially on the discussions of
the “unspeakable fate of the wounded” that haunted the author, who was distressed at
“their privation and ‘perfect torture’ because of the grave lack of food and water and
medical supplies, most of the caretakers being laypersons like himself or the local
townsfolk, all willing to aid the survivors but frightfully incapable of doing so” (248).
She reads about how “[all] the churches in the area surrounding the town called Solferino
were filled with miserable soldiers, the air of their sanctuaries fouled with the stench of
the dead and dying” (248).
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Even after she is forced to return the book to Sylvie, who notices its
disappearance after a few days, June continues to read the book to herself whenever
possible. As she reads, June
couldn’t help but imagine that it was Sylvie Tanner who was the witness and
author of the book, as if she had seen with her own eyes the fierce fighting and
wretched wounded in the churches, had toiled to alleviate the suffering without
the aid of medicines or clean bandages or food. (249)
This is perhaps the most explicit parallel that Lee draws between the suffering depicted in
A Memory of Solferino and the situation of the survivors of warfare in his own book.
Sylvie, of course, does toil to alleviate the suffering of the dozens of war orphans under
her care; she has witnessed fierce fighting, and she cares for the wretched wounded in the
church she and her husband build for that very purpose. In this way, she clearly sees
herself as extending the humanitarian mission that Dunant calls for in his book. For June,
gaining an understanding of Solferino as a historical background only augments her view
of Sylvie as a heroine and savior, the steadfast “angel of mercy” that Sylvie’s parents
entreat her to be in the book’s inscription.
Months later, in the chaotic period when the Tanners are preparing to leave Korea
for the States, Hector sardonically addresses the question of Sylvie’s benevolence during
a fight:
“You’ve taken pity on all of us, haven’t you? … Before you came this place was
no better or worse than any other orphanage in this damned country. Which was
just fine for the kids and the aunties, and even for me. There’s enough food and a
roof and no more killing, and so what else is there to want?” (415)
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Here, Hector lambasts the limits of her magnanimity: beyond food, shelter, and safety
from physical harm, he implies, lies more. Her “pity” may have materially improved the
lives of her charges, but it has had unintended emotional consequences as well. When
Sylvie helplessly responds that she “[wants] to take every one of them” (416), Hector
unexpectedly brings A Memory of Solferino into the picture:
“Then take them!” he said … “Did you think you could come and go so easily? Is
this what happens in that precious book of yours? I want to know. I thought it was
about showing mercy to the helpless, to the innocent. But I think that book of
yours is worthless. In fact, it’s worse than that. It’s a lie. It’s changed nothing and
never will.” (416)
In the hundred years since the Battle of Solferino, he continues, “How many people got
slaughtered…? Got ground up to nothing? How many went up in smoke?” (416). For
Hector, the problem is not just the failure of a lofty humanitarian ideal, but Sylvie’s
fixation with and perpetuation of the lie of that ideal in the present. Comparing the book’s
account of the Battle of Solferino to his experiences in Korea and the wars that have
taken place in between the two, he finds that the humanitarian ideals that were first
enunciated after Solferino have not relieved the pain he sees and feels a hundred years
later in Korea. The distance between the originary moment for humanitarian aid in 19th
century Solferino and Sylvie’s impossible attempts to reenact that moment in 20th century
Korea collapses in face of the failure of both to achieve their supposed goals.
A Memory of Solferino is a meaningful text not just in these characters’ lives, but
also for the construction of the novel as a whole. What remains occluded in the
circulation of this book across the decades and continents that span Lee’s novel is
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precisely the world-historical significance of both the battle and the book in question. We
don’t learn of the similarities between the historical contexts of the Battle of Solferino
and the Korean War, both nationalist struggles for unification fought in the shadow of
encroaching imperial neighbors. Nor do we ever explicitly learn that Dunant’s proposals
in A Memory for the creation of a neutral organization to protect and assist the wounded
in war and the institution of an international principle to serve as the basis for such a
voluntary relief corps would lead to the founding of, respectively, the International Red
Cross and the Geneva Conventions.79 (Dunant’s two crucial questions that lead to the
founding of the Red Cross and the creation of the Geneva Conventions are as follows:
first, whether it would be possible “to form relief societies for the purpose of having care
given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted, and thoroughly qualified
volunteers” and second, whether military authorities could formulate “some international
principle, sanctioned by a convention and inviolate in character, which, once agreed upon
and ratified, might constitute the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded in the
different European countries” (“From the battle”).) In other words, while the novel
dramatically stages the significance of the book for Sylvie, Hector, June, and Nicholas’
personal lives and relationships, its historical importance for the form of modern warfare
itself – and for our conceptions of national sovereignty and the universal human subject –
is obscured. Despite his inclusion of such a historically and politically overdetermined
text in his novel, Lee resists any reading of A Memory of Solferino that would explicitly
draw out its historical or political threads in relation to his own narrative. Rather, he
79

See the documents “Solferino and the International Committee of the Red Cross” and “From the Battle of
Solferino to the eve of the First World War,” both available on the website of the International Committee
of the Red Cross.
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emphasizes the circulation of A Memory of Solferino as a privileged object invested with
intense affective meanings and histories.
Lee’s embedding of A Memory of Solferino within his novel invites a kind of
comparative eye across several axes, for example, Europe and Asia, past and present,
soldier and civilian. By centrally locating a past European narrative of war and survival
inside his own story of the Korean War, Lee could be said to participate in a pattern that
Rey Chow has named “Europe and Its Others,” a hierarchical form of comparison in
which the outcome of comparison is always predetermined to privilege European
thinking and writing over their non-European counterparts. According to this logic, she
argues, the rationale for comparison “hinges on the conjunction and,” which “signals a
form of supplementation that authorizes the first term, Europe, as the grid of reference, to
which may be added others in a subsequent and subordinate fashion” (77). Because of
this subordinated status, non-European histories, cultures, and languages are doomed to
“remain, by default, undifferentiated – and thus never genuinely on a par with Europe –
within an ostensibly comparative framework” (77). Lee’s novel does engage in a form of
asymmetrical comparison between Europe and Asia. but in my view, he reverses the
terms of Chow’s framework. For Lee, the Korean War and its aftermath are the main
story; the story of Solferino remains an obscure, though weighty, referent. The details of
the historical context of Solferino remain hazy, and to the extent that Lee makes the
Battle of Solferino a predecessor to and interlocuter for the Korean War, he does so to
point out its failures. In this case, it is Korea that is the first term, the grid of reference
that subordinates and gives meaning to Solferino. At the same time, Dunant’s naming of
specifically European countries in his vision of an “international principle” of
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humanitarian aid in A Memory raises the question of the true universality of the
conception of human lives in need of protection that his book enshrines. If the vision for
these “international” institutions in their inception was limited to Europe – and, by
extension, to white bodies – then what happened when that vision was forced to
accommodate nations beyond Europe? How would his humanitarianism account for the
suffering of non-European peoples of color in war, as in the Korean War?
The Surrendered largely stands as a document of the failure of the modern regime
of humanitarianism inaugurated by Dunant’s Solferino in the context of the Korean War
and other episodes of state violence that surrounded it. It also retells the story of the
Korean failure to achieve national unification in the face of the geopolitical interests of its
(neo)imperial protectors, rivals fighting the first “hot war” of the Cold War across the
landscape of the peninsula at the cost of millions of lives. To the extent that Lee makes
the Battle of Solferino a predecessor to and interlocuter for the Korean War, he does so to
point out the utter failures of both to achieve a humanitarianism that succeeds in helping
those in need. At the same time, by making Solferino the ending place both for June and
for the reader of the novel, The Surrendered enacts a return of the violence of the Korean
War to the grounds of Solferino, at once paying homage to and indicting the mission
which it birthed.
At the end of the novel, Hector and June stand inside la chiesa dell’ossario in
Solferino, the chapel of bones consecrated in 1870 as a reliquary of the fallen soldiers of
the Battle of Solferino, gazing upon the “grinning, grimacing dead” (468). At this point,
June, afflicted with stomach cancer, is on the verge of death. After they enter the chapel,
June, her vision faltering, says to Hector, “‘It must be beautiful. Is it beautiful?’” In
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response, Hector whispers, “It is beautiful … This is our place” (469). All the drama of
the novel, it seems, has finally culminated in bringing them – the war orphan and the
savior GI, the war bride and the American husband, the rescuer and the rescued – here
together. By figuring the resting place for the fallen soldiers of Solferino as the place
where Hector and June both belong – our place – Lee brings the disparate remnants of
Cold War violence to Solferino. If the Cold War entailed an outsourcing of violence to
the grounds of Asia, then Lee’s novel plots a return of the suffering that resulted from
that violence to the 19th century European source of the Geneva Conventions, the Red
Cross, and the ideal of humanitarianism in wartime. But, as Hector protested decades
before, it’s changed nothing: the survivors of Korean War violence belong there in the
chapel alongside the bones of the war dead of the Battle of Solferino. One might read
Hector and June – and the novel – as bearing witness in Solferino to the continuing need
to alleviate the suffering of victims of war, to bring Dunant’s ideals to fruition even
today. But I believe the novel instead asks us to read Hector and June as dwelling in the
failures of humanitarianism in the Korean War and its aftermath. As a child, June burned
down the institution whose humanitarian mission could never have saved her. Now, on
her deathbed, she stands in another humanitarian chapel, bearing witness with the former
GI who proclaims, “This is our place.”
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